The US-Israel’s assault on Tehran on February 28, seeking to initiate a regime change, shocked the world due to its disregard for innocent lives and rule-based framework that protects sovereignty of nations. Amid the flurry of strikes on the Iranian regime, what may be overlooked is Washington’s message of its ability – and willingness – to affect China’s resources just a month before the scheduled Trump–Xi trade summit. The strike on Iran implies major consequences for Indo-Pacific security and economy, and it comes just weeks before looming trade negotiations over tariffs – talks that previously stumbled and underscored how much China influences global supply chains.The recent strike on Iran highlights Washington’s strategic flexibility and unpredictability in the Indo-Pacific, despite earlier concerns that the Trump administration’s “America First” pivot to the Western Hemisphere might reduce US influence and, therefore, benefit Beijing. Washington’s push for partners to invest more in their own security apparatus – and specifically in American arms – also signalled a policy shift consistent with its “America First” approach. Although Marco Rubio, in early 2025, assured Taiwan and other regional allies – including New Delhi and other members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – that Washington remained committed to its Indo-Pacific strategy, the announcement of a new policy focus created some confusion. The assault on Iran illustrates that Washington’s global strategy remains tied to containing China, even under its “America First” posture.Notably, the strike on Iran aims to disrupt China’s energy supply lines. Approximately half of China’s oil supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz. While China does not report its oil imports from Iran, it is estimated that about 12 percent of its oil comes from Iran, transported via Malaysia or unmarked ships in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). An attack on such a significant source, in addition to disruptions to other supply channels, signals the United States’ capacity to impact China’s growth. Although China can manage three months of disruption using stored supplies, some of these reserves are also sourced from Iran and stored on ships in the IOR, which are now under extensive US military scrutiny. The US decision on Iran follows two other major initiatives over the past year aimed at limiting Chinese influence in global energy supply networks. After abducting President Maduro of Venezuela, the Trump Administration did not couch the fact that the move was designed to control the country’s oil resources. The American public’s complaints that Venezuela’s dictatorship and struggling economy produced a migration towards the United States became a secondary justification for the kidnapping.The Maduro kidnapping was followed by a declaration by the White House that the oil fields were the largess of American oil corporations and therefore will be controlled by the United States, effectively restricting a source of energy for China. Although Venezuela accounted for just about 4.5 % of China’s oil imports, Beijing’s years-long energy infrastructure investments signalled future expectations from this source. Trump administration’s pressure upon India to purchase oil from Venezuela and the United States rather than from Russia illustrated Washington’s focus on using oil as a part of its larger security strategy. Simultaneously, Brazil also an oil supplier for China (approximately 8%) faced pressures from Washington in the form of high tariffs. Both Venezuela and Brazil also supply critical minerals to China and purchase arms from the country; China supplies most of the Venezuelan arms.Washington’s actions in South America also mirrored its efforts to challenge China’s control over resource markets in Africa. While China dominates critical mineral refining, much of its supply comes from Africa and South America. In 2025, the US targeted China’s cobalt supply in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which produces the world’s largest cobalt stocks – vital for batteries and China’s green energy goals. Over 65% of China’s cobalt comes from the DRC, where it has invested $11 billion in southern mines over the past decade. US efforts to mediate the Rwanda-Congo conflict also aimed to influence mineral exports, promising security cooperation over key resources in Congo and Rwanda, therefore effectively controlling China’s cobalt sources. Recent sanctions on a Rwandan military general reinforce US influence in the region and limit China’s mineral imports. While the US depends on China for mineral processing, these moves signal its ability to affect supply sources. Meanwhile, Washington launched Project Vault earlier this year to stockpile critical minerals for use by American companies, with African and South American countries becoming one of its main sources.Washington’s China containment approach may suggest a certain logic as it prepares for talks with Beijing, however, the strategy carries disturbing side effects for its foes and partners. It risks ongoing disruptions of the global economy, increase in human toll, and potentially reshaping international alliances – especially as the policy imposes substantial costs on some US partners. New Delhi, in the long term, faces a challenge to its strategic autonomy and balancing other relationships as it seeks to work within the model of multipolarity, as noted in the American strike on the Iranian naval ship, Dena which was returning from naval exercises with India. In the short term, it confronts an energy crisis caused by an impact on oil prices. Washington’s 30- day waiver to India to purchase Russian oil as a solution to the immediate problem is a relief but also an indication of things to come as a partner of the United States.Anshu N. Chatterjee is a visiting scholar at ISAS at UC Berkeley and taught at the Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey) for the past 20 years.