On March 20, the Indonesian parliament – Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR)– passed a contentious revision to its military law allowing active military officers to occupy more civilian government posts without resigning from the armed forces. The Prabowo-led coalition championed and unanimously passed Law No. 34/2004, leading to widespread protests. Across major cities, including Jakarta, demonstrators have clashed with riot police, torn down parliamentary fences, and faced water cannons. Pro-democracy activists and human rights groups warn that the law threatens Indonesia’s post-1998 democratic reforms, reviving fears of military dominance reminiscent of the authoritarian Suharto era (1967–1998). Expanding military influence in civilian affairsThe revised Indonesian Military or Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) law aims to significantly expand the role of the armed forces in the country’s governance through three key provisions. First, the number of institutions active TNI officers can join has increased from 10 to 14. Active military personnel can now hold positions in institutions such as the Attorney General’s Office, Supreme Court, Coordinating Ministry for Political and Security Affairs, and counterterrorism and narcotics agencies. Previously, such roles required officers to retire or resign from service. This is seen to be the most problematic measure of this law as it revives “dwifungsi” or dual-function doctrine of Suharto’s New Order regime, where military officers held key government positions, allowing them to control governance and suppress opposition. This practice was abolished under the 1998 reforms. The second provision is extending the retirement age for military personnel. The new law allows enlisted and non-commissioned officers to serve until 55 years, and junior and senior commissioned officers until 58. The highest-ranking four-star generals can serve until they are 63, with a possible extension to 65, subject to a presidential decree. The third provision is the addition of two tasks under the aegis of Operasi Militer Selain Perang (OMSP) in English – Military Operations Other Than War. These include military assistance in dealing with cyber defense threats and securing the interests of Indonesian citizens and national interests abroad. These provisions inadvertently allow President Prabowo Subianto broader powers to appoint military personnel to government roles. As an ex-military man, Prabowo understands the military as a well-trained group that will obey and implement. This is already witnessed in his roping of the military into implementing his popular flagship programme of distributing free nutritious meals. A report suggests around 200 officers have been tasked with undertaking two-week business management and finance courses to be deployed to state-owned enterprises. Indonesian defence minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin defended the reforms as necessary to address modern security threats, including geopolitical tensions and non-traditional challenges like cyber warfare. Proponents argue that military expertise will enhance efficiency in sectors like counterterrorism and food security while also playing an essential role in national stability and unity, particularly in a nation characterised by diverse ethnic and religious composition. Opponents argue that the law blurs the line between civilian and military governance, risking resource inefficiency and unfair competition. For example, experts warn that military involvement in projects like free meal programmes or food estates could marginalise small businesses and farmers. Human rights groups also fear diminished accountability, as military personnel in judicial or law enforcement roles could shield colleagues from prosecution for past abuses.A return to Suharto’s New Order? The law’s passage has reignited debates about democratic backsliding and the military’s resurgence in politics – a hallmark of Suharto’s authoritarian regime. Under Suharto’s New Order, the military (dwifungsi, or dual function) held reserved parliamentary seats and dominated key government agencies, enabling systemic human rights violations and corruption. The echoes of this dark chapter in Indonesian history resonate deeply with many citizens, leading to fears that the current law’s provisions – such as embedding officers in civilian institutions – mirror this framework, raising concerns about a regression to militarised governance.It is important to note that dwifungsi has already been in some practice in the country’s system. This amendment dates back to former President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s tenure, when approximately 2,500 serving military officers worked in civilian institutions within and outside the scope of TNI law. Jokowi introduced the Bill during his government, which Subinato has now rushed. Even before the new amendment, Prabowo had already given some civilian posts to active military officers, such as the appointment of the army’s Major General Novi Helmy Prasetya as the new head of the State Logistics Agency, Lieutenant General Nugroho Sulistyo Budi as head of the National Cyber and Crypto Agency and his choice of cabinet secretary, Lieutenant Colonel Teddy Indra Wijaya, who has been a loyal aide to Prabowo since 2019.Added to this is Prabowo’s controversial legacy as a former Suharto-era special forces commander accused of human rights abuses during the 1998 pro-democracy protests. He has long faced scrutiny over his authoritarian leanings, resulting in a ban from entering the United States lifted after he became the defence minister in 2020. His authoritarian past and image have been worked upon, especially in the run-up to last year’s presidential elections, where he gained immense popularity amongst young voters through his carefully curated ‘cuddly grandpa’ image and a “gemoy,” a moniker for all things cuddly and adorable.Indonesian law minister Supratman Andi Agtas dismissed comparisons to the New Order, stating that the revisions did not signify a return to the military’s past dual-function doctrine, and that all military appointments would remain strictly related to national defence and security. However, critics highlight that the law lacks safeguards to prevent abuse, such as term limits for military appointees or independent oversight mechanisms. Protests led by students and civil society groups have erupted nationwide, with slogans like “reject militarism” and “back to the barracks” reflecting distrust in the military’s expanding role. Violent clashes – including burning tires, petrol bomb throws, and police crackdowns – underscore the depth of public opposition. The revised TNI law marks another critical juncture for Indonesia’s democracy. While the government frames it as a modernisation effort, the lack of transparency in its rushed approval and the absence of civilian oversight mechanisms suggest a more profound politicisation of the military. While it might be premature to announce the return of Suharto’s New Order, the fear of the Indonesians is not entirely misplaced. The current wave of protests coincided with the holy month of Ramadan. Post-Ramadan, the demonstrations is likely to get louder and broader, but given the bipartisan political support for the amendment, not much change can be expected. But nothing can be a certainty in politics, especially in Indonesia. Recently, in August 2024, two months before the end of Jokowi’s and the beginning of Prabowo’s tenure, Indonesia witnessed widespread protests in reaction to a plan to change the country’s electoral rules. Jokowi was accused of trying to establish a political dynasty through these rule changes. But these protests put a halt to electoral law changes, for now. Thus, the outcome of these protests and the government’s response will be a guesswork for now. However, the outcome will set the tone for Indonesia’s political trajectory, especially under Prabowo Subianto. Ashutosh Nagda is a foreign policy and political analyst based in Berlin. He is a former German Chancellor Fellow (2023-24) and is currently working on an election observation project for the German Federal Elections 2025. He tweets at @nagdashutosh
