BRICS+ meet in New Delhi for their annual summit at a time when two of their members are in a kinetic war (Russia and Iran), two seek to define their troubled relations (India and China), all prepare for rough external headwinds of global multi-crises where financial, energy, climate top the long list, and one angry hegemon with its wounded proxy is on the prowl. Twenty years after its foundation (2006) the BRICS operates in a radically different international system. One which is in transition from a unipolar system with US hegemonic presence is giving way to a multipolar one, albeit with a weakened but dangerous superpower seeking to revive its predominance. The BRICS have actively engaged in constructing multipolarity despite contradictions between the BRICS countries and the pressures and comprises between the BRICS and the US. These contradictions determine BRICS’ trajectories. Internal asymmetries between BRICS countries have increased in the last decade. China dominates all others in manufacturing, AI technologies, trade, and military capabilities. These imbalances create hierarchies in inter-BRICS relations. The US’ recognition of China as ‘near peer’ and its offer of ‘G-2’ relationship has translated as a ‘constructive strategic stability’ for the country which lowers others in the BRICS hierarchy. The unresolved issues between China and India come in the way of cohesive relations within BRICS. Further, India’s strategic lending of itself to the US, to balance with China, leads to suspicions. Similarly, the antagonistic relations between Iran and the UAE – both new members of BRICS – which prevented a joint statement of the foreign ministers of BRICS earlier in the 2026 foreign ministerial meeting – remain a roadblock to consensual joint declarations. The US problemThe BRICS countries have different approaches on US hegemony. Russia is engaged in a proxy war with Ukraine, which is in turn supported by the US. Despite some diplomatic measures between Presidents Putin and Trump (their Anchorage meeting, telephone conversations and engagements with Trump’s envoys) relations between the two are tense and Russia is in indirect conflict with the US. The US sees China as its most significant and longstanding threat. They are in a political, economic military competition in the Pacific, over Taiwan along with technology, trade and resources. China envisages a direct challenge to the US hegemony. India does not even use the word ‘hegemony’ for the US in official foreign policy statements, and talks of ‘multipolarity’ and ‘dominant power’. India is committed to strategic engagements with the US but wants the benefits of choice in a multipolar system and with BRICS. Brazil tries to challenge US hegemony without confronting it and talks of reducing ‘structural dependence’ on the US. South Africa speaks of US as a ‘dominant power’ and its policy has a distinct anti-apartheid and anti-colonial thread. As a collective, BRICS statements do not name the US but critique “unilateralism” (Kazan, 2024) and oppose and hegemonism (Johannesburg, 2023).Multipolarity, money, and IndiaMultipolarity is the underlying theme in all of BRICS documents and approaches. However here too, there are differences. India simultaneously speaks of both a multipolar international system and the need for a ‘multipolar Asia’ pointing to their concerns about the asymmetric power balance with a dominant China in Asia (which it can do little to address).Also read: How India’s Strategic Tilt Towards the US Faces an Indifferent WashingtonChina and Russia lead the debate on multipolarity. While Brazil and India push for reforms in the UN Security Council and Bretton Woods institutions, Russia and China are already veto-carrying Security Council members. Epistemic differences within BRICS have been summed up by Xi Jinping who has called the idea of universalising liberalism as an authoritarian tendency as China promotes the global security and global development initiatives. The others see modernisation as de-westernisation underpinned by western techno-capitalist structures.The major BRICS institutions – the New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement – never presented themselves as alternatives, but as add ons for global finance where the IMF remains at the centre. In lending, China gives priority to its own banks, and supports conditions imposed by IMF. The NDB also does not have a history of lending to the poorest countries. Important agenda items in this summit are the steps for adopting central bank digital currencies (CBDC) and measures to operationalise a cross-border digital payments system. China, India and Russia are running pilot projects in inter-operability of banking to make these digitally compatible. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is also examining the adoption of CBDC. Proposed at earlier BRICS meetings, the cross border payment system is a fast system between banks that would reduce transaction financial costs and boost trade between the 11 BRICS member countries. This mechanism – similar to the western controlled SWIFT – is a parallel system that can bypass western sanctions. Both these systems target no other country, are optional and voluntary financial logistics services. BRICS countries already have this service internally like India’s UPI, China CIPD, Russia SPFS, Brazil’s Pix. This system is limited as a financial infrastructure and has nothing to do with de-dollarisation.There is no significant substance to the conversation around de-dollarisation. The share of the dollar in global central bank reserves according to IMF Cofer [Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves] data in the first quarter of 2026 is at 57.13% (down from the 71% peak in 2000) and remains dominant even though there are some dents as countries increasingly use national currencies in bilateral trade. Further, the value of these currencies are pegged to the US dollar. So BRICS is creating a parallel lane for trade while the overall paradigm of the global financial architecture remains the same. The dollar remains the strategic reserve despite the US weaponising it. So, BRICS will call for more balanced and mutually cooperative trade, in keeping with its hallmark. So what keeps this heterogenous grouping – who talk of multipolarity, oppose unilateral economic measures, and take steps for plural multilateralism, and whose members all negotiate with the US separately – together? It is the constant engaging, finding consensus, agreeing to disagree unlike the military interventions and unilateral tariffs backed by military blocs, that continue the method of old but not forgotten empires. Anuradha Chenoy retired as professor and former dean, School of International Studies, JNU, Delhi.This article is part of a series on BRICS and Global South cooperation curated by The Wire and the Centre for Financial Accountability (CFA).