Cara Abercrombie, currently a visiting scholar with Carnegie Endowment’s South Asia programme, is a senior defence department officer who knows Asia well. Most recently she served as deputy assistant secretary of defence for South and Southeast Asia (2016-2017), advising the senior Pentagon leadership on developing and implementing policy for the region. She was the point person for defence relations with India, and has interacted with most of the key players. She was principal director for East Asia policy from 2014 to 2016, looking after China, Japan, Mongolia, North and South Korea and Taiwan.Abercrombie understands the challenges and the opportunities, having dealt with both India and China over the years. She can see the big picture and also the granularities where difficulties and possibilities lie. She talks about India-US defence relations in an extensive interview. (Abercrombie spoke to The Wire in her private capacity and her views do not reflect the official position of the US Department of Defence)SS: There is growing concern that India might come under US sanctions related to CAATSA – Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 – if it buys the S-400 missile defence system from Russia. If India is not granted a waiver, how do you think it would impact the relationship?CA: Should India trigger CAATSA sanctions with a significant defence acquisition from Russia, there will be repercussions for US-India ties, particularly in the area of defence trade, which to date has been a bright spot in the relationship. It has taken many years for the US and India to build trust after the US imposed sanctions in the 1990s; new sanctions would upend that progress.The Indo-US defence relationship has come a long way both in terms of conceptual convergence and increased arms sales. But the full potential is still to be realised. What do you think are the main hurdles?The two countries have made tremendous progress in defence cooperation over the past 15 or so years. Yet, as you note, despite this progress they have yet to build the habits of cooperation akin to what the United States has with other close partners, where officials engage their counterparts frequently, through informal, as well formal channels to exchange views and share perspectives. In this way, partners are attuned to one another’s thinking on policy issues well in advance of major decisions or announcements. This type of comfortable relationship is particularly important for defence cooperation. You want to build these habits of cooperation between armed forces before a crisis strikes, so they can respond together effectively. India and the US are slowly but surely getting there.What do you make of the inherent feeling among Indian officials that proximity to the US means a compromise, even a loss of sovereignty for India?One need only look at the foreign policy stances of multiple US treaty allies, for example France and its opposition to the 2003 Iraq war, to see that a close partnership with the United States does not compromise one’s sovereignty. Our allies retain the ability to set their own foreign policy agenda, and they do not always agree with us.If anything, cooperation with the United States today gives India more options for the future. Some types of cooperation, particularly in the military domain, but in economic and diplomatic space as well, cannot happen spontaneously; spade work – like military exercises, legal agreements, etc. must be done to enable that cooperation. The decision to avoid some types of cooperation today could effectively close doors to future cooperation.Cara Abercrombie. Credit: US Department of DefenseHow important are the foundational/enabling agreements in going forward? India took 10 years to sign the logistics agreement because many thought it was unnecessary, infringed on India’s sovereignty and created problems of perception. How can those concerns be addressed for the two major agreements that remain?The so-called enabling agreements have taken on outsized significance among some strategists in India as a purported challenge to India’s sovereignty. In the US system, these are simple, common documents that enable basic operational cooperation. I think the signing of the LEMOA (Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement) in 2016 has shown, quite effectively, how non-threatening – even boring – it is. It’s essentially a document for accountants to use with year-end billing; allowing for in-kind and reimbursable transactions, such as exchanges of fuel or supplies. Neither country is under any obligation to provide the other such support, but if it so chooses, the respective bureaucracies now know how to account for the transaction. The fact that it was signed after so long shows how far we’ve come in building trust.The two remaining agreements you reference – the COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) and BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement) – give the US the assurances it requires to provide secure communications equipment and geospatial data, respectively. Not signing these agreements will not prevent cooperation, but will impede the two countries’ ability to work together in the most effective and efficient way.Would the US be willing to discuss ownership and security of data generated by sensors on any platform India might acquire from the US? This delves into Indian fears about losing control and the close relationship between Pakistan and the US.Generally speaking, candid dialogue is critical to ensuring trust between close partners like the US and India. Issues like data sharing and security should be discussed.The geographical divisions in the US Department of Defense do not match those in the State Department. India comes under the Pacific Command or PACOM and Pakistan is under Central Command or CENTCOM. To what extent does this hamper coherence in US policy?I firmly believe that bureaucratic organisation matters, but is not dispositive, in setting policy. The US Defense Department divides the Indian Ocean into three separate combatant commands, with India assigned to US Pacific Command, along with all the countries to its east. Its neighbours to the northwest fall under US Central Command and the island states of the southwest Indian Ocean are assigned to US Africa Command. I believe this division has resulted in missed opportunities for cooperation with India, whose navy has close ties to countries across the region, from the Gulf, to East Africa, to Seychelles and Mauritius. However, I also believe that as bilateral US-India defence cooperation deepens over time, these organisational seams will matter less. Recent reports that India will have a defence attache coordinating with the US 5thfleet in Bahrain is an example of this.The US approach is structured and it has a trained defence bureaucracy dealing with procurement, licensing and export controls. India does not. What kinds of difficulties does this create for negotiators?The challenges in bilateral defence trade stem more from philosophical differences than bureaucratic differences, though that too can be a factor. In principle, the two countries have each developed exceptional systems – the US as the world’s largest defence exporter, and India the world’s largest defence importer – where each expects others to bend to their terms. They have done a good job working through systemic disconnects thus far, and will continue to do so, but it can be time-consuming for individual government officials on both sides.James Carafano of Heritage Foundation recommends crafting a unique strategic relationship, “one that delivers the benefits of allied status without the formal architecture that goes with it.” Is that possible or desirable?I am a great believer in the potential of the US-India strategic partnership, and agree with the recommendation that it requires a unique approach. A formal alliance would certainly have its benefits, but would also have associated complications for both countries. For the time being, the two countries should continue the path upon which they’ve already embarked, and build a robust structure of dialogues and mechanisms to facilitate cooperation short of a formal alliance.One of the main reasons for the US-India convergence has been the rise of China and its deft pushing of boundaries in the maritime space. What is the likelihood that India and the US will conduct joint patrols or do something similar in the near future as has been suggested?There are many reasons for the United States and India to pursue closer defence ties. The relationship is not directed at China. The most likely scenario for operational cooperation is a combined response to a humanitarian crisis or natural disaster in the Indian Ocean region. The two militaries train together to prepare for such an eventuality.I do believe that India and the United States’ shared interest in improving maritime domain awareness offers a real opportunity for mutually beneficial cooperation in the Indian Ocean. The conduct of joint air or maritime patrols would allow them to develop a common operating picture of the maritime domain.While China has steadily increased its military spending, the Indian defence budget this year was 1.5% of its GDP, which barely pays for salaries and pension. Realistically, how can India be a net security provider, something which the US would like to see?By any measure, India spends a lot on its defence. While the US rule of thumb for NATO defence spending is 2% of GDP, what matters most is that India provide resources for its armed forces to meet its national security requirements. India, like the US, faces the challenge of modernising its military through capital investments, while maintaining the appropriate capacity – or size and readiness –of its forces, against the backdrop of rising personnel costs, to meet a wide range of operational objectives.The decision to form the new Defence Planning Committee appears to be a positive development in this regard. It shows GOI (government of India) leadership taking steps to address this critical linkage between strategy, planning, resourcing, and procurement.India’s decision to form the new Defence Planning Committee shows that its leadership is taking steps to address the critical linkage between strategy, planning, resourcing, and procurement. File photo of Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman. Credit: PTIA free and open Indo-Pacific is the new concept gaining currency. What is or should be the conceptual framework to actually operationalise the strategy? Some have said it is a case of over promising and under delivering.The vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific is not entirely new, in that it champions the key principles and rules based order that have undergirded US efforts to provide stability and economic development in the region for decades. The challenge today is ensuring these principles remain protected. They include respect for the rule of law, international norms like freedom of navigation and overflight, the free flow of commerce, and the ability of states in the region to act free from coercion. Achieving this vision will require states to champion and adhere to these principles.As liberal democracies, the US and India are largely aligned in their vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. They have had different interpretations of some international norms but I believe that these differences can be bridged over time.Do you see Asian alliance partners of the US, such as South Korea, playing a role in the Quad (India, US, Japan and Australia) in the future?The network of US Alliances has played, and will continue to play an important role in providing stability in the Indo-Pacific. Increasingly, we are seeing a networking of these partnerships; US partners are working together in various trilateral or multi-lateral arrangements, such as the India-Australia-Japan trilateral. I think the structure is less important than the substance of cooperation among countries in the region. Whether cooperation takes the form or a Quad-plus or some other arrangement, I do believe the Republic of Korea and other US allies and partners will work together to address security challenges across the region.Do you think the Quad can provide an alternate to China’s mercantilist model? How will that unfold?The Indo-Pacific’s infrastructure needs are enormous – according to the Asian Development Bank, something like $26 trillion is needed to sustain growth across the region. This presents an opportunity for public and private investments across the region to promote connectivity and trade. The Quad countries share the view that infrastructure development should be conducted consistent with international law and standards. I think you will see them working to promote transparency and good business practices that are in the region’s best interests.Seema Sirohi is a Washington DC-based commentator.
