On December 4, 2025, President Donald J. Trump put his signature on the National Security Strategy (NSS 2025) of the United States of America. Earlier, during his first term (2017-21), Trump had signed his first NSS on November 14, 2017. Since he lost his re-election, nobody remembers that document anymore.This 29-page document has not so far been called the “Trump Doctrine”. But given the experience of nine earlier Doctrines it may soon be so designated. The earlier doctrines were the Monroe Doctrine (1823), the Theodore Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1904), Truman Doctrine (1947), Eisenhower Doctrine (1957), Kennedy Doctrine (1961-63, no specific year), Nixon Doctrine (1969), Carter Doctrine (1980), Reagan Doctrine (1985), Bush Doctrine (2001), and the Obama Doctrine (2008).In this essay we will analyse NSS 2025 to understand the way America views the world and what role it wants to play therein. Besides some critical points regarding international security and economy, four regions have received mention in the document, namely, the Western Hemisphere (the Americas), Asia, Europe and Africa (briefly).We have eight major takeaways from its reading. The first and foremost is the U.S. anxiety which runs through the text, that is, of losing its Numero Uno position. The argument is that this process cannot be arrested unless America reasserts itself as the global leader, Trump’s MAGA (Make America Great Again) promise put in a policy term. This is possible through recruiting, training and equipping a most powerful and technologically advanced military. America, therefore, must build itself as the world’s strongest economy with a robust industrial base (pages 3-4).Two, by using the expression “Trump Corollary” to the “Monroe Doctrine” (page 5) NSS 2025 gives primacy to the need for the U.S. to assert its predominance in the Latin American region. “The United States will reassert … to restore American pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region. We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.” (page 15, emphasis added)Three, America is not only determined to discourage migrations from the developing countries to the United States, but it expects even Europe to be an active partner in this U.S. mission. The theme of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers runs throughout the document which underlines how seriously Trump wants to address the problem. Note the Following:“We want a world in which migration is not merely “orderly” but one in which sovereign countries work together to stop rather than facilitate destabilising population flows, and have full control over whom they do and do not admit…. [W]e cannot allow meritocracy to be used as a justification to open America’s labour market to the world in the name of finding “global talent” that undercuts American workers…. The era of mass migration must end.” (pages 3, 11, emphasis added to draw the attention of India’s STEM professionals).Four, the White Man’s Burden has been retold, though this phrase has not been used. The cultural connection and mutual dependence between America and Europe have been underlined in unmistakable terms. Here is an example:“We want Europe to remain European, to regain its civilisational self-confidence…. As a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine, European relations with Russia are now deeply attenuated, and many Europeans regard Russia as an existential threat. Managing European relations with Russia will require significant U.S. diplomatic engagement, both to reestablish conditions of strategic stability across the Eurasian landmass, and to mitigate the risk of conflict between Russia and European states…. America is, understandably, sentimentally attached to the European continent–and, of course, to Britain and Ireland.” (pages 25-26, emphasis added)Five, China looms large as an economic adversary, which must not overtake America. The commercial relations between America and China are “fundamentally unbalanced” which must be addressed.“If America remains on a growth path – and can sustain that while maintaining a genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing – we should be headed from our present $30 trillion economy in 2025 to $40 trillion in the 2030s, putting our country in an enviable position to maintain our status as the world’s leading economy.” (page 20)Six, the question of climate change has been subordinated to that of America’s superiority in the energy sector. Hence America should not be expected to contribute to the climate change discourse. “We reject the disastrous “climate change” and “Net Zero” ideologies that have so greatly harmed Europe, threaten the United States, and subsidise our adversaries,” (page 14).Seven, there is an indication of Trump’s penchant to win the Nobel Peace Prize. “President Trump has cemented his legacy as The President of Peace….He negotiated peace between Cambodia and Thailand, Kosovo and Serbia, the DRC and Rwanda, Pakistan and India, Israel and Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and ended the war in Gaza with all living hostages returned to their families.”Note Trump’s reiteration of his role in ending the four-day India-Pakistan war (Operation Sindoor) which, according to Trump, had the potential to become a nuclear showdown (page 8).Our eighth and last point is about India. India has figured thrice in the document, twice in the context of Indo-Pacific security as America’s “partner” (pages 21, 23), and once, when Trump claims to have forced the belligerent India and Pakistan to agree to a ceasefire in the post-Pahalgam 4-day war (page 8). “We must continue to improve commercial (and other) relations with India to encourage New Delhi to contribute to Indo-Pacific security, including through continued quadrilateral cooperation with Australia, Japan and the United States (“the Quad”).” (page 23)In conclusion, let us make two points. One, any presidential doctrine is valid only for the presidency during which it has been enunciated. That too, it need not guide every U.S. policy step for diplomacy is essentially situational, and sometimes even a fire-fighting intervention. As we have mentioned above, barring the two-hundred-year-old Monroe Doctrine (1823) the remaining eight Doctrines did not survive their authors.Two, the NSS 2025 is a blueprint of Trump’s MAGA promise but without its usual boast. Here, Trump’s “America first” is not speaking with flamboyance. On the contrary, it lists a litany of expectations from its allies and in the process laments the decline of America’s most trusted alliance system, NATO. Even the Chinese economic threat to America has been viewed more as a challenge to be addressed. Given the fact that Trump is a confirmed jingoist, NSS 2025 on the whole is a modest and liberal statement of the American intent.Partha S. Ghosh is a retired professor, JNU.