Tuesday’s US midterm elections bring into view a second: the resumption of the US-Israeli war on Iran. By now Washington should have learnt that military capability is not the same as strategic advantage. But tell that to Donald Trump.The bigger problem is that even now the US is not clear as to what its strategic objectives are – a surrender by Iran leading to regime change, a destruction of its nuclear and missile capacity, or a negotiated settlement that constrains the nuclear and missile programmes and allows toll-free passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Each requires a different kind of war. But the US is stuck on a rut and resuming the first is likely to end where the last round did, at the same dead end.And this time, the Iranians are not waiting passively. Last week, the Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamanei met his three military commanders and ordered “immediate and effective response without geographical limitations” to achieve “maximum deterrence.” The US may have the first go in starting a war, Khamanei said, but it will be Iran that will determine when and under what conditions it will end.Two tracksLast week, CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper briefed President Trump on the state of the war. Washington is running two tracks at once: preparing a second round of Operation Epic Fury while negotiating a deal. The build-up is substantial: over 50,000 troops, more F-15s and refuelling tankers, additional Patriot and THAAD batteries to protect bases and allies, and three carrier groups with 20 other warships in the theatre.Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty.A group of regional mediators led by Qatar is trying to head off a resumption. A channel has opened between Vice President J D Vance and Mohsen Rezai, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Vance has reportedly insisted that the nuclear programme be addressed. Iran wants the naval blockade lifted, its frozen funds released and its oil allowed to be sold before it discusses the nuclear issue. The sticking point is trust. Twice attacked in the middle of negotiations in the past year, Tehran is wary of dealing with someone like Trump.Meanwhile the blockade has squeezed Iran hard, and the US has used a variety of means to restore oil flows through Hormuz to near pre-war levels. But the flows hit at least 30-34 commercial ships and tankers in the Strait but have so far chosen not to do so at scale. The result is “no war, no peace”, which requires the constant commitment of a substantial part of the US military to the Hormuz operation. The great unknown is how much pain Tehran can bear.What the war has shownNobody doubted that the US and Israel could inflict massive damage on Iran, which was plainly inferior in air and naval power. The question was what that damage could achieve. The June 2025 strikes had already shown Iran’s capacity for missile and drone warfare, and it had regional allies in the Houthis and Hezbollah. Washington’s apparent aims were threefold, and none has been secured.1. Regime change was the hardest, for two reasons.There is no unified opposition in Iran, and a ground commitment and long campaign would be needed for which neither the US nor Israel has any appetite after Iraq and Afghanistan. The alternative was to destabilise the regime by decapitation, through a campaign of assassination. But the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears to have anticipated this and reorganised in a decentralised manner. The leadership has chosen to endure the campaign rather than surrender.2. Destroying the nuclear programme.Trump claimed he had done so in June 2025. Repeated strikes since have flattened all the facilities except Pickaxe Mountain, which sits under a granite mountain. The programme’s present status is unknown, but Iran reportedly retains enough highly enriched uranium for perhaps a dozen bombs, along with an unspecified number of working centrifuges. More important, it retains the scientific knowledge, the human capital and the political will.3. Eliminating the missile arsenal.The campaign degraded Iran’s capabilities significantly, but Tehran has preserved a substantial arsenal and can manufacture new missiles from stored components. All these are based in vast underground facilities that are not easy to reach. This is the core of its defensive strategy, and it has not been eliminated.The war also produced results nobody planned for. Iran discovered the leverage that its position on the northern side of the Strait of Hormuz gives it. Iran also showed the sophistication of its missiles, the accuracy of its targeting and its innovation in evading interception, which exposed the limits of American protection for its Gulf allies. American facilities across the region suffered extensive damage, forcing US power out to sea or far back to the American continent.The endgameHow the war ends remains unclear. US forces are ready to go, and so are the Iranians, who have made clear they are adopting a strategy of offensive-defence.Eight months into the campaign, the American endgame remains elusive. Trump has variously spoken of eliminating Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities, reopening the Strait of Hormuz and destroying Iran itself. These objectives require different military strategies and carry vastly different risks. Air strikes might damage nuclear facilities, but neutralising the missile force is harder. Forcing regime change or unconditional surrender could take a prolonged campaign requiring a commitment of ground forces and a risk of American casualties, with no guarantee of success.Iran’s objectives, by contrast, are easier to identify: an end to American military action, credible guarantees against future attacks, relief from sanctions, a settlement that protects its regional interests, and a say in the arrangements governing a Strait through which a substantial share of the world’s oil passes. What concessions Tehran would accept, and whether Washington would accommodate them, is far from clear.There is always that wildcard that in the event of continued and relentless American pressure, Iran decides to scrap its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and fabricate nuclear weapons. It is a tribute to the thoughtlessness of American strategy that they assassinated the man who had so far blocked an Iranian bomb – Ayatollah Ali Khamanei.What it means for IndiaIndia imports nearly 90% of its crude, and a renewed war would hit through energy prices, disrupted shipping, inflation and pressure on the rupee. At $120 per barrel, India could end up with an import bill of nearly $ 200 billion in a year. Some 9–10 million Indians live in the region, many in the Gulf, and airspace closures and delayed projects mean layoffs and recruitment freezes. Last year India got a record high of $ 110 billion as remittances from the Gulf.India has limited influence over the course of the war, but it cannot afford passivity. India’s initial statement called for restraint, followed by an emphasis on de-escalation and protection of civilians. It called for dialogue and diplomacy to handle the situation, while noting that “sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states must be respected.” Yet India has strategic ties with the US and Israel and invested heavily in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states while preserving ties with Iran. But so far this seemingly neutral posture has not given it any special dividends.The countries with the most to lose from the Strait’s disruption are Asian: India, China, Japan and South Korea. Together they buy a large share of the Gulf’s oil. They could back Qatar’s mediation, work out shared arrangements for navigation and insurance in the Strait, and tell Washington jointly that a resumption would cost them dearly. They have been the collateral casualties of this war. There is no reason for them to keep behaving like bystanders.Monoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.This piece was first published on The India Cable – a premium newsletter from The Wire – and has been updated and republished here. To subscribe to The India Cable, click here.