The US-Israeli war against Iran seems to be readying itself for its third round. Just by surviving the first, Iran was the clear victor. The second round was a draw – Iran blockaded Hormuz, and in turn was blockaded by the United States. Just how the third will turn out is still not clear.On Sunday (May 3), Trump announced that in a “humanitarian” move, the US Navy will help the ships of foreign countries through Hormuz from Monday (May 4) onwards and if Iran tries to disrupt the process that could result in war. But it is not yet clear what his plan would involve.There is considerable confusion over the various proposals and counter-proposals floating around. But in essence, as of now Trump has rejected an Iranian plan which essentially calls for the reopening of the Hormuz Strait, an end to the war, followed by nuclear negotiations at a later stage. Not surprisingly, the US responded with amendments that front-load the nuclear issue. However, in a plan reportedly put forward on Sunday, Iran has said that it was willing to suspend enrichment for 15 years or so and give a “no stockpiling” commitment. But the proposal rejected the idea of dismantling the nuclear infrastructure or destroying its facilities.“There are options. Do we want to go and just blast the hell out of them and finish them forever or do we want to try and make a deal. Those are the options,” Trump said last Friday (May 1), adding that he preferred not to resume the bombing.Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty.Neither of these options look good for him. The first is military escalation, but that would have broader consequences for the global economy and even then it is unlikely to have decisive results in pushing Iran on the nuclear front. The second is a negotiated agreement that would require Trump to make significant concessions. With both sides believing they have the upper hand, or seeking to achieve it, a compromise looks somewhat difficult at this stage.One option being explored by the US is to revive its coalition to have a multi-national operation to keep Hormuz open. Trump is still hoping that what he couldn’t achieve by bombing could be gained by a prolonged blockade. Iran is aware of the danger that the blockade represents and in Tehran it is not seen as another form of war. Iranian decision-makers may soon conclude that it is better to resume the war, rather than face prolonged strangulation by blockade.The problem is that the US and Israel may once again be under-estimating Iran’s capacity and willingness to fight. The Americans have been raising the issue of the cohesion of the Islamic regime and the alleged divisions there. The issue is not really that. The fact that the regime has come up with a number of proposals to break the deadlock indicates that it is more cohesive than is being claimed. The problem is that the Trump administration is wrongly focusing on how the decisions are being made in Tehran, rather than the strategic situation that is pushing those decisions. Iran is not coming to the negotiating table under pressure to surrender its established positions and it is negotiating from the point of what it views as its leverage – the ability to shut Hormuz at will and impact the global economy.The heart of the problem, both in February and now, is the need and the ability for US and Israel to define realistic objectives they could achieve. No one doubts that the US and Israel have overwhelming military strength in comparison to Iran. But Tehran’s asymmetric tactics, especially its use of ballistic missiles and drones remain in play, as do its allies like the Hezbollah and the Houthis.Even now, it is not clear what exactly the US wants. It has been clear after its initial blunder of assassinating Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that regime change is effectively off the table. It is not something the US can achieve without a prolonged ground operation – that too in a country several times the size of Iraq and Afghanistan.In Iran, the US confronts a country with a layered political system with built-in measures for regime security. For example, not many know that Iran has two parallel military structures. The Artesh is the regular army responsible for conventional defence, while the IRGC is tasked with protecting the regime’s ideology. One reports to the Supreme Leader via the President, the other reports directly to him.The US-Israeli campaign has been militarily devastating and Iran has suffered massive blows but the key issue is whether or not the Americans and Israelis have succeeded in achieving the objectives that they had set. The answer as of now is “No.”Recall that the campaign’s objectives were clearly stated as 1) achieving regime change, 2) destroying Iran’s ballistic missile capability, 3) eliminating its nuclear capacity and 4) Forcing Iran to stop support to its regional allies like the Hezbollah, Houthis and the Hamas. After two months of relentless bombing backed by AI targeting and the use of extraordinary conventional munitions and Israeli ground intelligence, the objectives have clearly not been achieved.The most significant failure relates to the nuclear issuePerhaps the most significant failure relates to the nuclear issue. Iran continues to possess a significant stockpile of enriched material, including 440 kg of uranium enriched at 60%. Actually Iran has a total of 11 tonnes of uranium enriched at various levels. One of its major facilities, at Kuh-e-Kolag Gaz La (Pickaxe Mountain) near Natanz remains untouched under a granite mountain which is apparently not reachable by US deep-penetration bombs.An important point with regard to the American campaign is that while buildings and facilities can be destroyed and delay processes, it cannot erase the know-how or alter Iran’s strategic decision, if it decides to go ahead and make a nuclear weapon. Note, of course, that most assessments, including that of the IAEA chief Rafael Grossi is that Iran did not have a nuclear weapons programme on the eve of the US-Israeli attack. Iran had been pursuing a strategy of accumulating the capacity of making such weapons, but abjuring from the actual process beginning 2003.Thereafter, it signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a UN approved plan under which Iran agreed to cap uranium enrichment to 3.67% capable of producing electric power. It also agreed to degrade its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98% to just 300 kg., it agreed to dismantle over two-thirds of its centrifuges, keeping only some 5,000 active and it provided 24/7 access to the IAEA to monitor all this.This commitment was for a 15-year period, but influenced by Israel, the US under Trump walked out of the deal in 2018 citing issues with Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Two years later, Iran also walked out of the deal and began enriching uranium to higher levels.Now the US says that Iran must end all enrichment on its soil and remove the entire stockpile of enriched uranium from the country. It wants an irreversible dismantling of nuclear infrastructure. Essentially it wants something that can only be achieved by a Iranian surrender. Iran says that as a non-weapon NPT signatory it is already committed to not making nuclear weapons. But it insists that it has the right to have the entire nuclear cycle as part of its NPT commitments. On the other hand, the US-Israeli attacks last June and now, have probably reinforced hard-liners in Iran who feel that giving up the nuclear weapons option would be tantamount to suicide.Today, the JCPOA does not exist, and there is a regime in Iran which has probably understood the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. In other words, the US-Israeli trashing of the JCPOA was a dangerous self-goal. Iran retains significant nuclear capacity, its regime is largely intact and its ballistic missile capacity remains to threaten both Israel and the US in the region. In addition, it has discovered the value of its control over the Strait of Hormuz.Having failed to achieve its political and strategic objectives, the US-Israeli military campaign, though a technical success, has been a failure.The big question that could well be asked is what would have happened if the JCPOA had been upheld instead of destroyed. It is possible that over its term, a more moderate, pragmatic leadership may have emerged, more comfortable with the West. Instead, Trump’s 2018 decision and his “maximum pressure” campaign led to a more hawkish regime and has brought Iran far closer to nuclear weapons than it was at 2018. Currently, there is no oversight over whatever exists of the programme and with the 440 kg enriched at 60%, Iran is closer to the goal of weapons grade enrichment.So, the US is today back at the point of trying to get Iran into a framework that restricts or rolls back its nuclear activity, and it is clear that that can only be done through negotiation, not the use of force.Ironically, in the early 1990s, the objective of the US was to “freeze, cap and roll back” India’s nuclear programme. India was able to handle the pressure for a few years, but then eventually had to break out of the constraints by testing its nuclear weapons.The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.This piece was first published on The India Cable – a premium newsletter from The Wire – and has been updated and republished here. To subscribe to The India Cable, click here.