The upheavals currently shaking West Asia prompted Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan to sign a mutual defence agreement known as the ‘Mecca Pact’ in August 2026. Indeed, Israel, through its attacks on Iran and Lebanon – as well as on Qatar – has displayed a new level of aggression. The United States – despite its interventionism, particularly toward Iran – appears to be intent on withdrawing from a region where many countries, starting with Saudi Arabia, had been counting on its protection. In this context, Riyadh had already drawn closer to Islamabad through a strategic mutual defence agreement in 2025.From Pakistan’s perspective, what are the implications of this three-way Mecca Pact? Does it stand to gain significantly from it, or is it a trap?Strengths and weaknesses of the Pakistani militaryPakistan today tends to position itself as a ‘security provider’ for three reasons that complement one another.First, it possesses nuclear weapons, a capability that Islamabad has from the outset presented as the “Islamic bomb,” to borrow the phrase of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who served as president of Pakistan from 1971 to 1973, and then as prime minister from 1973 to 1977. This idea initially helped Bhutto raise funds from powers as diverse as Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya and also Saudi Arabia. It may once again become relevant as Arab countries seek to resist the rising power of Israel, which undoubtedly possesses nuclear weapons.Then, in May 2025, during the war between India and Pakistan, the latter was able to retaliate using equipment whose effectiveness had been previously unimagined. This included Sino-Pakistani fighter jets such as the JF-17 Thunder and Chinese-made jets such as the J-10, as well as Chinese-made missiles, the PL-15E. These weapons enabled the Pakistani air force to shoot down at least one Indian Rafale aircraft. This episode led several Arab countries – starting with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Libya – to place orders for the JF-17 Thunder. Pakistan also provides pilot training to its customers, a skill in which it has become something of a master.Finally, China emerged during this war as an unwavering ally. From the outset of the conflict, it publicly supported Islamabad “in defence of its sovereignty and territorial integrity,” as Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated on May 20, 2025 – a first for Beijing. It shared information gathered by its intelligence services, including satellite imagery showing the movement of Indian forces. For Arab countries, drawing closer to Pakistan thus also means gaining additional – indirect, even discreet – access to China and some of its military equipment, which the Pakistanis know how to use to train their own soldiers. However, Pakistan does not have full control over the use of weapons it does not manufacture itself: to use them, it must have Beijing’s approval.It has, however, demonstrated its operational capability following the signing of the 2025 mutual defence pact by deploying an entire squadron of fighter jets – 16 JF-17s in total – as well as 8,000 soldiers and two squadrons of drones to Saudi Arabia. According to several Pakistani sources, these forces could be supplemented by Chinese-made HQ-9 surface-to-air missile batteries, a further sign of Pakistan’s access to some of the most sophisticated Chinese equipment.While this is a significant effort, it must nevertheless be put into perspective. Indeed, Pakistan does not have full control over the use of these weapons, which it does not manufacture itself – at least not on its own: to use them, it will need the green light from Beijing, whose approach to the conflict in West Asia remains unclear to this day.Furthermore, Pakistan cannot afford to deplete its forces along the borders with India and Afghanistan, where thousands of soldiers and weapons are massed. The Indian front, particularly in Kashmir, has remained on high alert since last year’s lightning war. On the Afghan front, the situation also deteriorated sharply in 2025 following terrorist attacks by the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan, or TTP), who had taken refuge in Afghanistan. In response, the Pakistani military bombed its neighbour and remains on war footing.The country, therefore, does not necessarily have the means to come to Saudi Arabia’s aid as the latter had hoped. But even if it did have the capabilities, would it do so?The Iran FactorPakistan’s room to manoeuver is limited by its relations with Iran, with which it wishes to maintain good ties for many reasons.First, the two countries share more than 900 kilometres of border. However, Pakistan’s Baloch population is currently being targeted by a separatist movement, whose guerrilla activities are giving the army a hard time. This is all the more concerning to the government because it is an area where China is expected to invest in infrastructure. Iran could easily further complicate the situation by supporting the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).Furthermore, Pakistan is home to about 20% Shia Muslims who readily support Iran, as evidenced by the protests organised in response to Israeli-American attacks and, above all, the death of Ali Khamenei. Islamabad wishes to avoid reigniting the conflict between Shia and Sunni Muslims, which plunged part of the country into a civil war-like atmosphere 15 years ago.Added to this is its energy dependence on its Iranian neighbour, which accounts for half of its gas imports. Yet its economy is already on its knees, due, in particular, to the global rise in hydrocarbon prices.Finally, Islamabad fears that Tehran will allow India to regain a foothold in Iran, from where it could come to the aid of the BLA, and then support Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and the TTP, which has established a base there. Iran has already largely reopened its border with its Afghan neighbour.For all these reasons, Pakistanis have always sought to remain on good terms with the Iranians and have resisted efforts by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to draw them into an anti-Iranian coalition. This was particularly evident in 2015 when Islamabad refused to participate in the war against the Houthis – a stance that the Saudis and Emiratis viewed as an affront.Subsequently, then-Prime Minister Imran Khan attempted to reconcile the two countries in 2018–2020, foreshadowing Beijing’s approach a few years later. In 2026, Pakistan condemned both the US-Israeli attacks against Iran – denouncing them as a violation of international law – and Iran’s attacks targeting Gulf countries. The current prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif, also condemned the assassination of Ali Khamenei.But in the face of the new Houthi offensive, Pakistan has the challenge of explaining to Riyadh that it would be of little further assistance…A predictable failure or a paradigm shift?If the Mecca pact has little chance of resulting in significant Pakistani involvement at a time when its ally needs it most, why did Pakistan sign it?This decision can be attributed both to a near-existential financial constraint and to an element of surprise. On the one hand, the country needed money from the Saudis, who, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), regularly come to its rescue. But this year, their aid was more necessary than ever. In April, the United Arab Emirates – now on good terms with Israel and India – demanded repayment of a $3.5-billion loan in retaliation for the Pakistan-Saudi agreement. Islamabad was able to meet this demand only thanks to a $3-billion loan that Saudi Arabia immediately granted it.Without it, its economy risked collapsing, especially since the war forced millions of Pakistani workers in the Gulf – whose remittances are vital – to return home. While in 2015 Pakistan could say no to the Saudis, 11 years later, its room to manoeuver has vanished.As for the shock, it stemmed from the ease with which the Houthis advanced on the ground and struck Saudi Arabia, particularly the Riyadh airport: Pakistan might not have signed the Mecca pact if its leaders had anticipated such a scenario. The Saudis then tried to convince Tehran to hold back the Houthi offensive, to no avail.They are also counting on Turkey, the pact’s third partner, with which they have grown closer, particularly following the 2015 rift with the Saudis and the Emiratis. As early as 2016, Islamabad and Ankara signed a strategic partnership that was accompanied by a deepening of diplomatic and cultural ties. This is evidenced, for example, by the surge in the number of Pakistani students in Turkey (fewer than 1,000 in 2016, 12,000 in 2024, and between 8,000 and 8,500 in 2025). Similarly, in 2019, while Pakistan had failed to convince the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Saudi Arabia to condemn the Narendra Modi government’s abolition of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, Ankara spoke out against this decision, thereby straining its relationship with New Delhi.But Pakistan’s primary motivation lies elsewhere: Turkey is, after China, its largest arms supplier, whether in the form of corvettes (purchased in 2018) or upgrades to its F-16s. For its part, Turkey also sells certain equipment to Pakistan, but above all, it trains its fighter pilots. Finally, the two countries are reportedly working together to develop a drone.Turkey also provided military support during the brief war between Pakistan and India in 2025. This assistance is all the more valuable because it allows Islamabad to avoid being entirely dependent on Beijing. The two countries may also agree to contain Iran’s rising power, while working toward an Iranian-Saudi rapprochement, which is by no means impossible.Is ‘Tehran summit’ paving the way for a new regional security architecture?On October 26, 2026, the Saudi defence minister, the Turkish intelligence chief, and the Pakistani chief of army staff traveled to Tehran to meet with President Massoud Pezeshkian as the risk of Israeli-American strikes grew. The Iranian side, without making any firm commitments, reportedly showed a willingness to reduce its support for the Houthis in exchange for the pact’s member countries dissuading Donald Trump from striking Iran again after the midterm elections. This was something they had already attempted before the first bombings, with the success we all know.Beyond these immediate issues, the “Tehran summit,” as the Iranians call it, may have paved the way for a new regional security architecture. In any case, Mohsen Rezaï, the Iranian Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, welcomed the participants’ “unanimous agreement” “to ensure regional security through the participation of countries in the region, without any foreign intervention.”If so, the Mecca pact will have served as the crucible for a paradigm shift involving the beginning of the US withdrawal from the region – one of Iran’s traditional objectives and a process already set in motion by Donald Trump.If this scenario materialises, it could reinforce Pakistan’s role as a “guarantor of regional security.” But many uncertainties remain, starting with the Iranians’ desire to call the shots – which the pact’s signatories may find excessive – and the disruptive influence of Israel, in alliance with the Emirates and the United States.If this scenario does not play out and the Houthi threat intensifies, the Pakistanis will be left with nothing but bad choices. Either they step up their support for the Saudis and alienate the Iranians, or they offer only limited support to the Saudis, in which case the Saudis will also limit their assistance.Christophe Jaffrelot is Senior Research Fellow at CERI-Sciences Po/CNRS, Paris, Professor of Indian Politics and Sociology at King’s College London, Non resident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Chair of the British Association for South Asian Studies.A French version of this article has appeared on Orient XXI.