The Myanmar military junta’s substantial loss of over 300 military bases and crucial urban centres since the initiation of the ‘Operation 1027′ initiated by the Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armies in northern Shan state, has been a pivotal indicator of its declining authority. The junta’s loss of authority over key areas and the major advancements made by the Chin National Front/Army or CNF/A in taking seven towns in Chin State make it necessary for New Delhi to rethink its approach towards Myanmar. It has been long overdue for India to seriously explore engaging with the Chin resistance, underscoring the wane of Naypyidaw’s power. Territorial expansionThe recent capture by the CNF/A and its allies of strategic towns such as Rihkhawdar, Lailenpi, Rezua, and the newly-acquired Bungzung in Chin State, strategically positioned at the tri-junction Sagaing-Magwe-Chin routes, has significantly impacted the Indo-Myanmar border trade routes and the connectivity between people.Furthermore, the capture of Khampat, a strategic border town with India, has significant implications for India-Myanmar border trade. The town is located on the Asian Highway in Tamu District, close to the boundary of Sagaing Region and Chin State. The spokesperson of CNF/A Salai Htet Ni vows to control about 70% of Chin State since last year. The recent seizure of towns extending the CNF’s territorial control as well as its political leverage. Representative image of Theizang in the Chin State, Myanmar. Photo: (CC BY 2.0 DEED)Diplomatic engagements and expressions of gratitudeRecently, the 20th round of India-Myanmar Foreign Office Consultations was held in New Delhi with Deputy Foreign Minister U Lwin Oo and Foreign Secretary Shri Vinay Kwatra in attendance. The discussions encompassed a wide range of issues, including the border situation, security, connectivity, status of bilateral development projects in Myanmar, and concerns related to transnational crimes. India has reaffirmed its backing for Myanmar’s journey toward a federal democracy. This shows India’s significant concern about the junta’s inability to manage the border. India’s stance towards the military junta emphasises a call for the reinstatement of a federal democratic system, serving as a warning to the junta regarding its declining authority.Chairman (3) of the Chin National Front, Dr. Sui Khar. Photo: Video screengrab.There seems to be growing interactions between the CNF/A and New Delhi, potentially indicating a shift in alliances or understanding. In an interview the Chairman (3) of the Chin National Front, Dr. Sui Khar, expressed sincere gratitude to the Indian government for its efforts in aiding displaced people who sought refuge in Mizoram. Dr. Sui Khar emphasised India’s opportunity to shape its relationship with neighboring countries. He also highlighted the crucial assistance provided by the Mizo people, despite their resource limitations, in offering access to health and education for Chin IDPs and refugees. Amid the Manipur issue and the election campaign, the CNF unveiled their stance for neighbouring countries in July 2023, notifying its citizens to refrain from engaging in illicit activities, such as the smuggling of illegal drugs, and to stay out of domestic politics, which is a serious problem for India. These public statements underscore the CNF’s aim to foster a positive relationship with its neighbour, possibly due to the establishment of a new governing body for the Chin by the CNF. The formation of new government body Another issue that may cause New Delhi to reconsider its strategy is the establishment of a parallel government in Chin State. From December 4-7, 2023, the Chinland Council conference convened with 235 delegates from CNF, township and area-based administration organisations, 2020 elected Members of Parliament (MPs), and several individuals from different Chin stakeholders in Chinlung City, a newly established town post the coup and the conference ratified the Chinland Constitution Many observers appear to have been misled when the conference decided to rename ‘Chin State’ as ‘Chinland,’ raising concerns over whether it will opt for independence. The constitution explicitly calls for the establishment of a federal union which enshrines full self-determination, equal political rights, and national rights for the Chin. Notably, the Chinland Council seeks self-determination and sovereignty over its area rather than declaring itself to be an independent state. Per meeting minutes, the Chinland Council has a mandate to set up the Chinland government, which consists of a parliament, cabinet, and supreme court, within 60 days. As the constitution stipulates, the Chinland Council has a mandate to oversee the effective operation of these fundamental institutions and the current CNF chairman, Pu Zing Cung, will chair the Council for two years. The constitution will serve as the first ever Chin State constitution enacted by the Chin for the Chin The establishment of the Chinland Council meanwhile abolishes the Chinland Joint Defense Committee (CJDC), a coalition of pro-democracy armed groups formed after the coup. From loosely collaboration previously, Chin State is expected to see a stronger command-and-control system under the new defense ministry. Political implicationsWith the formation of the Chinland Council, I expect to see formulating a well-coordinated and comprehensive policy toward alliances and international relations under the new government. This approach should include determining how to collaborate or adopt a parallel approach in working alongside the National Unity Government. Now, having approximately 60,000 of internally displaced peoples (IDPs) as a result of the militarisation and cyclone mocha, cross-border aid could be something the international community should engage with the Council through the Indian Govt. The recent political development in Chin State draws India attention, to address its interests in border security, counterbalancing China’s influence, and effectively managing its major business ventures in Myanmar. Of particular concern are connectivity projects like India’s Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport and the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway project, which are set to traverse Chin State. Chin-Mizo Relations Amid Border Issues The recent Mizoram state’s election has marked another milestone for Indo-Myanmar relations. Though we do not expect to see a different Mizo State’s refugee policy under the new Zoram People Movement (ZPM) party, the newly appointed Chief Minister of Mizoram, Lalduhoma, keen to maintain a good relationship with the Chin. He publicly supports the reunification of Zo communities (Chin-Kuki-Mizo) and expresses solidarity with the Chin people in Myanmar and Kuki in Manipur state, emphasising their interconnectedness. This robust backing also serves as a reminder to the Chin community of the significance of fortifying their ties to the Mizoram government and Mizo people.Historically, the Chin and Mizo communities have shared a great bond; the Mizo community warmly welcome and generously support the Chin, offering shelter, food, and unwavering assistance in sharing the burdens faced by the Chin.File image: A Zawlsei refugee camp in Mizoram’s Aizawl. The camp serves as home to Myanmarese who fled the military persecution in their country. Photo: Sushila Sahay/The WireThough there is a strong tie between the two communities, illicit drugs have been a major concern. The vice-president of the sub-headquarter YMA Champhai, a prominent youth organisation, highlighted in a recent report the significant worry among the Mizo community regarding the influx of illicit drugs across borders. Therefore, the Chinland government also has to make an impression on the Mizoram government and its people who have been long supporting the Chin people as well as New Delhi with regards to illegal drugs and crimes that fall within its purview. In a recent UNODC report, it was revealed that opium cultivation in Chin State has surged by 10% following the coup. This significant increase poses a serious threat to both India and the Chin community, necessitating urgent attention and action to curb its growth. Despite sharing the same bloodline or kinship, the geographic separation takes the relationship into account. Therefore, the Chin has to establish positive ties with the Mizoram administration, which offers individuals seeking asylum in the region access to healthcare and education. Importantly, the Chin has to deal with the refugee issues in terms of the resettlement and rehabilitation sectors. In that regard, both parties must be concerned about crossing borders through a coordinating organisation, for instance a local border security coordination committee or refugee coordination committee. Overall, India stands at a critical juncture in its relations with Myanmar, especially considering the evolving landscape of the Chin resistance forces and the weakening junta. The establishment of the Chinland Council, coupled with political changes in Mizoram, demands a cautious diplomatic strategy by India to secure its interests while navigating the complexities of the region. Given that Naypyidaw has lost significant territorial control, particularly since the 1027 operation, New Delhi should not be putting all of its resources behind the military dictatorship. Salai Van Bawi Mang, a Chin ethnic researcher from Chin State, explores Indo-Myanmar relations and governance, dedicating his efforts to advancing democracy, peace, and federalism within Myanmar.
