New Delhi: US President Donald Trump will arrive in Beijing on Wednesday (May 13) for a state visit that runs through May 15, the first by a sitting US president to China in almost nine years.Originally scheduled for late March, the trip was delayed by the US-led war against Iran, which has upended global energy markets and reshaped the diplomatic terrain on which the two leaders will meet.Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping will hold formal talks at the Great Hall of the People on May 14, followed by a tour of the Temple of Heaven UNESCO heritage site, a state banquet and a working lunch on May 15. A business delegation including Tesla’s Elon Musk and Apple’s Tim Cook will accompany Trump, though it is smaller than the one that travelled with him when he last visited Beijing in 2017.Both sides have set low expectations for deliverables. But the summit takes place at a moment when the US-China relationship has been fundamentally altered by the events of the past year, and when the questions it raises extend well beyond the two countries to the energy security, supply chain resilience and strategic calculations of nations across Asia, including India.How the 2025 trade war changed the gameTo understand what is at stake in Beijing this week, it is necessary to understand how the US-China trade war of 2025 transformed the relationship between the world’s two largest economies.In an essay published in Asia Policy this April, former National Security Council official Evan Medeiros argued that the confrontation marked a turning point in US-China competition, shifting it from a tariff dispute into what he described as a “supply chain war”.The escalation began soon after Trump’s return to office in January 2025, with tariffs eventually rising to 145% on Chinese goods entering the US and 125% on US exports to China. But the defining shift came when Beijing imposed export controls on rare earth elements and permanent magnets critical to US defence systems, electric vehicles and advanced electronics. Washington responded with restrictions on semiconductor design tools, industrial gases and jet engine technology needed for Chinese aircraft production.Both sides discovered that they could inflict serious pain on the other by cutting off single-source chokepoint items.The confrontation eventually forced both governments into a temporary retreat. At the Trump-Xi summit in Busan in October 2025, Washington suspended enforcement of the Affiliates Rule for one year, while Beijing paused its expanded rare earth export controls. The two sides also agreed to extend tariff reductions and China pledged additional purchases of US agricultural goods.But the Busan framework resolved little beyond the immediate crisis. Medeiros argued that the relationship has now become “a race by each side to gain leverage over and reduce exposure to the other”. China is trying to reduce dependence on Western semiconductor supply chains while the US is attempting to loosen China’s grip over rare earths and critical minerals.Since Busan, Washington has invested in alternative supply chains through Pentagon-backed rare earth projects, G7 coordination and a new coalition called Pax Silica. Beijing’s latest Five-Year Plan similarly called for “extraordinary measures” to overcome vulnerabilities in advanced semiconductors.The scale of the disruption to bilateral commerce is visible in the data. Jin Xu, president of the China Association of International Trade and a former commerce ministry official, told a roundtable organised by the Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG) in Beijing on April 26 that bilateral trade reached roughly $550 billion in 2025, a decline of nearly 19%. Chinese FDI into the US collapsed from a peak of $27.4 billion in 2016 to about $589 million in 2024, a drop of over 90%. Jin compared the relationship to a married couple who cannot divorce but cannot live well together.China is trying to reduce dependence on Western semiconductor supply chains while the US is attempting to loosen China’s grip over rare earths and critical minerals. File: Workers use machinery to dig at a rare earth mine in China’s Jiangxi province in 2010. Photo: Chinatopix via AP.What Washington wantsThe Trump administration’s economic focus is reflected in the fact that preparations have been led primarily by treasury secretary Scott Bessent rather than secretary of state Marco Rubio or the national security adviser.Nicholas Burns, the former US ambassador to China who served in Beijing until January 2025, said in a Foreign Affairs interview that he could not recall a time in decades when Treasury rather than State had been the driving force behind a presidential summit with China.Even on the eve of Trump’s arrival, negotiations over deliverables appeared to be continuing. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng is meeting Bessent in South Korea on Wednesday for last-minute economic and trade consultations.The expected deliverables are modest. Both sides are likely to announce Chinese purchase commitments for US agricultural products, particularly soybeans, along with a possible Boeing aircraft order.They may also announce a “Board of Trade”, a standing bilateral body first floated by US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer after talks in Paris in March. The idea, as described by Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) president Michael Froman, would be to identify roughly $30 billion of US products China would import, matched by an equivalent amount of Chinese goods entering the United States, with lower tariffs in non-strategic sectors and a forum for resolving disputes.Analysts remain sceptical about how durable such arrangements would prove. Froman compared the idea to the ultimately unsuccessful US-Japan framework talks of the Clinton era, while Burns argued that an economics-first approach, though necessary, would be insufficient if broader strategic issues were sidelined.Trump has also said he wants China to use its leverage with Iran to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz. “He’d like to see it get done,” Trump said of Xi on Monday, referring to the strait. But the White House has set low expectations on this front. “We don’t want this to be something that derails the broader relationship,” US trade representative Greer said last week.Beyond trade and Iran, Trump said Monday he would raise the case of jailed Hong Kong media tycoon Jimmy Lai with Xi, and discuss arms sales to Taiwan.What Beijing wantsChina’s primary objective at the summit appears to be stability rather than any grand bargain or structural reset in ties. Analysts who study Beijing’s approach say Xi’s government is seeking a managed equilibrium that gives China time to consolidate its technological and industrial position while preventing relations with Washington from spiralling further.In a People’s Daily commentary published on May 12 under the pen name Zhong Sheng, a byline reserved for authoritative commentary on international affairs in the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper, Beijing framed the summit as an opportunity for both countries to “walk a correct path of getting along” and contribute “stability and certainty” to a volatile world. The commentary emphasised the “irreplaceable role” of heads-of-state diplomacy in guiding the relationship and devoted a full section to Taiwan, calling it “the core of China’s core interests” and “the first red line that cannot be crossed”.Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun similarly said Beijing was ready to “expand cooperation and manage differences” with the United States on the basis of “equality, respect and mutual benefit”.The degree of priority Beijing has attached to the summit is visible in its diplomatic scheduling. Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi will skip the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi on May 14-15, which falls under India’s presidency of the grouping. Chinese Ambassador to India Xu Feihong will attend in his place. The dates overlap directly with the Trump visit, and Beijing’s decision to send its ambassador rather than a deputy foreign minister signals that Wang Yi’s presence in Beijing for the summit takes precedence over a major multilateral commitment.Yu Jie, a senior research fellow on China at Chatham House, said in a podcast discussion before the summit that Beijing’s aim was “to establish a floor on this bilateral relationship, but not really to seek to [establish] a ceiling”. Beijing has acknowledged, she said, that “the longer-term rivalry between Beijing and Washington won’t go away”.Henry Huiyao Wang, founder of the Beijing-based CCG and a former counsellor to China’s State Council, argued that the summit should be seen as an opportunity to move towards “managed interdependence” between deeply intertwined peers. He advocated for the establishment of both a bilateral trade board and an investment board, an AI safety dialogue, the reopening of consulates closed in 2020 (China’s in Houston and the US consulate in Chengdu), and visa-free access for US visitors to China, something Beijing has already extended to every other G7 country.Rush Doshi, the C.V. Starr senior fellow for Asia studies at CFR, wrote that Xi approaches the summit with strengthened confidence, having successfully used rare earth controls to force Trump to back down in 2025.Beijing is willing to offer purchase commitments and goodwill gestures, he argued, but views these as management tools. “Beijing may use these meetings to ‘manage’ the United States, inducing Trump to put off necessary competitive steps for the sake of bilateral stability.”At a practical level, China wants the current trade truce extended, US technology controls prevented from tightening further and movement on Taiwan. According to Reuters, Beijing is also pressing Washington to ease existing restrictions on chipmaking equipment and advanced memory chips while avoiding new export control measures.Has the balance of power shifted?The question hanging over the summit is whether the balance of leverage has shifted in China’s favour after the upheavals of the past year.Those arguing that Xi enters the talks from a stronger position point to China’s successful use of rare earth export controls during the 2025 trade war and to growing US vulnerabilities exposed by the conflict in West Asia.Some argue that Xi enters the talks stronger but several analysts caution against overstating China’s hand. Photo: The main gate to the Zhongnanhai complex in Beijing. Credit: Prcmise/Wikimedia Commons/CC BY-SA 4.0.CFR’s Heidi Crebo-Rediker wrote that the US heads to the summit “facing an uncomfortable reality” as its rapid expenditure of advanced weapons in West Asia compounds deep vulnerabilities in supply chains dominated by China, while former deputy secretary of state Kurt Campbell contrasted Xi’s image as a “methodical, consistent planner” with Trump’s reputation as an “impatient improviser”. Others have suggested Washington now needs economic stability with China more urgently than Beijing needs accommodation with the United States.But several analysts caution against overstating China’s hand. Bill Bishop, who writes the widely read Sinocism newsletter, wrote that claims of overwhelming Chinese leverage are exaggerated, at least from the perspective of the Trump administration. Former US ambassador Burns similarly offered a mixed assessment, arguing that China’s inability to decisively support partners such as Iran has dented its credibility as a global power even as Xi seeks to project steadiness and reliability in contrast to Trump.Others see the summit less as evidence of Chinese strength than of mutual uncertainty. Susan Shirk, a former deputy assistant secretary of state, criticised the lack of diplomatic preparation and warned that an excessively trade-centred agenda risked sidelining broader strategic issues.Offering a rebuttal to the “China advantage” narrative, David Shambaugh and Steven Jackson wrote in Foreign Affairs that despite tensions between Washington and its allies, Beijing has struggled to convert US missteps into lasting geopolitical gains. Countries across Asia and Europe, they wrote, are increasingly hedging against both powers rather than aligning decisively with either.Taiwan: The issue Beijing will not let goChina has signalled clearly that Taiwan will be central to the talks. Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi raised the issue in a call with Rubio ahead of the summit, warning that Taiwan is “the biggest risk in China-US relations” and urging Washington to “make the right choices”.Beijing’s demands reportedly include a tougher US position against ‘Taiwan independence’, limits on future arms sales and, potentially, movement toward endorsing “peaceful reunification”. Burns warned that even a semantic shift in Washington’s language from “does not support” to “opposes” Taiwan independence would carry major implications by placing responsibility for tensions primarily on Taipei.According to a New York Times report, Xi’s immediate focus is likely to be slowing or reducing US arms sales to Taiwan. A $14 billion package has been awaiting Trump’s approval for months even as Taiwanese lawmakers recently approved a separate $25 billion defence budget. Chinese analyst Xin Qiang told the paper that Beijing at minimum wanted “delays and then a reduction” in the scale and quality of weapons sales, warning that further arms transfers could affect Chinese purchases of US goods such as Boeing aircraft and agricultural products.Despite repeated assurances from Rubio and Taiwanese officials that US policy remains unchanged, anxiety has grown in Taipei. Trump denied a transit request by Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, a second major arms sale remains stalled and Washington omitted direct reference to Taiwan in the 2026 National Defence Strategy.Together, the moves have fuelled concern that Trump’s instinct for transactional diplomacy with Xi could eventually weaken long-standing US commitments to the island. Some analysts believe Beijing may also try to exploit divisions within Taiwanese politics, particularly by portraying Lai as out of step with mainstream opinion on cross-strait relations. Former Biden administration official Campbell warned that Trump’s “strategic ambiguity” risked becoming “a mask for US acquiescence to China’s power and ambitions”.Iran: The shadow over the summitThe US-led war against Iran, now in its third month, hangs heavily over the summit and has complicated Washington’s expectations of Beijing.Trump has alternated between frustration that China has not done more to pressure Tehran and acknowledgment that Beijing helped steer Iran back toward ceasefire talks last month. Still, the White House has signalled low expectations that Xi will significantly alter China’s position.China faces competing pressures. It remains Iran’s largest oil buyer and has pledged hundreds of billions of dollars in long term investments there, but it also has major energy and financial interests in the Gulf Arab states and has been hit hard by the Strait of Hormuz disruption.Ahead of the summit, Wang defended Iran’s right to civilian nuclear energy while also calling for the strait to reopen, and Xi separately underlined with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman about the need to restore normal shipping flows.Beijing’s inability to strongly back Iran has made it appear weak in some quarters, Burns argued, but Xi is also using the crisis to project himself as a steadier and more responsible global actor than Trump. Other analysts see longer term advantages for China. David Hart of CFR argued that disruption to Gulf energy supplies strengthens China’s position in clean energy technologies such as batteries, solar panels and electric vehicles, sectors where it already dominates global production.The tensions have already spilled into sanctions. Days before Trump’s departure, Washington sanctioned Chinese firms accused of helping Iranian military operations and targeted refineries purchasing Iranian oil. Beijing responded by activating a blocking statute barring Chinese entities from complying with the sanctions.For India and other major Asian economies dependent on Gulf energy flows, the Hormuz crisis gives the summit direct economic significance. Any US-China cooperation to reopen the strait could ease immediate pressures, while also underscoring how much leverage the two superpowers hold over global energy markets.Any shift from “does not support” to “opposes” Taiwan independence would be a major concession. Whether the $14 billion arms sale is approved, delayed further or scaled back will be closely watched. Photo: AP/Chiang Ying-ying, File.AI and technology: The race neither side can afford to loseThe summit may produce the beginnings of an AI safety dialogue, something China has long sought. Reports suggest both sides are considering the establishment of a formal channel.In Washington, the debate is increasingly over whether engagement with China risks accelerating Beijing’s technological catch-up. Chris McGuire assessed that China sees AI safety talks as a way to expand access to US technology and narrow what he estimated was an eight-month gap with US firms. He called instead for a “maximum pressure” strategy built around tighter export controls.Burns described technology as “the most important issue” in the relationship and criticised Trump’s decision last year to permit sales of Nvidia H200 chips to China, arguing that Beijing would eventually reverse-engineer the technology while shutting US firms out of its market.Chinese analysts argue the restrictions have instead accelerated domestic innovation. He Weiwen of the CCG pointed to surging Chinese chip production and the launch of the DeepSeek V4 AI model on Huawei Ascend chips rather than Nvidia hardware as evidence that export controls were backfiring.Others have warned that the pace of AI development is outstripping political coordination. Eurasia Group’s David Meale said AI capabilities were “doubling every four months”, raising new concerns over cyber warfare and strategic instability, while Scott Kennedy of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) advocated what he called “calibrated coupling” rather than full decoupling, combining strict controls on military technologies with continued openness in areas such as research and public health.Media reports of of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang’s absence from Trump’s business delegation has meanwhile fuelled expectations that no major breakthrough on chip exports is likely during the visit. But, Trump posted specifically that Jensen was with him “currently on Air Force one”.What is not on the agenda, and why it mattersFor all the attention on tariffs and trade, several former US officials warn that the summit risks sidelining issues that could prove more destabilising over time, including military communication, nuclear competition, human rights and China’s support for Russia’s war economy.Burns argued that the near absence of military-to-military engagement remains particularly dangerous as China rapidly expands its nuclear arsenal without showing much interest in arms control discussions.Other analysts worry that the Trump administration’s overwhelming focus on economic bargaining leaves little room for broader strategic preparation, especially at a moment when US military resources are increasingly stretched by the West Asia conflict. The concern is not simply that difficult issues are being deferred, but that both governments may now prefer managing tensions through leader-level deals rather than sustained institutional diplomacy.Allies and partners: Caught in the middleThe summit is being watched closely far beyond Washington and Beijing, particularly by countries worried that a more transactional phase in US-China relations could leave allies and partners increasingly exposed.Ben Bland, director of the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House, captured the regional anxiety. “What all other countries fear is a world in which two leaders of the superpowers carve up the rest of the world in their own interests,” he said.Japan and India illustrate those pressures in different ways. Tokyo has taken a tougher public position on Taiwan but remains uneasy about being sidelined as Trump pursues direct diplomacy with Xi. India, meanwhile, continues to view China as a strategic rival while also confronting the economic fallout of the Strait of Hormuz crisis and uncertainty over Trump’s tariff policies.What to watch forA joint statement is very unlikely, according to CSIS, so the differences between what Washington and Beijing say they agreed on will be revealing. Any shift from “does not support” to “opposes” Taiwan independence would be a major concession. Whether the $14 billion arms sale is approved, delayed further or scaled back will be closely watched.The trade picture is equally uncertain. The announcement or non-announcement of the Board of Trade will signal whether managed trade is the new framework.Whether there is a concrete Iran-related deliverable or just atmospherics will indicate how much leverage China is willing to deploy. And any movement on export controls or the establishment of an AI dialogue will indicate the direction of the technology race.The schedule of future meetings matters too. Xi is expected to attend the APEC summit in Shenzhen later this year. A reciprocal state visit to Washington is under discussion.The prospect of as many as four Trump-Xi meetings in 2026 would signal mutual investment in stability. But Brookings’s Ryan Hass warned that if Trump leaves Beijing feeling “disrespected or trifled with, then he could have a change of heart”.CSIS’ Kennedy offered the most concise verdict on the likely outcome. It would be, he predicted, “a superficial ceasefire that is largely to China’s advantage”.