Narendra Modi’s public embrace of Benjamin Netanyahu in January 2025 symbolised the decisive shift of Indian foreign policy from strategic autonomy to overt alignment. The meeting was staged, publicised, and celebrated at the very moment when Netanyahu faced arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. Timing in diplomacy is never accidental. When over 70,000 Palestinians including over 16,000 children had been killed, entire neighbourhoods flattened, and international legal proceedings were underway, India chose not restraint but affirmation.This was not routine statecraft. It was theatre – two leaders under international scrutiny validating each other. For Netanyahu, increasingly isolated and confronting both legal jeopardy and domestic unrest, the visit provided invaluable optics: proof that a major democracy stood visibly by his side. For Modi, the embrace reinforced a domestic narrative of muscular leadership, ideological solidarity with Israel, and indifference to Western criticism or international institutions. The spectacle served both men’s political needs.The International Criminal Court’s warrants followed months of documented devastation in Gaza – widespread civilian casualties, destruction of hospitals and refugee camps, and allegations of collective punishment. South Africa’s case before the International Court of Justice further intensified legal scrutiny. Across Europe, Latin America, and Africa, governments re-calibrated their diplomatic positions. Even within the United States, Israel’s principal ally, opposition to continued support grew louder. Israel faced mounting isolation.Into this climate stepped India – not quietly maintaining security cooperation, but offering conspicuous legitimacy. Alternatives existed: low-profile engagement, calibrated statements of concern, technical consultations without public endorsement. Instead, the Modi government opted for maximum visibility – joint appearances, declarations of enduring partnership, carefully choreographed imagery. Such choices carry meaning. In global politics, spectacle signals endorsement. The images travelled far beyond domestic audiences. They were seen in Palestine, across the Arab world, throughout Africa and Asia where India once cultivated moral authority as a champion of anti-colonial struggles, and in multilateral forums where India asserts commitment to international law. The message perceived was stark: India under Modi privileges strategic alignment and political optics over humanitarian principle and legal accountability.The strategic costs may not be immediate, but they are cumulative. India’s energy security, diaspora interests, and trade relationships are deeply embedded in the broader Muslim world. Its historic diplomatic capital rested on anti-colonial solidarity and principled non-alignment. Public endorsement at a moment of global legal censure erodes that legacy.Spectacle can generate applause at home. But when foreign policy becomes performance, national interest risks becoming secondary to image management. An embrace lasts seconds; its implications may endure far years.The hidden costs of security cooperationThe government may defend the blunder on grounds of strategic necessity: advanced weapons systems, missile defence components, drones, intelligence-sharing, and counterterrorism expertise. Israel has indeed become one of India’s largest arms suppliers after Russia, and the military cooperation addresses real security challenges.Much of the technology India procures from Israel has been refined in prolonged conflict and occupation contexts. Drones, surveillance systems, and counterinsurgency techniques were operationally tested in Gaza and the West Bank. When India purchases such systems, it risks material and symbolic association with actions widely alleged to constitute genocide.The Pegasus spyware controversy illustrates the risk. The surveillance software developed by Israel’s NSO Group – allegedly used in India against social activists, journalists, and opposition leaders – emerged from Israel’s expansive monitoring apparatus in occupied territories. Its deployment domestically suggests the normalisation of intrusive surveillance as a tool of political management.Also read: After Backing UAE, Modi Calls Netanyahu, Urges Early End to HostilitiesSecurity cooperation also intersects with Kashmir. Israeli equipment, training, and counterinsurgency experience have informed Indian security practices in the region. The parallels between methods employed in Palestinian territories and those visible in Kashmir – extensive surveillance, communications blackouts, heavy militarisation – have strengthened perceptions that India is borrowing from an occupation template. Whether or not the analogy is exact, the perception itself carries diplomatic consequences.Finally, the relationship resonates domestically. For sections of the Hindu nationalist movement, Israel represents a model of muscular majoritarian governance. The symbolic alignment reinforces narratives that frame Muslim populations primarily through a security lens.India’s outsourced foreign policyFor decades after independence, India pursued what it called strategic autonomy – the ability to engage rival powers without formal alignment, balance competing interests, and take positions rooted in its own calculations rather than bloc loyalty. It maintained ties with both Washington and Moscow during the Cold War, supported Palestine while engaging Israel, sustained relations with Iran despite Western pressure, and cultivated partnerships across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This was not moral posturing alone; it was pragmatic statecraft. Autonomy maximised options, enhanced leverage, and amplified India’s global weight beyond its material power.Under Modi, this flexibility is abandoned. On key geopolitical questions, India’s posture has increasingly converged with American strategic priorities. The shift is most visible in West Asia: from a carefully balanced approach between Israel and Palestine to overt alignment with Israel; from energy and connectivity cooperation with Iran to retrenchment under US sanctions pressure. In the Indo-Pacific, participation in US-led frameworks such as the Quad has drawn India more tightly into Washington’s China containment architecture. In trade and technology negotiations, asymmetries have deepened, with market access and regulatory concessions often favouring American corporate interests.The asymmetry is visible: the United States retains full freedom of manoeuvre in its China and West Asia policies, while India absorbs diplomatic and economic costs to remain within the alignment.The Israel relationship exemplifies this drift. The cumulative cost is erosion of leverage. Strategic autonomy once allowed India to extract concessions by maintaining alternatives. As India becomes identified more closely with a US-led bloc, its bargaining space narrows. States will increasingly calibrate engagement with New Delhi through Washington. The diplomatic capital accumulated through decades of independent positioning is being spent rapidly – and with limited tangible return.Trade-offs that don’t add upThe economic defence of Modi’s Israel policy rests on claims of expanding trade, technology cooperation, and investment. Yet the numbers suggest a far narrower reality. India–Israel bilateral trade stands at roughly $3.75 billion annually– modest when set against India’s total global trade exceeding $1.2 trillion. A substantial portion comprises defence imports, with civilian trade in diamonds, chemicals, agriculture, and high-tech sectors forming the remainder. Useful, certainly – but not transformative. Israel is simply not economically central enough to justify the diplomatic and reputational costs of overt political alignment during periods of international controversy.The contrast with the Gulf region is overwhelming. India’s trade with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries exceeds $150 billion annually. The UAE alone far surpasses Israel as a trading partner. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states supply critical crude oil; Qatar provides natural gas essential to India’s energy matrix. Beyond trade and energy, over eight million Indians work across the Gulf, sending home more than $50 billion each year in remittances – vital to household survival, state economies, and India’s external balance. These ties dwarf India’s economic engagement with Israel by orders of magnitude.Geopolitics sharpens the imbalance. India’s high-profile solidarity with Israel during the Gaza crisis risks eroding goodwill in Arab capitals. While several Gulf governments have normalised relations with Israel, public opinion across the region remains deeply pro-Palestinian – especially during moments of mass civilian suffering. Governments cannot indefinitely ignore domestic sentiment. Diplomatic friction could eventually affect energy negotiations, labour conditions for Indian workers, or broader economic cooperation.Indian expatriate workers are particularly exposed. Already operating within restrictive labour regimes, even marginal shifts – subtle discrimination, tighter regulations, reduced opportunities – could significantly affect millions of families dependent on remittances.At the same time, China has expanded its economic footprint in West Asia through infrastructure investments and trade integration. Historically, India benefited from its reputation as an independent voice sympathetic to Arab causes. By visibly aligning with Israel at a moment of global condemnation, India weakens that comparative advantage and opens diplomatic space for Beijing to position itself as more attuned to regional sentiment.On straightforward cost–benefit analysis, conspicuous alignment with Israel does not add up. The economic gains are limited and attainable without theatrical endorsement. The potential costs – strained relations with far more significant partners, vulnerability of millions of workers, erosion of regional leverage – are substantial. A foreign policy that privileges symbolic alignment and defence optics over vastly larger economic and diaspora interests risks misjudging the hierarchy of India’s real stakes.Subordination by designModi’s Israel visit must be read alongside the broader shift in India’s economic alignment with the United States. The recent US–India trade framework has been hailed as strategic partnership, yet its structure reflects marked asymmetry. India has agreed to tariff reductions, expanded agricultural access, stronger intellectual property protections, and greater openness in digital and financial sectors – concessions that primarily advantage American corporations.Agriculture illustrates the imbalance. Lower barriers to US farm exports expose Indian producers – who operate with far lower subsidies and smaller scales – to competition from heavily supported American agribusiness. Dairy, fruits, and other sectors risk price pressures that small farmers cannot easily absorb. While the agreement promises expanded access for Indian exports, the scale differential suggests that US agricultural penetration into India will outweigh reciprocal gains.Intellectual property provisions favour American pharmaceutical and technology firms by extending patent protections, potentially delaying affordable generics and raising costs for consumers. Digital trade terms may constrain India’s regulatory flexibility over data flows and taxation of global tech platforms. Financial sector liberalisation increases foreign institutional presence while heightening exposure to volatile capital movements.Taken together, these shifts restructure segments of India’s economy in ways that align with US corporate priorities. Against this backdrop, the Israel embrace appears less an isolated diplomatic choice than part of a broader strategic convergence. In West Asia, Washington seeks consolidation of Israel-centric alignments and containment of Iran and China. India’s demonstrative solidarity reinforces that architecture.The cumulative pattern – economic concessions paired with geopolitical alignment – raises questions about autonomy. Strategic partnership between equals allows room for divergence; sustained asymmetry narrows it. The Netanyahu episode thus reflects not merely a foreign policy gesture but a deeper reorientation in which India’s diplomatic and economic positioning increasingly tracks American priorities, often at significant domestic and regional cost.Spectacle substituting for strategyModi’s foreign policy is increasingly shaped by spectacle – grand receptions, choreographed embraces, diaspora rallies, and carefully staged imagery that dominate media narratives. These performances reinforce a domestic storyline of India’s rise and of a leader who commands global attention. For political supporters, the optics signal power and parity with major states.But spectacle is not strategy. Strategy requires defined objectives, calibrated trade-offs, coalition-building, and measurable gains. Spectacle requires only compelling images. When optics substitute for outcomes, performance replaces substance.Also read: Arithmetic of Power Hegemony and Iran: Why the US May Not Be Able to Sustain the Old OrderThe Netanyahu embrace illustrates the problem. Defence and intelligence cooperation could have continued through routine channels. If the goal was maintaining security ties while navigating international controversy, low-profile engagement would have sufficed. Instead, the choice was maximum visibility – serving domestic political theatre while eroding India’s diplomatic flexibility and regional goodwill.This pattern recurs. High-profile events – from diaspora mega-rallies to summit pageantry – generate dramatic visuals but often yield limited structural gains. Media attention substitutes for policy depth. Diplomatic engagement becomes stagecraft, judged by applause rather than strategic return.Over time, such an approach carries costs. Partners begin to perceive inconsistency when positions shift with domestic optics. Commitments appear contingent on image management. India’s credibility as a steady, strategic actor diminishes if foreign policy seems driven by personal projection rather than institutional calculation.An image can project strength; only strategy secures it.Islamic Bloc Politics and Pakistan’s OpportunityModi’s Israel policy unfolds amid shifting dynamics in the Muslim world. While the idea of an “Islamic NATO” is exaggerated, cooperation among several Muslim-majority states – on Palestine, defence coordination, and political messaging – has grown more visible. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), though often divided, has shown sharper unity on Gaza. Countries such as Turkey, Iran, Malaysia, and even Saudi Arabia have positioned themselves, with varying consistency, as defenders of Palestinian rights.This environment offers Pakistan diplomatic opportunity. Islamabad has long attempted to internationalise Kashmir within OIC forums. India’s high-profile embrace of Israel during the Gaza crisis strengthens Pakistan’s narrative that New Delhi is hostile to Muslim causes. By linking Kashmir with Palestine rhetorically, Pakistan can frame India as part of a broader anti-Muslim axis – an argument that gains traction when India appears visibly aligned with Israel during intense regional outrage.The problem deepens when foreign policy optics intersect with domestic realities. Allegations of discrimination and marginalisation of Indian Muslims already attract global scrutiny. When combined with enthusiastic solidarity with Israel during the Gaza conflict, the cumulative message – fairly or not – suggests ideological alignment against Muslim populations. Such perceptions, once entrenched, are difficult to reverse and can impose long-term diplomatic costs.What has India actually gained?Any foreign policy must answer a basic question: what tangible national interest does it advance? Applied to Modi’s Israel policy – and particularly the public embrace of Netanyahu – the gains appear limited while the costs are substantial.Security: Israel supplies advanced weapons, surveillance tools, and intelligence cooperation. These capabilities matter. But most can be sourced from alternative partners – Russia, France, the United States – or developed domestically. The few uniquely Israeli strengths lie in surveillance and counterinsurgency technologies, which carry political and reputational risks. The security benefits, while real, do not clearly outweigh the diplomatic liabilities of overt alignment.Prosperity: Trade with Israel is modest relative to India’s global commerce and negligible compared to economic ties with Gulf states. Energy imports, remittances from millions of Indian workers, and trade with Arab economies far exceed Israel’s contribution. An economic calculus that privileges symbolic alignment with Israel over safeguarding vastly larger Gulf interests is strategically thin.Autonomy: The relationship increasingly fits within broader convergence with American strategic priorities. Rather than expanding India’s room for manoeuvre, visible alignment narrows it – projecting India as part of a US-led bloc rather than an independent balancer. Strategic autonomy depends on the capacity to diverge when interests require; that space appears to be shrinking.Influence and standing: India once derived diplomatic weight from its reputation as an independent voice for decolonisation and international law. Visible endorsement at a moment of global legal scrutiny weakens that capital. Influence built over decades erodes faster than it is rebuilt.Measured against these dimensions, the tangible returns are limited: continued defence procurement, symbolic proximity to power, and domestic political signalling. The structural costs – strained regional goodwill, narrowed diplomatic flexibility, and reputational damage – are longer lasting.Anand Teltumbde is former CEO of PIL, professor of IIT Kharagpur, and GIM, Goa. He is also a writer and civil rights activist.