On January 8, 2026, five days after the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in Caracas, which resulted in the death of 32 Cuban military personnel by US forces, United States President Donald Trump was asked about the fate of Cuba, having also threatened military action against the leaders of Mexico and Colombia. He responded: “Cuba’s hanging by a thread… Their whole life was Venezuela. They got their oil; they got their money from Venezuela… I think that Cuba is really in a lot of trouble… But you know, people have been saying that for many years, and they haven’t quite gone down… But I think they’re pretty close.”The “many years” that Trump was referring to was presumably the Special Period economic crisis of the early- and mid-1990s in Cuba which ensued after the fall of state socialism in Eastern Europe and loss of Soviet financial support. While annual GDP fell by 38% during the first four years of the crisis (1990-1994) and extreme scarcities of food and basic consumer products resulted in a 18.5% decrease in per capita household consumption, the United States tightened the embargo with a view to restricting Cuba’s foreign trade and leveraging the crisis for regime change. This never happened as a series of economic liberalisation policies and new strategic alliances, most notably with Venezuela, allowed the Cuban economy to temporarily recover, albeit not to the levels which existed prior to this watershed in revolutionary history. Cuba’s faltering economyHowever, due to external events since 2019, Cuba once again finds itself in a period of economic devastation although this time it is worse than the Special Period. During Trump’s first term, his administration once again ramped up the now 68 years of economic warfare to destabilise the socialist regime.These measures included limiting family remittances, a lifeline for around two-thirds of families on the island and imposing travel restrictions which severely hampered the international tourism industry, Cuba’s largest source of hard currency. These measures together with invigorating fines and potential lawsuits for companies doing business with Cuba served to intensify Cuba’s economic isolation during the Covid-19 pandemic. Cuba’s lauded healthcare system began to crumble without access to medicines and equipment. Also read: Venezuela as a Message to the WorldGovernmental economic mismanagement also resulted in extreme inflation as the unification of the dual currency system, which was in theory meant to simplify everyday financial transactions, significantly devalued the Cuban peso in practice causing steep inflation. The devaluation aggravated shortages given import prices were most costly resulting in a complete erosion of purchasing power. These events, together with a severe energy crisis, caused by reduced imports of Venezuelan oil, hurricanes, and an outbreak of mosquito-borne diseases which affected one in three Cubans, also weakened an already faltering system. While the revolution had afforded Cubans with outstanding public services and subsidies for over six decades, these services faltered and the state was forced to cut certain subsidies due to necessary austerity measures. Those with sole access to pensions or salaries paid in devalued pesos were most vulnerable. Young working-age Cubans began to flee the island en masse, with some academics estimating that almost 25% of the population migrated between 2021-2025, leaving the state with the burden of an aging population. These events coincided with greater access to the internet and the proliferation of digital activism which highlighted youth disillusionment with the revolution’s current performance. Civil society called for greater political and economic freedoms, which was countered with state repression during the J-21 protests. Without greater accountability, the revolution is losing its legitimacy even with citizens who are apolitical or have traditionally been pro-revolution which was once the overwhelming majority. A polycrisisThe possible impact of Maduro’s abduction and interruption or potential curtailment of Venezuelan oil imports would only serve to compound this ‘polycrisis’, where multiple crises have occurred simultaneously and augmented each other. Cuba’s electricity output in 2025 was already almost 25% lower than in 2019. Three quarters of the island’s electricity is thermoelectric and a third of this is currently produced with Venezuelan oil. It has been estimated that Cuba’s GDP could fall as much as 27% (it has already contracted 15% since 2018), the price of transport could rise as much as 75%, inflation could rise as much as 60%, and household consumption could fall by up to another 30%. This would be catastrophic. While Cuba possesses a world-renowned biotech industry, the infrastructure to accommodate around four million tourists should they decide to return and sustainable agriculture, the island looks unlikely to recover from this crisis the same way as it survived the Special Period. The post-Maduro Venezuelan regime, currently led by Delcy Rodríguez (Maduro’s vice-president) could decide to resume former agreements, including the shipment of oil.Yet, the latter seems unlikely given the US proclamation that it will ‘run’ Venezuela’s oil industry, and Trump announcing over social media on January 11 that there will be no more aid or oil shipments to Cuba. Russia and China could come to Cuba’s financial rescue, as its biggest creditor and trading partner respectively. However, this also seems unlikely based on their soft power precedent towards the US’ recent military action in Venezuela, a nation which is in theory more geopolitically strategic in a multi-polar hegemony, given the South American country possesses the world’s largest oil reserves. Cuba is comparatively resource poor, unless you count nickel, cobalt or human capital.Also read: Venezuela is Merely the Front Line in America’s China WarRussia is embroiled in a bitter campaign in Ukraine and only condemned the US assault on Venezuela’s sovereignty without taking action to protect its ideological ally. The attempted regime change in Venezuela has placed China’s ability to use its USD 10-12 billion debt to leverage cheap oil shipments in jeopardy – around 40 million barrels of sanctioned oil en route to China is now currently en route to the United States.Ultimately, the US has shown China that it cannot protect its strategic partners in the Western hemisphere if the US exerts hard military power; China’s air defence radars in Caracas weren’t even able to detect advanced US military aircraft. Is it too late?On January 11, Trump urged the Cuban government to “make a deal, BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE” over Truth Social. He did not specify the terms of the deal or the consequences of not succumbing to such threats. But what can the Cuban government do to maintain the socialist system and withstand the pressure of the past few years, which is only going to intensify? Democratic elections are merely a bandaid for the systemic flaws which have been exposed by external events over the past few years, beyond the revolution’s control. Increased citizen participation through transparent and accountable institutions, a reinvigorated civil society and free press might just reassure the population of the revolution’s declining legitimacy. Furthering economic liberalisation to make Cuba more attractive to foreign investors, improving trade options and strengthening the private sector are the only way to stimulate economic growth and maintain the mixed-market system which still protects its most vulnerable citizens, even though state capacity for this is fast diminishing. Courting the diaspora and their economic and professional potential to help develop the country is also a potential advancement strategy and even more relevant given the brain drain and significant exodus of working-age Cubans in recent years. Perhaps, regime change in Venezuela will prove a silver lining and serve as a catalyst for the immediate reforms needed to tackle the current polycrisis and its inevitable deterioration? After all, only Cuba can resolve its tragic predicament, and the almost seven decades of collective national belief in the revolutionary slogan ¡Venceremos! (We will triumph!) might just be enough to do so.Daliany Jeronimo Kersh (she/her) is a professor in history at NYU’s London campus. She also teaches at Fordham and Boston Universities in London. She specialises in Global South politics and history, and Black British history.