On July 10, 2024, Bangladesh’s former prime minister Sheikh Hasina abruptly cut short her week-long trip to China to return to Dhaka. It was her fifth state visit to China as prime minister of Bangladesh, a country that has repeatedly backed her both financially and politically in the face of increasing international pressure. Yet, for regular observers accustomed to Hasina returning with heavy bags of “goodwill”, the outcome of this visit felt painfully underwhelming. Hasina, who had reportedly been expecting a $5 billion check to put a quick band aid on Bangladesh’s fast dwindling currency reserves, came back with a meagre promise of just $137 million. Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty.Furthermore, she managed only a 30-minute interaction with president Xi Jinping and was denied the ‘appropriate’ state protocol typically accorded to visiting state leaders. As Chinese dissatisfaction with her became abundantly clear, the fragile ground beneath Sheikh Hasina’s carefully constructed house of cards began to tremble. Less than a month later, on August 5, that house came crashing down. Hasina, after having overseen the injury and killing of thousands of protesters in the hands of pro-Hasina forces, fled for India – a development that sent shockwaves through the South Block.All eggs in the same basket: Arrogance or myopia?For many farsighted analysts, this moment had been long in the making. India, for decades, has played a high-stakes game by fully backing Hasina (and her only) no matter the cost – a strategy that ultimately alienated all other political parties and millions of Bangladeshi citizens who longed for a return to the basics: democracy and human rights. In the early years, India’s myopic choice seemed well-founded considering Hasina’s emergence as India’s most formidable strategic ally: effectively neutralising extremist Islamist groups, addressing New Delhi’s northeastern insurgency concerns, and facilitating an unprecedented deepening of trade and economic engagements between the two countries. But beyond the glitz, India’s unwavering support for Hasina allowed her to oversee, with impunity, some of the most brutal violations of human rights against her own citizens, three consecutive national elections that were either severely rigged or manipulated, and the systematic erosion of all state institutions. The result was a highly unpopular, oligarchic regime resorting to unprecedented levels of corruption and oppression to cling to power. While others like Russia and China were also consistent backers of Hasina, Bangladeshis hold the Indian government the most squarely responsible. Unlike with others, India is viewed as the most active interferer in Bangladesh’s domestic affairs and an unashamed protector of Hasina’s autocratic rule. Worse still, India is also widely perceived as a neocolonial power, more interested in exploiting Bangladesh than in promoting its people’s welfare. An entirely one-sided power deal signed by Hasina’s government with the Adani Group – forcing Bangladesh to pay three times the usual price while allowing Adani to reap unprecedented profits – is only one of many such examples. For the average Bangladeshi, the quid pro quo seemed obvious: India would protect Hasina’s grip on power while she furthered Indian interests at Bangladesh’s expense, including allowing entities close to the current Indian regime to unfairly enrich themselves through Bangladeshi tax-payer resources. The result? Anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh is now at its peak, leaving New Delhi scrambling to respond to rapid changes in a nation of 180 million people with whom it shares its longest, most porous border, all the while attempting to rebuild trust from scratch. Is the lesson learnt?One would expect that the events of Bangladesh’s July Revolution would serve as a much-needed wake-up call for the Indian government, offering an opportunity to recalibrate its approach and align with the aspirations of the Bangladeshi people. Yet, since August 5, India’s actions are being largely perceived as an affront to the spirit of the revolution. Despite the well-documented evidence of Hasina’s complicity in recent killings and widespread demands for her accountability, India has chosen to shelter her. This decision has enabled Hasina to continue fomenting instability through distorted and provocative statements at public events. Adding to this discontent, Indian mainstream media – through coordinated misinformation campaigns allowed to persist under state oversight – have amplified exaggerated and false narratives about communal violence targeting Bangladeshi Hindu minorities. These narratives have been echoed in official government statements and inflammatory remarks by ruling party leaders. The focus on such exaggerated claims starkly contrasts with India’s conspicuous silence on the bloodshed wrought by the Hasina regime in July and earlier. This double standard has not gone unnoticed by ordinary Bangladeshis, who view it as a betrayal of their struggle for justice and democracy. The propagation of false narratives, such as claims of a “genocide” against the Hindu population by Bangladesh’s interim government or the so-called “Talibanisation” of the country in Hasina’s absence, alongside India’s overt protection of Hasina and her incendiary politics, has fuelled widespread suspicion of a deliberate conspiracy. Many believe the Indian government is actively working to undermine Bangladesh’s aspirations for reform and democracy in order to reinstall its preferred leader. Such perceptions pose grave risks, not only to longstanding diplomatic ties but also to public safety, particularly for minorities on both sides of the border who could become targets of renewed communal violence. The recent attack on Bangladesh’s diplomatic mission in Tripura by the Hindu Sangharsh Samiti – a newly formed organisation linked to the RSS – is a striking example of this growing volatility. The Indian government’s swift expression of regret over the attack, disciplinary actions, and the subsequent high-level meeting in Dhaka emphasising “a constructive approach to resolving issues” are commendable steps towards de-escalation and rebuilding trust. Yet, a truly robust and mutually beneficial relationship demands that India’s leaders look beyond the narrow, blood-stained “Hasina lens.” At this critical juncture, they must recognize that an unstable Bangladesh inevitably leads to an unstable India. Supporting the interim government’s success aligns with India’s long-term interests, while perpetuating its demonisation risks amplifying anti-India sentiment – a consequence India can ill afford.Time for a moral reckoningIndia’s apathy – and to some extent its antipathy – towards Bangladesh’s democratic aspirations reflects a gradual but radical shift in Indian foreign policy. Some key themes that have emerged within this shift include the saffronisation of Indian diplomacy. Moreover, due to a plurilateralist stance, current Indian decision-makers now increasingly view global affairs as a “transactional bazaar”, where the pursuit of naked self-interest leaves no room for moral pretence. In essence, it has fully embraced the realpolitik approach, shedding the old Nehruvian and Gandhian principles of pacifism and “moralpolitik”. India, therefore, seems no longer interested in offering the world a “third”, Indian brand of moral leadership.In a multipolar and disruptive world where the criteria and dimensions of power are evolving rapidly, a purely realpolitik approach is not unfounded. Besides, Indian advocacy for pacifism in the past has often fallen into deaf ears. But what Indian decision makers seem to be getting wrong is that “hard” power seldom achieves lasting success without the necessary foundation of “soft” power. With Hasina out of the picture, the race for influence in Bangladesh is now open ground for others, while New Delhi falls behind. India’s regional decline, be it via Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and now Bangladesh, is symptomatic of its diminishing soft power, as populations in its neighbouring countries no longer see New Delhi as a trusted guide in an increasingly polarized and uncertain world. This is an understandable outcome of a Neighbourhood First policy too mired in realpolitik.It is important to note that this need not be the case. Nehruvian moralpolitik has had its fair share of regional successes. Records show that India had historically embodied a foreign policy philosophy that recognised the merits of inclusive and representative democracy. This philosophy, rooted in its liberal democratic identity, shaped how India perceived past crises in the region and how it sought to resolve them. One example would be that of Nepal, 20 years ago, when India, in the face of a mass movement, backed pluralism as the only sustainable strategy. Resisting the temptation to support autocracy for short-term gains, India leveraged its influence to help restore democracy in Nepal and in return earned the goodwill of the Nepali people. The short-term risks of anti-India or pro-“other” regimes coming to power through democratic processes in its neighbourhood is an understandable concern for Indian leadership. But conversely, autocratic or illiberal regimes, no matter how beneficial or “pro-India” in the short term, are bound to face growing internal dissent and instability, which will inevitably become detrimental to Indian interests in the long run. The Bangladesh situation, as it unfolds further, remains a case in point. Christophe Jaffrelot is research director at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Professor of Politics and Sociology at King’s College London and Non Resident Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His publications include Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy, Princeton University Press, 2021, and Gujarat under Modi: Laboratory of Today’s India, Hurst, 2024, both of which are published in India by Westland. Manucheher Shafee is a Bangladeshi political analyst deeply committed to fostering an accountable, democratic, and just South Asia. He has previously worked for the United Nations and is an alumnus of Sciences Po, Paris.
