The US-led talks to end the Ukraine-Russia war remain stalemated, both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. Following a round of talks in Abu Dhabi earlier this month, the American negotiators, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, travelled to Moscow to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin and subsequently to Dublin to hold discussions with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Meanwhile, the scope of the negotiations now include a larger agreement on a new security order for Europe.After his discussions with Kushner and Witkoff, Zelenskyy revealed that the Americans had floated the idea of Ukraine ceding the Donbas region in exchange for NATO membership. This is a significant proposal, given that Kyiv has long sought NATO membership something that has been vehemently opposed by Russia and, at various times, even by the US and other alliance members.Currently, Russian forces occupy most of Donbas, though Ukrainian troops continue to hold several important towns and defensive positions in the east. Russian advances have been incremental, despite the enormous military effort and casualties involved. Moscow has insisted that any peace agreement must include Ukraine withdrawing from the parts of Donbas that remain under its control, in addition to accepting Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia has also laid claim to the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.In Moscow, the American envoys asked Russia to submit a fresh proposal for a future security agreement with Europe, along with measures that could help ease tensions. This comes against the background of the hardline Russian position in Abu Dhabi, where Moscow reiterated its demand that NATO forces pull back from Poland and the Baltic states. The Russians also insisted that the negotiations address their longstanding grievances against NATO and the post-Cold War European security arrangement.In effect, Moscow is harking back to the Cold War, when the US and the Soviet Union maintained separate spheres of influence in Europe. The Russians argue that such an arrangement reduced the risk of confrontation and should provide the basis for a new European security architecture.This is not a new position. It is almost identical to the proposals Moscow made in December 2021, on the eve of its invasion of Ukraine. Russia had then proposed two treaties, one with NATO and another with the United States. These demanded that the US and its allies halt further military activity in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and substantially roll back NATO’s military presence in the region.In Abu Dhabi, the Americans reportedly reminded the Russians that the situation had changed considerably since 2021 and that the negotiations needed to look ahead rather than return to old grievances.BackgroundThe Russian grievance over NATO expansion has its origins in the discussions surrounding German reunification in 1990. Moscow has long maintained that it was given assurances by the West, that NATO would not expand eastward. However, the discussions at the time related primarily to the territory of the former East Germany.The Russians now want the starting point of the negotiations shifted to the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, which committed the two sides to developing a non-adversarial relationship. The agreement also explicitly recognised the right of all states to choose their own security arrangements and alliances. NATO pledged not to station substantial combat forces in the new member states.Russia now wants NATO to roll back its military infrastructure and deployments to the position that existed in 1997. This would have major implications for countries such as Poland and the Baltic states, which have become important elements of NATO’s eastern defences.Moscow has also sought the abrogation of the 2008 Bucharest Declaration, which held that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members of NATO.Looking aheadAt the meeting in Moscow with Witkoff and Kushner, Putin, however, insisted the proposals made in 2021 continued to reflect Russia’s position on a viable European security architecture. The Americans have now asked Moscow to submit a new proposal and have indicated that European countries must also be involved in the negotiations. Russia has so far been reluctant to accept substantive European participation.There is need to recognise that there has also been a major shift in the Europe-US-Ukraine equation in the past year and more. The Alaska summit of August 2025 brought out the extent to which the US was leaning towards Moscow. Today, though it continues to provide Ukraine with some weapons systems and intelligence support, it has curtailed its direct financial commitments, leaving Europe to fill much of the gap. European assistance has risen to around €72 billion annually, while European countries are also paying for weapons procured from the US for Ukraine.This in essence indicates a US stepping away from its European commitments and insisting that the Europeans take a greater stake in their own security and the Ukraine war. Because Europe still depends on the US for security, Washington retains much agency and is able to provide leadership to the peace process.Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty.Before the Abu Dhabi talks, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had said that discussions on a new security architecture could take place only after the war in Ukraine had ended. Under American pressure, however, Europe appears willing to consider a two-track approach, with negotiations to end the war proceeding alongside discussions on the longer-term security arrangements for the continent.The Europeans have therefore decided to be represented in the talks by six negotiators drawn from the UK, France, Germany, Poland and Italy, along with a representative of the European Union.There remains as yet a considerable gulf between Russia and Europe on the question of a new security architecture, just as there is between Moscow and Kyiv on the terms of a peace agreement.The Americans are right to remind Russia that the situation has changed substantially since 2021. The invasion, which Moscow presumably expected would lead to a quick victory and the subordination of Ukraine, has instead produced a stronger Ukrainian national identity and a much more militarily capable Europe. It has also imposed enormous costs on Russia in terms of casualties, economic expenditure and the diversion of resources.A return to the Cold War arrangement, in which Eastern Europe and the Baltic states were effectively treated as part of a Russian sphere of influence, is no longer a realistic possibility. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are now fiercely independent and countries such as Poland have consolidated their political and economic positions and play a substantial role in European affairs.Indeed, the Russian invasion has accelerated a major transformation in European security policy. With the US increasingly pursuing its ‘America First’ policies and displaying uncertainty about its long-term commitment to European security, the continent has begun taking steps to strengthen its own defence capabilities.The EU has launched its ambitious €800 billion ReArm Europe initiative. This includes a mechanism, SAFE, to provide up to €150 billion in loans for joint defence procurement and industrial production, alongside increased allocations for defence and space in future EU budgets.Germany has implemented its historic Zeitenwende, or turning point, by substantially increasing defence expenditure. Its defence spending rose by 24 per cent in a single year, making it Europe’s largest military spender.Also read: Russia and Ukraine Agree to a Large Prisoner Exchange as Talks End With No Major BreakthroughPoland has emerged as one of NATO’s biggest defence spenders relative to the size of its economy, with expenditure exceeding 4 per cent of GDP. It is building what is expected to become Europe’s largest land army and has embarked on a major programme of border fortifications. The three Baltic states have also pushed their defence expenditure well above 3 per cent of GDP and are developing defensive fortifications along their borders with Russia and Belarus.Perhaps the most consequential change has been the decision of Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Their accession has transformed the strategic geography of northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region. The Nordic countries have also moved towards greater military integration, including closer coordination of their air forces. But we should be clear that as of now Europe lacks the cohesion and capacity to face the Russian challenge. The rise of nationalism in Europe militates against a common position on security.The larger point is that Russia’s invasion has produced almost the opposite of what Putin set out to achieve. NATO has expanded, European countries have increased their defence spending, and countries that were once relatively comfortable with their security arrangements have become deeply conscious of the Russian threat.The difficulty with the present negotiations is that Moscow is still trying to secure a European security arrangement based on the strategic circumstances that existed before February 2022. But the war itself has fundamentally altered those circumstances.Russia may be able to extract territorial concessions from Ukraine through a negotiated settlement, but it cannot expect to reverse the political and strategic changes brought about by its own invasion.Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.This piece was first published on The India Cable – a premium newsletter from The Wire – and has been updated and republished here. To subscribe to The India Cable, click here.