Greenland is back in the headlines, accompanied by a new round of anxiety over its future. Recall, on January 17, nearly a third of Nuuk’s population gathered near the US consulate, carrying placards declaring that Greenland was not for sale. The same day, US president Donald Trump announced tariffs against eight European countries, saying they would remain until an agreement was reached for the “complete and total purchase” of Greenland.The confrontation had been building for sometime. On 3 January, US forces seized Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. A day later, Trump declared that the United States “absolutely” needed Greenland. As early as 2019, during his first presidency, Trump had publicly confirmed that he was considering buying the island.Eight months later, on September 18, Trump announced a security agreement with Denmark and Greenland, to be signed in New York next week. He calls it permanent American authority over Greenland’s security. Denmark says it respects its sovereignty and Greenland’s right to decide its own future.So, what is in the deal, with whom, when and for how long? Did Denmark and Greenland give in, and for what? What does America want from Greenland while Russia, China and India move into the Arctic, new tariffs hit Russia’s oil buyers and Xi Jinping heads to Washington? What is Greenland’s legal position? And what does Trump gain from all this?What has been announcedThe two sides describe the deal very differently. Trump says the US will have permanent authority over its security needs in Greenland. He says hostile powers will not be allowed bases, forces or sensitive investments there without the approval of US, and that US will expand its military presence. Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen says the deal strengthens security in the Arctic and North Atlantic and recognises Danish sovereignty and the Greenlandic people’s right to self-determination. Greenland’s leader, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, calls it a gain for the whole Western alliance.On duration, “permanent” is Trump’s word. An agreement with no end date can still be amended or ended by consent. The 1951 defence agreement, which the new deal builds on, is tied to the North Atlantic Treaty and can be reviewed by agreement. “Permanent” may describe political intent more than legal fact.Did Denmark and Greenland give in?However, nothing announced so far deals with transfer of territory. Denmark held its line on sovereignty, and the argument moved from ownership to security. That is a retreat for Trump, at least on paper. But Denmark and Greenland may have conceded more than they say. The US already had wide rights under the 1951 agreement: building bases, stationing troops, moving forces, flying aircraft. A former Pentagon official said that many American goals could have been reached through ordinary diplomacy. So the new part must be something else. The likeliest option is a say over who else may build, station forces or invest in Greenland. If Washington can block foreign investment, that reaches into Greenland’s control over its own minerals and economy. Until the text appears, nobody outside the negotiating rooms can say how much was given.What America wants from GreenlandThe military case is known. Greenland sits on the shortest path between Russia and the United States, which makes it useful for missile warning. America has operated Pituffik Space Base there for decades, and Greenland may figure in the planned “Golden Dome” missile shield. This interest began in the Cold War, well before China’s rise.The economic case is clear enough. Melting ice may open shorter shipping routes between Europe and Asia. Greenland also holds an estimated 25 of the EU’s 34 critical raw materials, including rare earths and graphite. Western states want these to reduce their dependence on China.Is the threat as large as Trump says? A Danish defence college expert said that there is no immediate military danger of the kind Trump describes. He said China does not routinely operate warships or submarines there, though Russian submarines sometimes pass nearby. The Arctic is changing, but the “Chinese ships everywhere” claim is disputed.The Arctic race, BRICS and the timingRussia treats the Arctic as central to its future. India is moving in. At the BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12-13, Russia said it could sign a Northern Sea Route agreement with India this year, with a joint trial voyage in 2027. Putin also offered BRICS partners cooperation on an Arctic transport corridor. At the same summit, leaders including Putin, Modi and Xi condemned unilateral and secondary sanctions without naming America.Days later, Trump signed a new sanctions law, on the same day as the Greenland announcement. It lets him put tariffs of up to 100% on the top five buyers of Russian oil and gas, which mainly means China and India. It exempts European allies who cut their Russian gas use, and it leaves the decision on who is hit, and at what rate, largely to him.Washington is apparently working on two fronts: cutting the money Russia earns from energy, and securing the western end of the northern routes that Russia, China and India want to use. Xi Jinping arrives in Washington on 24 September, with AI expected to be a main topic. Trump will meet him holding a new tariff power and a fresh Arctic announcement. Because the tariff power is discretionary, it can also be traded away.Greenland’s legal statusGreenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Under the 2009 Self-Government Act it runs its domestic affairs, while Denmark keeps defence, foreign affairs and currency. The Act also recognises a path to independence.The legal scholar Kamrul Hossain argues that Greenlanders are a people with a right to self-determination, so a change of sovereignty cannot be treated as a property deal between Copenhagen and Washington. Strategic importance, he adds, gives no state a right to the territory (Hossain). Force is barred by the UN Charter. And a security deal is not sovereignty: a country can host foreign troops without giving up its territory.Three weaknesses are worth examining. First, defence still belongs to the Kingdom, so Greenland’s voice on a defence deal rests on consultation rights and political weight more than on formal power. Second, Greenland depends on Denmark’s annual grant, and one estimate says it would need about 24 large mining projects to replace it. A people with a legal right to choose but a thin budget is easy to lean on. Third, polls show most Greenlanders do not want to join the US. Their consent is what the law requires, and so far it has not been asked for.How China, Russia and the EU responded earlierChina’s foreign ministry had earlier rejected Trump’s claim that Chinese ships were around Greenland. On January 5, spokesperson Lin Jian told Washington to stop using a “China threat” to justify its aims, and on January 12, Mao Ning said lawful activity in the Arctic should be respected.Russia was more mixed. Foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said Trump’s push signalled a “deep crisis” for NATO. He denied that Russia threatens Greenland but also said it is not a “natural part” of Denmark. He compared it to Crimea, and other Russian voices openly welcomed the split in the West. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called the situation “extraordinary” from the standpoint of international law. Moscow’s concern for Greenland’s rights is hard to take seriously given Ukraine.The European Union (EU) stood with Denmark. Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa had said the EU was in “full solidarity” with Denmark and Greenland and warned that tariffs would set off a downward spiral.What Trump gains, and what could go wrongIn the short term, the deal gives him something to show voters before the November midterms. The Iran war, which began in late February, remains part of his record, and a Republican strategist warned in July that rising energy prices make it harder for Republicans to talk about lowering costs. A Greenland pact that sounds like a big win, without a fight and with a NATO ally at the table, helps him at home. “Permanent control” is a good line even if the text is more modest.In the long term, he could gain a bigger US role in missile defence, a hand in where Greenland’s minerals go, and a model for using security deals to shape who invests in strategic regions.The risks are clear. If the published text gives far less than “permanent control,” his own supporters may notice. Danish and Greenlandic lawmakers can amend or reject it. Greenlanders remember the tariff threats and the talk of force, and nearly a third of Nuuk’s residents marched in January. Threatening an ally’s territory also wears down trust inside NATO.In short, one may argue that America has not bought Greenland, and on current evidence Denmark and Greenland have not sold it. What they have apparently agreed to is a security arrangement whose real weight depends on a text nobody has seen. The questions to ask when it appears are simple. Does Washington get a veto over other countries’ bases and investments? Does Greenland keep control of its resources? Can the arrangement be reviewed or ended? Those answers will show whether this was a compromise or a concession made under pressure.K.M. Seethi is director, Inter University Centre for Social Science Research and Extension and academic advisor to the International Centre for Polar Studies at the Mahatma Gandhi University (MGU) in Kerala. He also served as ICSSR senior fellow, senior professor of international relations and dean of social sciences at MGU.