In the turbulent arena of 21st-century geopolitics, few spectacles capture the contradictions of contemporary power quite like the ongoing confrontation with Iran. As war escalates and spreads, oil prices gyrate with mind-boggling confusion with every presidential utterance, and the Strait of Hormuz remains a chokepoint of global anxiety, one figure dominates the narrative: Donald J. Trump. His self-proclaimed mastery of “The Art of the Deal” – a blend of bravado, buffoonery, walk-away threats and last-minute triumphs – was once marketed as a disruptive force capable of reshaping everything from real estate to great-power relations. Yet, transplanted into the high-stakes arena of armed conflict with a resilient and experienced revolutionary regime, the tactic has backfired – with dangerous consequences.This is a style of leadership increasingly emblematic of our age: highly personalist, temperament-driven, amplified by digital media, and rooted in a broader global trend toward elite-populist and autocracy. What we witness in Trump’s Iran policy — including the rapid raising and then selective lifting of oil sanctions on both Iran and Russia — is a vivid case study in how such approaches fare when confronted with the unforgiving realities of global power. And it seems that the pattern is becoming more common, not less.Trump’s deadly Iran spectacle: Daily whiplashTrump’s second-term approach to Iran began with echoes of his first: maximum pressure through sanctions, stern letters to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and repeated vows that Tehran would never acquire nuclear weapons. Deadlines were issued — 60 days for a new understanding, then tighter windows. Even as diplomacy continued, Israel opportunistically acted, and the United States joined with significant, deadly combat operations. Early rhetoric was triumphalist: Iran’s forces were “dead,” its leadership “gone,” its defences “non-existent.” Victory, Trump declared at various points, was “weeks ahead of schedule.” America had essentially “blown Iran off the map.”Then the zigzags accelerated. One day the conflict was “very complete, pretty much over.” The next, “more determined fighting” lay ahead for “ultimate victory.” Threats to “obliterate” Iranian power plants and energy infrastructure if the Strait of Hormuz was not fully reopened came with 48-hour ultimatums. Markets trembled. Allies were urged — often demanded — to shoulder the burden of policing the waterway, with Washington offering only conditional support. “The United States does not need to guard it,” Trump insisted, even as he floated vague ideas of joint arrangements.Hours later, the tone shifted again. “Very good and productive conversations” had taken place, he announced. Iran had supposedly reached out. There were “major points of agreement,” especially on preventing nuclear weapons. Strikes on critical infrastructure were postponed for five days, then ten, framed as a magnanimous gesture toward “complete and total resolution.” Envoys were engaged; a “top person” from the Iranian side was reportedly at the table. Yet Tehran flatly denied negotiations, dismissing the claims as manipulation or “fake news” and insisting it would not bargain under duress. Objectives morphed: from total dismantlement of the nuclear programme, to missile curbs, to shipping lanes, to hints of “regime change” without clear definition. Who knows what the aim of this war is? And anxieties around the world skyrocket.Oil sanctions? Yes, no, maybe later…Compounding the whiplash has been Trump’s handling of oil sanctions: the art of the deal hits the rock of wartime realities. Having raised or intensified pressure through sanctions earlier in the conflict, the Trump team has moved swiftly to ease them when energy prices spiked toward $100 per barrel and beyond, threatening U.S. consumers and global markets. In mid-March, the Treasury Department temporarily lifted sanctions on Russian oil already at sea, allowing shipments to proceed for roughly a month until mid-April, explicitly to inject supply and calm volatility triggered by disruptions in the Gulf. Similar relief followed for Iranian crude: on a Friday, officials waived restrictions on approximately 140 million barrels of Iranian oil loaded onto vessels, authorising purchases until mid-April. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent framed the moves as “narrowly tailored” and “temporary,” aimed at defeating Iran’s strategy of driving up prices while continuing military operations.These easings came after periods of heightened sanctions rhetoric and followed patterns that appear calibrated to market rhythms. Announcements of relief often landed toward the end of the working week — Fridays in particular — providing an immediate boost to trading sentiment as markets closed for the weekend, only for the underlying pressure (and threats of reimposition) to resurface or intensify in rhetoric during the subsequent trading days. The administration has also drawn from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and accelerated domestic flows, but the selective lifting of foreign sanctions stands out as a gambit to placate Wall Street and Main Street amid soaring gasoline prices. Trump himself has linked such steps to broader efforts to “keep prices low” while maintaining leverage, yet the rapid cycle of raising pressure, then partially lifting it, only to signal potential reinstatement “once the crisis ends,” adds another layer of inconsistency if not chaos. Iran gains revenue windfalls from the loosened barrels, even as U.S. strikes continue; Russia receives a timely financial reprieve despite its reported assistance to Iranian targeting. Critics, including former officials, note the irony: wartime sanctions policy appears driven as much by domestic market optics as by strategic coercion.This is terrifying testimony to personalist power, a hallmark of our age.Infantile blame game as diplomacyThis is the diplomacy of panic, oscillating between apocalyptic warnings and sudden de-escalation, sending a message of anarchic confusion. It is exacerbated by blame games when promises of quick dissolve into thin air. Everyone else is blamed: previous administrations for “giving” Iran rights, Iran for intransigence, allies for insufficient enthusiasm. Iran, forged in decades of sanctions, proxy wars and American policy reversals (including the 2018 unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA), knows how to weather storms, and how to turn American volatility into a propaganda asset. The result is farcical anarchy for oil prices, and the demise of US credibility.Trump’s defenders argue that the chaos keeps adversaries off-balance, forcing movement through uncertainty — a modern Trump-inflected “madman theory.” In business, a developer can renegotiate, declare bankruptcy or simply walk away. In great-power conflict there’s a lot more stake. The “art” on display risks leaving not a superior deal but a more dangerous region, with costs measured in lives and treasure.Parallels in recent history: Not unique, but increasingly familiarTrump is hardly the first world leader to exhibit such traits. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey offers perhaps the closest ongoing parallel. Over years in power, Erdoğan has zigzagged dramatically: shooting down a Russian jet in 2015 then backtracking after sanctions bit; oscillating between confrontation and reconciliation with NATO allies while purchasing Russian S-400 systems; launching military operations in Syria, Libya and the eastern Mediterranean, and de-escalating as costs mounted. Bombastic rhetoric, shifting red lines, blame on external forces or past governments, and declarations of new eras followed by pragmatic deals have become normalised. Supporters hail it as shrewd multi-alignment in a multipolar world; critics see exhausting strategic amateurishness rooted in personalist whim.Boris Johnson in Britain displayed similar patterns during his premiership: impulsive announcements, frequent U-turns on Brexit deadlines and negotiations, chaotic communication, and blame-shifting onto civil servants, predecessors or EU elites. Dramatic “oven-ready” claims gave way to revisions, with allies and adversaries left uncertain about underlying objectives. Even within his own party, the style was often described as temperament overriding institutional reliability.North Korea’s Kim Jong Un has long weaponised unpredictability: alternating nuclear threats and insults with sudden charm offensives, summits and letters. Goals shift between full denuclearisation rhetoric and celebration of nuclear status. Trump himself engaged this style in 2018-19: theatre without any durable results.Other cases abound, including Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines with volatile rhetoric toward the US and China alike, alongside hedging foreign policy. India’s Narendra Modi’s bizarre flip-flops on meetings with Pakistan in 2015, and his short-lived but tempestuous on-off bromance with Trump, provides another telling example of the unmoored and personalist leadership abroad in the world today.These figures share a preference for instinct, grievance and public drama over bureaucratic consistency. They sell themselves as ‘can-do’ strongmen, who can through sheer force of personality, solve intractable global issues. What distinguishes the current moment is not the existence of such leadership but its visibility, spread and consequences in an interconnected world – where sanctions policy itself becomes another tool for daily market management rather than long-term strategy.A broader trend: The rise of personalist and populist stylesEmpirical evidence from democracy trackers such as the V-Dem Institute shows that personalist and autocratising tendencies have intensified over the past two to three decades. The “third wave of autocratisation,” underway since around the mid-2000s, shows no signs of easing. The number of autocracies has risen, while liberal democracies house only a small fraction of the world’s population. Nearly a quarter of countries are undergoing autocratisation, with the trend reaching established Western systems. Personalist rule — where power concentrates around an individual rather than institutions or parties — correlates strongly with centralised, improvised foreign policymaking, including ad-hoc sanctions adjustments timed to economic cycles.Populism amplifies these dynamics. Populist leaders often personalise politics, attack established institutions and rely on direct, emotion-driven communication that rewards drama. Foreign policy becomes more unpredictable in procedural terms, despite ideological affinities. This causes rising unpredictability in world politics, with consequences for multilateral cooperation and crisis management.This is no coincidence. The post-Cold War era dismantled the bipolar discipline that once constrained wild swings among major powers. Globalisation, economic shocks, migration, cultural change and technological acceleration created fertile ground for leaders promising simple, personal solutions against complex elite failures. The decline of credibility of strong party gatekeepers allowed more outsiders and charismatic figures to rise.Crucially, social media and 24/7 news cycles transformed the incentives. Leaders can speak directly, frequently and impulsively. This rewards theatricality, keeps domestic bases energised and adversaries guessing, but exacts a price in credibility. In earlier eras, volatility was harder to sustain publicly; gaps between rhetoric and action could be managed quietly. Today, every Truth Social post or press gaggle moves markets and tests alliances in real time.The result is a more fragmented international system in which personalist styles proliferate. Unpredictability in one capital ripples faster and farther due to interconnected finance, energy and information flows. Whether this represents adaptive flexibility in a volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous (VUCA) world or simply higher risks of miscalculation remains contested.Why “art of the deal” struggles in anarchyThe Art of the Deal assumes transactional counterparts who fear walking away more than you do and calculate in similar cost-benefit terms. Iran’s leadership, steeped in nationalist-revolutionary ideology, and theology, and survival instincts honed by decades of Western threats and sanctions, does not suit Trump-style dealmaking. Memories are long – including from the Anglo-American coup to instal the Shah in 1953, to the post-revolutionary support of Iraq during the 1980s war, sanctions, the JCPOA betrayal; those memories have hardened resolve.In such circumstances, patient diplomacy, credibility and alliance coordination matter more than individual flair. Allies hesitate to commit when endgames remain undefined and sanctions policy appears driven by weekly price fluctuations. Adversaries exploit visible divisions. Domestic pressures – war fatigue, rising energy costs, political polarisation – increase vulnerability. Sort-term theatre does not usually deliver stable outcomes.Trump’s Iran approach combines into a perfect storm bound to end in disaster.Broader implications and counter-trendsThe Iran case illuminates a larger conjuncture. As personalist and populist leadership spreads, the international system faces heightened risks of misperception, escalation and weakened cooperation. And global issues from nuclear proliferation and climate crises remain unaddressed.Yet counter-trends exist. Public backlash against chaos, empowered civil society, and the sheer electoral costs of prolonged volatility may force a rethink. Multipolarity may eventually impose its own discipline, as rising powers demand more consistent engagement. In the U.S. itself, institutional guardrails – Congress, courts, military professionals, even segments of the foreign policy establishment – have historically tempered executive excess, though their resilience is tested in the current environment.Ultimately, wars and nuclear standoffs cannot be managed to the rhythm of the markets or oil prices. They demand strategic patience, consistency and clear objectives. The “art” displayed in the Iran confrontation of 2026 may energise domestic voter bases or generate tactical manoeuvres, including temporary relief for floating barrels of oil, but it is a high risk strategy that could lead to catastrophic and prolonged warfare, drawing in the great powers.Yet this style of diplomacy of the street market is more common, more amplified and more consequential than in much of the post-1945 era. It is exposing the limits of personality-driven power in an interdependent, nuclear-armed world.The stakes extend far beyond one conflict or one leader. In an age of autocratisation and digital immediacy, the question is whether societies and institutions can constrain the most erratic impulses before they produce outcomes that no single “deal” – or weekend market reprieve – can undo.Inderjeet Parmar is professor of international politics and associate dean of research in the School of Policy and Global Affairs at City St George’s, University of London. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences and writes the American Imperium column for The Wire. His Twitter handle is @USEmpire. He is the author of several books, including Foundations of the American Century and is currently writing on the history of the US foreign policy establishment and Trump and the Crisis of American Empire.Bamo Nouri is a Visiting Lecturer at City St George’s, University of London, an independent investigative journalist and writer with interests in American foreign policy and the international and domestic politics of the Middle East.