New Delhi: An Indian official at the centre of the difficult negotiations India held with the United States over the details of their landmark nuclear deal from 2005-2007 has revealed for the first time how the Ministry of External Affairs’ decision to pursue a line “independently” of the Department of Atomic Energy’s key concerns in the initial phases led to “complete chaos on the Indian side”.That the DAE was at loggerheads with the MEA – which was keen to accept US demands on placing critical nuclear facilities under international safeguards – was known to reporters covering the negotiations. But official confirmation of this dissonance comes now from former Indian diplomat D.B. Venkatesh Varma in a newly published essay.Varma’s chapter for R. Chidambaram’s recent memoir, India Rising, pays tribute to the noted scientist’s role in shaping India’s diplomatic posture on nuclear issues – from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to the India-US nuclear deal – but also offers a glimpse of the divisions that plagued the Indian side as the US made demands that would have weakened India’s nuclear weapons programme.R. ChidambaramIndia Rising: Memoir of a ScientistPenguin eBury Press, 2023While Chidambaram was the principal scientific adviser to three prime ministers from 2001 to 2018, Varma was a director in the PMO for the crucial years of 2004-2007 – when the multi-stage nuclear deal with the US was negotiated and finalised. Varma subsequently became the first recipient of the S.K. Singh Award for Excellence in the Indian Foreign Service in January 2012 for his contribution to negotiating the India-US nuclear deal. He retired as India’s ambassador to Moscow in 2021.Varma’s chapter recounts how there were significant differences among the DAE and PMO on one side, and the MEA on the other, during various stages of negotiations with the US.In the run-up to the signing of the joint statement on July 18, 2005, Varma writes that there were disagreements within the Indian delegation in Washington on the strategic price that India should willingly bear in exchange for the removal of international trade restrictions on its nuclear industry:“There were already a lot of divisions on the Indian side which arose from the fact that there were strong advocates on the Indian side willing to pay a very high cost, almost as much as what the Americans wanted to agree to the nuclear deal, which would have had the negative effect of emasculating our nuclear weapons programme.”This disparity was evident in Washington on the eve of the signing of the joint statement, with Atomic Energy Commission chairperson Anil Kakodkar “almost alone” in pointing out the pitfalls in the initial drafts of the joint statement. “He had support from M.K. Narayanan, the NSA and the PMO’s team. But the rest of the establishment were saying that we should accept what the Americans were offering along with the associated high costs.”In his 2019 book, in fact, Kakodkar gave details of this meeting chaired by Manmohan Singh at his hotel in Washington on the eve of the summit. He specifically mentioned that after he said that the proposed draft was unacceptable, “several seniors” had “pounced” on him. Kakodkar specifically named Natwar Singh, who was external affairs minister at the time, and Indian ambassador to the US Ronen Sen.With Manmohan Singh declaring that Kakodkar’s assent was necessary to go ahead, the final draft was signed only after the language was changed as per the latter’s formulation.The 2005 joint statement marked the start of three years of tortuous negotiations, as India drew up a separation plan for its civil and nuclear facilities and consented to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and an additional protocol.Separation plan: ‘Confusion on the Indian side, including in the MEA’The US had wanted to bring the majority of India’s pressurised heavy water reactors, its fast breeder programme and part of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre under IAEA safeguards. “When Mr Kakodkar came back from Washington, he realised that unlike in the past, the times had changed, that there was a lot of pressure from the Americans and other western countries which had support within some sections of the Indian establishment,” writes Varma.Though Varma takes no names, the MEA’s lead negotiator was S. Jaishankar – then a joint secretary handling the US and Canada and currently India’s foreign minister – while Shyam Saran was foreign secretary.Based on his suggestion to NSA Narayanan that there be an internal group to formulate a unified stance, Varma writes that an “apex group” was formed on September 1, 2005. The group consisted of Atomic Energy Commission chair Anil Kakodkar, PSA R. Chidambaram, PMO principal secretary T.K. Nair, Chief of Staff Committee Arun Prakash and joint secretary PMO Sujata Mehta.“There was the need to establish some discipline of what the negotiating brief would be. The group played a critical role in the negotiation of the nuclear deal,” he wrote.In the weeks following the Manmohan-Bush joint statement on civilian. nuclear cooperation, Varma writes that there was “an onslaught of proposals from the US” on the separation plan and the proposed 123 agreement.File photo of D.B. Venkatesh Varma, India’s former ambassador to Russia and, from 2004-2007, a director in the PMO in Delhi. Photo: WikimediaThough Varma does not go into the specifics, one of the US proposals that the MEA embraced initially was the principle of ‘grid connectivity’ as basis for separating civilian from military nuclear facilities. This idea rang alarm bells in the DAE as it would have meant the bulk of India’s nuclear reactors going under IAEA supervision.MEA officials also pushed the narrative in the media that the DAE’s insistence on keeping the fast-breeder programme out of the civilian list would make the US drop the idea of nuclear cooperation altogether. “Kakodkar’s public espousal of the “indigenous” fast breeder reactors remaining out of the safeguards list, could be a deal-breaker,” the Times of India quoted unnamed “senior members of the government” as saying.Referring to different sections in the Indian establishment unable to come on the same page, Varma writes that there was “complete chaos on the Indian side, with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) proceeding independently on its own, while the DAE had difficulties agreeing to the former’s approach”.Varma does not say so but the DAE managed to have its way only by going public about its concerns in an interview Kakodkar gave on February 6, 2006 – much to the consternation of key MEA officials at the time.“This interview became a decisive factor in defining the contours of the Separation Plan,” R.B. Grover, another senior DAE official who was part of the Indo-US negotiations, wrote later.With regard to other aspects of the separation plan, writes Varma, “Conceptual clarity emerged from the Apex Group in one fundamental way as there was confusion on the Indian side, including in the MEA, namely that any plant that produces power is by definition a civilian facility.”The former Indian diplomat adds that the US had “sent signals” that it would not accept less than 18 Indian reactors under IAEA safeguards, while the rest would be enough to fuel the nuclear weapons programme. This was not acceptable to Chidambaram, who asserted that the nature of the nuclear weapons programme and its requirement “were entirely an Indian decision and firmly rejected the American argument”.With Manmohan Singh agreeing with his PSA, “this issue was settled once and for all by early February 2006”. Currently, there are 14 Indian reactors under IAEA safeguards.‘Corrective measures’ to the rescueWhile this issue was crossed off the list, the sticking matter of the US insistence on safeguards in perpetuity led talks between the Indian and American interlocutors breaking down on the night before March 2, the start of Bush’s state visit to India.“We would agree to safeguards in perpetuity, but the key issue for us, given our experience of US-supplied reactors at Tarapur, was whether there would be a lifetime guarantee of fuel supply,” he said.Varma said that it was only after another round of internal discussions in the morning that Kakodkar and Chidambaram worked out the concept of “corrective measures”. As per this construct, India would agree to put safeguards in perpetuity and US would agree to a lifetime guarantee of fuel supplies.Recounting his conversation with Chidambaram at Hyderabad House, Varma writes that he assured Chidambaram that the drafted language on “corrective measures” would be included in all future agreements. Following this assurance, Chidambaram gave his assent to the separation plan.“And the promise that I made to Dr Chidambaram that we would put Corrective Measures in all agreements can be found in the 123 Agreement, our safeguard agreements and Additional Protocol Agreement. It is quite unique because no other country in the world, not even the nuclear weapon states, have included anything like them in the safeguard agreements,” Varma says.The Indian side was not entirely happy with the 2006 Hyde Act which modified the US Atomic Energy Act to permit nuclear cooperation with India. Varma reminisces that in a meeting with Manmohan Singh, Chidambaram described it as a “hideous act”.With the Hyde Act having many “insulting provisions”, the ‘team’ of Chidambaram and Kakodkar decided to not outrightly reject its clauses, but expressed strong reservations.Varma wrote that there was immense pressure from the Americans for India to allow bilateral inspections in addition to IAEA safeguards inspections. “We said no. He (Chidambaram) was able to convince the PM, who made a statement in Parliament, saying, ‘I do not wish to have American inspectors roaming around in our nuclear facilities’.”Similarly, Varma underlines, India’s core interests were largely protected in the 123 agreement, especially over the future of its strategic programme. “So today, we have a nuclear deal where our civilian programme is not short of nuclear fuel and our weapons programme is proceeding merrily forward. Overall it has been a success. We got our cake and we ate it too,” he wrote.
