In recent months, the Union government has reiterated its long-standing position on Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir (PAJK), often referred to as Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK). On 10 April, Union home minister Amit Shah asserted that “PoK rightfully belongs to India, citing both historical context and legal grounds.” This aligns with earlier statements by external affairs minister S. Jaishankar, who, during a talk at Chatham House in London on March 5, outlined a three-phase strategy for securing lasting peace in Jammu and Kashmir. According to him, the abrogation of Article 370 was the first step, followed by development initiatives and the conduct of elections with high voter participation. Jaishankar framed the eventual return of PAJK to India as the final step in this process. His remarks echo his earlier statement from May 16, 2024, where he attributed the loss of PAJK to “someone’s weakness or mistake” – a veiled reference to first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Congress-led government during the critical years of 1947-48. These assertions reflect a broader political narrative that has gained traction over the past decade, which holds that strategic missteps in the early post-independence period contributed to the current territorial dispute.A shift in rhetoric: National and electoral narrativesSince the historic revocation of Article 370 on August 5, 2019, discourse of the political elite on PAJK has intensified, with key leaders sharpening their rhetoric. On September 22, 2019, while addressing a gathering in Mumbai, Shah directly blamed Nehru for the loss of PAJK, attributing it to what he called the “premature ceasefire” of 1947. The sentiment has since been echoed repeatedly, including during the high-stakes 2024 election campaign, where Shah reiterated this stance. This assertive narrative is not new. Shortly after the abrogation of Article 370, on September 17, 2019, Jaishankar, in a press briefing marking the first 100 days of Modi’s second term, declared unequivocally: “PoK is part of India, and we expect that one day we will have physical jurisdiction over it.” This bold assertion set the stage for a more aggressive posture on PAJK, one that continues to gain traction within government circles. The BJP has since leveraged this rhetoric, with its members vocally criticising the political leadership of the time for what they see as a strategic blunder – India’s decision to forgo PAJK. While asserting India’s claim over PAJK may serve as a potent diplomatic countermeasure – reinforcing the 1994 Indian parliament resolution – framing the issue as a historical failure of past leadership oversimplifies a far more complex reality. Such a narrative risks distorting historical facts, misrepresenting geographical and political dynamics, and fostering unrealistic public expectations. It is one thing to stake a legal and moral claim, but quite another to navigate the practicalities of reversing decades of political, demographic, and geopolitical shifts. Gilgit-Baltistan, though historically part of Jammu and Kashmir, requires a separate discussion due to its distinct history and demographics. More importantly, it is imperative to address the demands of the PAJK displaced population, whose prolonged neglect has only deepened restiveness and frustration reflected in their frequent protest rallies. Their concerns cannot remain peripheral to the national conversation. In this context, there is a great deal that needs to be unpacked – carefully, honestly, and inclusively. To do so, it is essential to revisit the decisions and constraints that shaped the ground realities in 1947–48, beginning with the military priorities and political calculations that defined India’s early engagement in Jammu and Kashmir. The heroism of major Som Nath Sharma and securing SrinagarWhen the Indian army arrived in Jammu and Kashmir after the signing of the Instrument of Accession on October 26, 1947, reclaiming PAJK was never its immediate priority. The sheer adversity it faced must be understood in context. Before acceding to India, Maharaja Hari Singh had been weighing the possibility of an independent Jammu and Kashmir. In a less-publicised interview on March 9, 2021, his son, Karan Singh, confirmed that his father had considered independence before ultimately signing the Instrument of Accession. However, by then, the state was already under siege.Pashtun tribal fighters, backed by Pakistan, had stormed into Jammu and Kashmir, seizing key areas, including Baramulla. While Maharaja Hari Singh’s numerically and logistically weaker forces fought back in some regions, they were vastly outmatched. The first wave of Indian troops, led by Major Som Nath Sharma of the 4 Kumaon Regiment, landed in Srinagar to defend the state.Major Sharma, the first recipient of India’s highest military honour – the Param Vir Chakra (PVC) – displayed extraordinary valour in the Battle of Badgam. Outnumbered and under devastating fire, his final recorded words embodied his unyielding resolve: “The enemy is only 50 yards from us. We are heavily outnumbered. We are under devastating fire. But I shall not withdraw an inch and will fight to the last man and the last round.”He died heroically, buying crucial time for reinforcements to secure Srinagar and prevent the fall of Kashmir. His legacy lives on – not only in history books but also in Delhi Cantonment, where a road bears his name, and in New Delhi’s RK Puram, home to the Som Vihar housing society, a tribute to his sacrifice.Strategic decision-making in focusing on the Kashmir ValleyThe Indian forces, upon arriving in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, prioritised securing the Kashmir Valley – an ethnically and geographically homogenous region – over the hilly, Pahari-speaking areas of PAJK. This strategic focus was driven by both military feasibility and political realities. In the Kashmir Valley, the Indian army had the crucial support of the National Conference (NC) cadre, led by Sheikh Abdullah, who wielded unparalleled influence over the local population. However, beyond the valley, particularly in PAJK, the situation was starkly different. Abdullah’s influence was limited, and the region’s political and social dynamics were far more complex. By 1947, central PAJK had already witnessed a significant local uprising against Maharaja Hari Singh. Many of these rebels were ex-servicemen, veterans of the British Indian army. Their armed resistance, coupled with the full-scale invasion by Pashtun fighters from Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), led to the rapid collapse of the Maharaja’s forces. This, in turn, facilitated the immediate de-facto control of the region by the Pakistani military. The central part of PAJK, which lies within the Pothwar belt and includes parts of Pakistani Punjab such as Rawalpindi, Gujrat, Jhelum and Chakwal, has long been a key recruitment ground for the British army before 1947 and later on Pakistani military. Many high-ranking officers, including Lt. Gen. Shahid Aziz – one of the architects of the Kargil conflict and a key player in General Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 coup – hail from this region. Similarly, Sardar Masood Khan, the former president of PAJK, is also from this area. His career trajectory, including serving as Pakistan’s Ambassador to China and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, underscores the deep entrenchment of this region within Pakistan’s power structures.Linguistic and cultural faultlines: The LoC as more than a borderPAJK is predominantly a Pahari-speaking region, distinct from the Kashmiri-speaking Valley to the east. The present-day Line of Control (LoC) serves not just as a military boundary but also as an ethnic and linguistic divide, reinforcing the region’s historical separation from Kashmir. The population of PAJK shares deeper cultural and kinship ties with Pakistan’s Punjab province and the Jammu division of the erstwhile princely state. Southern PAJK, particularly the districts of Bhimber and Mirpur, hosts communities – such as Jats, Rajputs, and Gujjars – that mirror the demographic composition of neighboring Punjab. This socio-cultural reality played a crucial role in shaping the military and political landscape of the conflict in 1947-48. These factors were instrumental in the strategic decision-making during the First Kashmir War. While securing the Kashmir Valley was immediately achievable with the support of Abdullah’s NC, pushing beyond into PAJK posed significant challenges. The absence of local support, the deeply entrenched resistance from armed ex-servicemen, and the rapid consolidation of Pakistani forces in the region made an Indian advance across the LoC unsustainable in the last quarter of 1947 and the first quarter of 1948. The Indian army’s swift and decisive success in the Kashmir Valley following Jammu and Kashmir’s accession in 1947 was significantly aided by the local support of Abdullah and his NC cadre. With an unchallenged political mandate in the Valley, Abdullah’s network provided crucial intelligence on the movements and positions of the invading forces – primarily Pashtun tribal militias. This grassroots support played a critical role in the Indian Army’s operations, allowing it to counter the invasion effectively. Even within Pakistan, occasional acknowledgments of this historical reality have surfaced. During a debate in Pakistan’s National Assembly on Jammu and Kashmir, former President Asif Ali Zardari implicitly conceded that Kashmiri-speaking populations had rejected Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s two-nation theory. His remark – that Kashmiris might now regret their decision of 1947 – indirectly confirmed their original political alignment. Foreign accounts also corroborate the view that India’s military success in the Valley owed much to Abdullah’s influence. His political backing not only facilitated India’s strategic advantage but also lent moral and popular legitimacy to the accession – making it more than just a legal formality.A deeper understanding of PAJK requires careful attention to its geography and connectivity. PAJK is integrated with Pakistan’s mainland, with key cities like Islamabad and Lahore in close proximity. However, internal travel within PAJK is challenging due to its mountainous terrain. For instance, a direct journey between Mirpur and Muzaffarabad takes approximately eight hours, whereas traveling through Islamabad significantly reduces the travel time. These logistical realities shape the region’s socio-political dynamics. Given this context, the decision by New Delhi’s leadership in 1947-48 not to cross the LoC militarily was not merely a tactical constraint but a calculated move based on a broader socio-political understanding of Jammu and Kashmir’s diverse components.Nehru has often been criticised for relinquishing India’s legal claim over PAJK, but historical records suggest otherwise. Diplomatically and legally, Nehru never abandoned the claim. In a letter dated August 20, 1948, to Josef Korbel, the chair of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, he asserted that once Pakistani forces withdrew – a prerequisite for a UN-mandated plebiscite – the administration of the entire region should revert to Jammu & Kashmir. He further emphasised that India would maintain garrisons to secure its borders and trade routes, except in Gilgit.The largest displaced group in J&K: Historical migration and settlement Beyond the prevailing rhetoric of territorial control, what remains largely ignored is the enduring plight of the displaced families from PAJK – whose struggles, generations later, still demand urgent attention, justice, and redress. In fact, they are the largest displaced group in the former state and attention on them had been minimal. In the last quarter of 1947, a total of 31,619 Hindu and Sikh families migrated from across the LoC, with 26,319 families choosing to settle within the State and now their number has grown exponentially. A portion of this community sought refuge in various parts of India, including the Pathankot area in Punjab’s Gurdaspur district, the Yol area in Himachal Pradesh’s Kangra district, Agra in Uttar Pradesh, and the Lajpat Nagar colony in New Delhi. Around, 10,054 families from Chhamb were displaced during the 1965 and 1971 wars. Given their numbers, they constitute the largest displaced community in Jammu and Kashmir. Unlike refugees from other parts of Pakistan, those displaced from PAJK were denied full compensation for the properties they left behind. What they received was interim relief – not comprehensive compensation. The reason for this denial of property compensation was the Union government’s international and multilateral stance that PAJK was an integral part of India, implying that these displaced persons would eventually be able to reclaim their property.While advocating for their rights, the descendants of Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir migrants often invoke the term “refugees”. The term requires further understanding in the context of present theoretical framework governing international humanitarian law. The caveat is that various contextual provisions of international humanitarian law are anchored in the World War II experience, with particular reference to Europe. For instance, the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees adopted on 28 July 1951 is the foundational tenet on the issue of refugees. In the oft-cited Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Section 88 says, “It is a general requirement for refugee status that an applicant who has a nationality be outside the country of his nationality. There are no exceptions to this rule. International protection cannot come into play as long as a person is within the territorial jurisdiction of his home country.”The Indian position is that entire J&K, including PAJK, became a part of India on account of instrument of accession signed by the princely state. Therefore, implicitly in line with the Indian position, the nationality of PAJK migrants never changed when they migrated – a necessary condition for the grant of refugee status. At the time of migration in November 1947, they were Indian citizens and that is why anyone who migrated from Pakistan-controlled Kashmir cannot be construed as refugees.Denial of property compensation: A policy paradox In between, in March 2003, the Jammu and Kashmir high court had also directed the authorities to grant those displaced from PAJK the same benefits as those provided to other displaced persons in India. This ruling came in response to a petition filed by those displaced in 1947, who had been forced to migrate from Kotli, Bhimber, Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, and parts of Poonch, now in PAJK. The high court observed that these displaced persons had been denied benefits due to a political decision, stating: “This is a decision on which this court is not supposed to pass judgment, but the hard reality of life is that there is little possibility of those who migrated from this part of the state ever returning to reclaim their property.” The court further noted that these displaced persons should not be left to sustain themselves indefinitely in the hope of reclaiming their land. “Something concrete must be done for the welfare and upliftment of those who, according to the respondents, have been displaced from an area still considered part of this State and an integral part of the country.” In light of this, the court suggested that the Union government formulate a policy and take steps to mitigate the hardships faced by those who continue to be treated as displaced persons within their own country.Governmental relief measures and limitations Following the displacement of families in 1947, the Union government had allotted agricultural land ranging from four to eight acres per family. In urban areas, affected families were provided with plots or residential quarters, along with a cash ex-gratia amount of Rs 3,500 per family. Those who did not receive land were compensated monetarily. Over the years, more than 10 lakh kanals of land have been allotted to displaced families. For those displaced during the conflicts of 1965 and 1971, agricultural land was allotted at the rate of four acres for irrigated land and six acres for non-irrigated land. These families also received cash compensation – Rs 3,000 per family for the 1965 displacement and Rs 7,500 for the 1971 displacement. Families who did not reside in government-established camps were later granted Rs 25,000 per family.Over the past two decades, several attempts have been made to address the multifaceted issues faced by displaced persons from PAJK. However, the complexities of the situation – particularly in the case of Chhamb displaced – have proven far beyond the capabilities of conventional bureaucratic mechanisms. Chhamb displaced: A case of repeated displacementThe Chhamb displaced persons represent a uniquely vulnerable group, having been uprooted repeatedly during the Indo-Pak wars of 1947, 1965 and 1971. Their experience stands apart in Indian displacement history not only due to the frequency of their displacement but also because of the strategic location and political implications of their original homeland. Located in the southwestern part of Jammu and Kashmir, near the LoC, Chhamb holds immense military significance. Its proximity to the Tawi river and the town of Akhnoor – a crucial alternative route to the Kashmir Valley beyond national highway 1A – made it a persistent target in wartime strategies. During the 1971 Indo-Pak war, Pakistan launched Operation Chengiz Khan, a pre-emptive strike aimed at capturing the Chhamb sector and destroying the Akhnoor bridge to sever India’s access to the Kashmir Valley. From December 3 to December 10, 1971, Chhamb witnessed fierce fighting involving both infantry and armored divisions. Despite strong Indian resistance, Pakistani forces succeeded in capturing the entire Chhamb region, including 28 villages. As part of the post-war delineation of the LoC under the Shimla Agreement (1972), these areas were not returned to India. This made Chhamb one of the very few Indian territories permanently retained by Pakistan after the war, despite India’s overall military victory. The repeated displacement of residents from the Chhamb region is a direct consequence of the redrawing of borders and shifting territorial control during the Indo-Pak wars of 1947, 1965, and 1971. Despite promises of land and compensation, many affected families have faced delays, bureaucratic irregularities, and incomplete rehabilitation efforts. Generations have now grown up in temporary settlements or resettled colonies, continuing to suffer from unresolved grievances related to land ownership and inadequate state support. A large number of these displaced persons – particularly those from Chhamb – have organised under the banner of the PAJK Displaced Persons’ Front 1947, 1965, and 1971 (non-Camp), led by Capt. (Retd.) Yudhvir Singh Chib. They have tirelessly advocated for just compensation, specifically demanding Rs 30 lakh per family, as recommended by the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC).Movement origins and government responseThe movement for adequate compensation for those displaced from the Chhamb sector was initiated in the 1990s through the efforts of Capt. Chib and the late Suram Singh. Recognising the complexity and moral weight of the issue, eminent public intellectual Balraj Puri took the matter to National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), which subsequently requested his expertise. From 1997 to 2008, he was regularly invited to brief the commission on the nuances around the issue. During this period, he also made detailed submissions directly to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, urging action. These interventions played a critical role in sensitising Prime Minister Singh to the plight of the displaced. In October 2008, under the leadership of Singh, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) approved a comprehensive relief and rehabilitation package for families displaced from PAJK during the 1947, 1965, and 1971 conflicts, including those from Chhamb. This package included provisions for housing, education, employment opportunities, and financial assistance, and laid the foundation for a policy framework to assess wartime losses and enable future land allotments and services. In 2015-16, based on a parliamentary committee’s recommendations – which relied on data largely gathered under the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government (2007–2014) – the Narendra Modi-led government approved a financial assistance package of Rs 5.5 lakh per displaced family under the prime minister’s development package (2015). This initiative was also formally adopted by the Jammu and Kashmir government. This amount was seen by many stakeholders as merely an initial installment, falling short of the full Rs 30 lakh recommended.The Rs 30-lakh demand and unfulfilled promises In October 2014, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, in its 183rd Report had recommended a one-time compensation of Rs 30 lakh per family for displaced persons from PAJK, including those from the Chhamb sector. This recommendation acknowledged the long-term, generational hardship faced by these families due to repeated displacements during the 1947, 1965, and 1971 Indo-Pak wars. However, the Union government has so far disbursed only Rs 5.5 lakh per family under the prime minister’s development package, which the displaced persons argue was merely the first instalment. The affected community, led by organisations such as the PAJK Displaced Persons’ Front, now strongly contends that the balance of Rs 24.5 lakh per family must be disbursed in accordance with the parliamentary committee’s recommendation.Adding to the discontent, recent government actions regarding transfer of evacuee land – land left behind by Muslims who migrated to Pakistan in 1947 – have sparked widespread opposition. This land was historically allotted to some sections of the PAJK displaced community under earlier policies, including the Agrarian Reforms Act and Government Order 254-C of 1965, granting them proprietary rights. In 2024, however, the government issued a new order imposing restrictive conditions on these lands, limiting the ability of displaced persons to transfer, sell, or mortgage the property. This move has been condemned by key stakeholders in the PAJK community. Reclaiming the discourse: From rhetoric to rights Looking back, the events of 1947-48 offer a crucial lesson. From the early 1950s, including the arrest of Abdullah on August 9, 1953, a combination of international and domestic factors – political, societal, and structural – triggered in the aftermath of partition contributed to periodic instability in Jammu and Kashmir. Also, contributing factor of instability is the failure to embrace Jammu and Kashmir’s immense diversity and to address its challenges within the broader framework of federalism which remains a persistent shortcoming of successive governments, both in J&K and New Delhi. The lack of understanding of these granular dynamics perpetuates a fertile ground for ethnic, religious and regional polarisation, making it susceptible to exploitation. However, this experience is not unique to J&K but mirrors the broader challenges faced by many post-colonial nation-states characterised by religious, ethnic, linguistic, and geographical diversity. All these developments and issues require separate discussion, and should not be conflated with the political decision in 1947 to forgo PAJK in favour of securing the Kashmir Valley. A people-centered path to peace Finally, rhetoric about reclaiming PAJK rings hollow when the very people who were torn from it remain unheard, unseen, and unresolved within the borders of their own country. The repeated protests of the displaced signifies that. These families – uprooted in 1947, 1965, and 1971 – constitute by far the largest displaced group from undivided Jammu and Kashmir. Yet, their story remains marginalised in both policy and public discourse. If the claim over PAJK is to be more than symbolism – more than a political slogan – then it must begin with those who paid the human cost of its loss. Full measure of justice is not only a humanitarian obligation – it is a litmus test for the moral seriousness of the Republic’s claims. In this context, meaningful stakeholder consultations are especially important – given that the issue of PAJK displacement is not only protracted but layered with historical, legal, humanitarian, and geopolitical complexities. Reconciliation with history must begin by honouring those it displaced. While PAJK may be periodically invoked in international and diplomatic forums, it is imperative that the authorities simultaneously ensure those actually displaced from PAJK find justice on the ground – where it matters most.Luv Puri is the author of Across the Line of Control, based on fieldwork in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir.
