Last week, the research institute Citizen Lab revealed that the mobile phone of Boniface Mwangi – a photojournalist, prominent opposition activist, and candidate in Kenya’s 2027 presidential election – had been hacked using a system developed by the Israeli company Cellebrite.Mwangi’s phone was seized by authorities when he was arrested in July 2025 over his involvement in protests against the government of President William Ruto. The mass protests erupted in response to violence by security forces, including extrajudicial killings, as well as the government’s widespread corruption. Addressing the investigation and subsequent media inquiries, Cellebrite said it works to prevent the misuse of its technology and invited anyone making such claims to contact the company directly with substantiated evidence, but did not announce any changes to its operations in Kenya.The alleged involvement of a private Israeli company in the persecution of Kenya’s opposition is yet another example of the evolution of Israel’s role in internal repression worldwide – from activities carried out primarily by official state bodies and government-owned companies to operations conducted by private firms operating under licenses issued by the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs. The use of private companies is intended to obscure responsibility and create the false impression that the State of Israel bears none. Yet Israel did not revoke Cellebrite’s operating license in Kenya following the Citizen Lab investigation – just as it has not done so in the wake of serious investigative findings in other countries.In Kenya in particular, Israeli Foreign Ministry files from the 1980s concerning relations with the authoritarian regime of Daniel arap Moi – opened to the public over the past two years – reveal only the tip of the iceberg of Israeli involvement in the country. While the Mossad was the central actor in these relations and its files remain classified, the Foreign Ministry records nonetheless offer insight into the underlying interests and patterns of conduct that continue to this day.In a report dated June 4, 1980, Aryeh Oded, head of Israel’s Interests Office in Kenya (operating out of the Danish Embassy in Nairobi), noted that “despite the severing of diplomatic relations in 1973, Israel managed to maintain significant economic and security activities in Kenya, which in some areas were even greater than during the period when an embassy was in operation.” Oded also highlighted the presence of Israeli military experts in Kenya, noting that this continued despite “the death of President Kenyatta, who had a deep affection for Israel and its leaders and a strong disdain for the Arabs, and the rise of Moi, who had no special ties with Israel.”In a cable sent on December 28, 1980, Israeli Foreign Ministry director-general David Kimche summarised Kenya’s importance to Israel: “Of all the countries in Africa, Kenya is among the most important for us, and the Israeli presence there is among the most impressive. An El Al branch and layovers for flights to South Africa, a Mossad station, defense and other exports worth tens of millions of dollars, and hundreds of Israeli families residing there.”Mossad’s activities on Kenyan soilPresident Moi allowed Israel to carry out activities on Kenyan soil that many other African leaders had refused. Unlike others who occasionally received ad hoc advice or services from the Mossad, Moi permitted the agency to operate a permanent station coordinating its operations across East Africa. Furthermore, the El Al route through Nairobi provided Israel’s only independent direct link to the apartheid regime in South Africa, a key security and economic partner at the time. Moi approved this because of the importance he placed on Israeli support for Kenya’s internal security.In a cable dated February 24, 1980, the Israeli Embassy in Washington reported to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem that during his visit, President Moi “mentioned his frequent contact with a Mossad operative in Nairobi.” In a follow-up cable sent on June 3, 1980, the Mossad representative in Kenya suggested leveraging this close relationship with Moi to “stir suspicions in Kenya toward the Arabs, including regarding the president’s personal security.”In Foreign Ministry cables, Moi’s regime was described as a one-party, corrupt government under a “repressive scepter of single-rule,” persecuting and arresting critics on the basis of unfounded accusations. However, a Foreign Ministry review prepared on February 1, 1981, noted that “the Mossad’s position in Nairobi, as is known, is strong and growing,” and regarding security cooperation, it stated that “in addition to equipment exports, the security apparatus is also, as is known, involved in training personnel in Israel.”The failed coup attempt, led by Air Force officers on August 1, 1982, took Israel by surprise, as it had until then considered Moi’s regime one of the most stable in Africa. In a series of cables following the coup, Foreign Ministry officials analysed its causes and assessed the risks it posed for the future.Among other observations, David Sultan, who replaced Oded as head of Israel’s Interests Office in Kenya, wrote in a review prepared on August 23, 1982, that “it can be concluded that Moi’s regime does not enjoy public support. The segments of the population and actors experiencing political and social alienation are strong and growing. The regime will increasingly have to rely on coercive measures.”In a cable from the Israeli Embassy in Washington, dated September 9, the Africa director at the National Security Council (NSC) told Israeli diplomats that Moi’s political future “is a matter of deep concern.” He characterised Moi as “not blessed with excess intelligence” and “paranoid, seeing traitors even among those who are simply incompetent, drunk, or merely corrupt.”In a series of cables, the massive repression carried out by Moi following the coup attempt was described in detail. His measures included the closure of Kenya’s major universities, based on unfounded claims of student involvement in the coup attempt, as well as the participation of large numbers of students in protests against the regime. Thousands were arrested, including Air Force personnel, students and university lecturers, journalists, politicians, intellectuals, civil servants, and others who criticised the regime or were suspected of opposing it. Many detainees were reportedly tortured during interrogations. The cables also documented looting by military and police personnel and “citizens killed and lying in the streets,” with the Israeli Foreign Ministry estimating that hundreds of civilians had been killed.In assessments prepared by the Mossad on August 27 and October 26, 1982, it was noted that the massive repression could produce the opposite effect of what president Moi had hoped: the “campaign to purge government institutions could turn into personal score-settling among political rivals at the top of the regime and further undermine governmental stability.” The reports also warned that strengthening the security services to increase oversight of the armed forces and opposition figures would expand their influence over the regime and deepen their involvement in political life.The Mossad concluded that “much now depends on the president’s determination to take decisive measures to ensure stability without sliding into the hallmarks of a police state,” cautioning that “the regime’s leadership addresses external manifestations rather than the root of the problems. A heavy-handed policy against rivals, both in practice and in force, increases alienation between the president and intellectuals as well as certain tribal constituencies… This policy could provide fertile ground for the growth of an underground opposition, since it is not accompanied by practical solutions to real problems.”In any case, according to the cables, the human rights situation in Kenya and the assessment that repression would only worsen the problems of Moi’s regime did not prompt Israel to reconsider its involvement in the country. On the contrary, the Mossad concluded that the regime would continue to rely on Israel to strengthen oversight of the armed forces and opposition figures and to bolster the country’s security apparatus. The Foreign Ministry welcomed the suppression of the uprising, noting that “the rise to power of leftist forces, known for their anti-Israel stance, would have led to a deterioration in Kenya-Israel relations.”Accordingly, President Moi’s close ties with the Mossad continued. In a meeting with a Mossad representative on May 20, 1983, Moi “said that he knows intelligence representatives from several countries. However, with none of them does he speak as openly and candidly as he speaks with us.”In a cable sent on January 26, 1984, Avi Primor, director of the Africa Department at the Foreign Ministry, wrote that Israel was assisting President Moi’s Presidential Guard. In April 1986, the head of Kenya’s military intelligence visited Israel, and in October, the head of the IDF Operations Directorate traveled to Kenya for meetings with senior military leaders.In addition to Mossad assistance and military training, Israel also supported the Kenyan police. According to the cables, in 1985 police officers traveled to Israel for training, and additional courses were planned. In January 1986, the commander of the Israeli Border Police visited Kenya, and in June, a Kenyan weapons expert attended a month-long training program in Israel. In a cable sent on November 20, 1987, David Woltz from the Israeli Interests Office reported that the U.S. Embassy had informed him that students at the University of Nairobi complained that “they are aware that Israel participates in training the police in counterterrorism, and that these policemen took part in brutal repression.”These security relations continued despite a series of cables describing the massive repression carried out by Moi in the mid-1980s, including mass arrests of protesters, opposition activists, students, journalists, and even clergy, many of whom were subjected to severe torture. Some were held under administrative detention. The head of the Israeli Interests Office, Pinchas Gonen, summarised the arrests in a cable sent on February 26, 1987: “The reality is that the ruling party is above the law, and some of the regime’s opponents are behind bars.”Israel’s tacit support for the authoritarian regime of president MoiThe parliament functioned as a rubber stamp for President Moi’s whims, and on August 28, 1987, diplomat David Woltz reported that Moi had instructed all members of parliament “to speak with one voice and follow the official line, and noted that he would no longer show leniency toward those expressing dissenting views.” The Israeli Interests Office also reported on “the violent handling of student demonstrations,” including the use of live ammunition, tear gas, and batons, which caused injuries and hospitalisations, as well as dozens of temporary university closures and student suspensions due to political activity. In a cable sent by Gonen on November 17, 1987, regarding the suppression of student protests, he wrote that it reflected “the regime’s nervousness, searching for enemies in every possible corner.”In addition, Israeli embassies in Washington and European capitals reported to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem that local governments, parliaments, and newspapers were critical of the severity of the human rights situation in Kenya, particularly the widespread political arrests and instances of torture.In an assessment prepared by the Foreign Ministry on November 19, 1987, it was noted that instead of calming the situation, President Moi “is taking increasingly harsh measures against any expression of opposition, thereby expanding the circle of groups opposed to him.” Although Israel again assessed that the internal repression actually undermined the regime’s stability, it nonetheless assisted President Moi precisely in that regard.In a cable sent on November 23, 1987, Gonen wrote that Moi maintained “under-the-table relations with the Mossad, which provides for his personal security needs, personnel training, and intelligence related to internal security… This has been the policy here for the past seven to eight years.” Earlier, on June 15, 1987, during a meeting between Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and President Moi, Shamir told him that “we are doing everything to assist Kenya in the security field. This is a mutual interest, and we will continue to do so.”According to a series of cables, the Foreign Ministry assessed that since President Moi was already receiving massive Israeli assistance in internal security matters, particularly through the Mossad station in the country, he had no incentive to officially and publicly renew diplomatic relations with Israel or to open reciprocal embassies – actions that would have carried a heavy cost in the form of sanctions from Arab states. For example, in a summary prepared on February 18, 1987, Emmanuel Seri, Director of the Africa Department, wrote that “today Moi enjoys the best of both worlds, and in fact he has no motive to expedite the renewal of relations with us.” At the same time, it was important for Israel to continue operating the Mossad station and maintaining El Al flights to the apartheid regime in South Africa via Nairobi, and therefore it did not dare to halt security assistance to Moi’s regime.Thus, President Moi and Israel found themselves caught in a “vicious circle”: Israeli-assisted deepening of internal repression in Kenya led to a growth in opposition to Moi’s regime, which in turn justified further intensification of internal repression, and so on. The recent findings of the research institute Citizen Lab indicate that this cycle continues to this day.Foreign Ministry files from later years remain classified, as do all Mossad files. In 1993, official diplomatic relations between the two countries were formally restored, and since then Nairobi has become a hub for Israeli security companies operating in Kenya and throughout the African continent.In May 2023, President Ruto decided to support Israel in UN votes, visited Jerusalem, and met with Prime Minister Netanyahu, where they jointly declared their intention to strengthen ties between the two countries. It was briefly noted that the two initially met in private before holding an expanded session. In an official statement regarding President Ruto’s meeting with President Herzog, it was mentioned that they also discussed strengthening security cooperation. In July 2023, Foreign Minister Eli Cohen issued a statement thanking President Ruto and Kenya’s Foreign Minister “for their efforts to promote Israel’s standing on the continent and to open doors for Israel in African countries with which we do not yet have diplomatic relations,” describing Kenya as “a key partner of Israel in the East African region.”In response to intense global criticism of Israel’s handling of the war in the Gaza Strip – including from countries across the African continent – Israel will do everything in its power to prevent a downgrade or severing of diplomatic relations. The hacking of Mwangi’s phone is seen as a small price to pay from Israel’s perspective.Eitay Mack is an Israeli human rights lawyer who has filed petitions to the Supreme Court that helped reveal details of Israel’s involvement in Lebanon.