Violence has escalated in the Middle East, with attacks on vessels in and around the Strait of Hormuz intensifying even as the conflict involving Saudi Arabia and the Houthis threatens to widen. Oil stocks are dwindling, inflationary pressures are mounting, and the global economy is becoming increasingly vulnerable to another round of hostilities. The consequences of a renewed US-Iran war would extend well beyond the region.Last week, reports emerged that the Pentagon had instructed Central Command (CENTCOM) to prepare for a possible resumption of military operations against Iran. US President Donald Trump has indicated that he could decide on further strikes after the November mid-term elections. Yet, his repeated shifts between threats of escalation and talk of negotiations make it difficult to take any of his statements as definitive. Meanwhile, the US has continued to boost its military presence in the region, including the deployment of additional forces that could bring a third aircraft carrier strike group into the theatre. The preparations suggest that Washington wants to retain the option of renewed military action even as it talks of diplomacy.Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty.The central question is: What does Trump hope to achieve by attacking Iran again?The issue is not simply what targets the US might strike, but how another round of attacks would bring Washington closer to ending the conflict on terms favourable to it.In an October 8 social media post, Trump spoke of “productive discussions” with Iran, while portraying the country as being in a desperate condition. He concluded with a categorical declaration that Iran would not have a nuclear weapon. At the United Nations last month, however, he had framed the choice in starkly different terms, asking whether he should strike a deal or “annihilate the Islamic republic”.It remains unclear whether Washington seeks regime change, Iranian capitulation or a negotiated settlement. Each objective would demand a different military strategy and carry different implications for the scale and duration of the campaign. Would an agreement be confined to reopening Hormuz, or would it also address Iran’s nuclear programme, sanctions and regional role? The absence of a clearly articulated political endgame makes renewed military action both more likely and more dangerous.Trump’s approach appears to rest on several assumptions: that the Iranian regime is approaching political collapse, that Tehran has lost much of its ability to control events in the Strait of Hormuz, and that it is seeking to rebuild its nuclear capabilities. Yet his shifting statements about when, and whether, the US will resume its attacks leave the strategic direction uncertain. His repeated threats to annihilate Iran and leave it with no chance of survival may also have reinforced Tehran’s determination to resist rather than negotiate under pressure.Iran’s plansIran’s immediate priority is to weather the American offensive while preserving its political system and the institutions through which it exercises power. Its military strategy appears to be evolving from one centred on defence towards a more forward-leaning posture combining deterrence, disruption and pre-emption.The recent escalation at sea illustrates this shift. Attacks on tankers reached their highest weekly level since the war began, and the threat has spread beyond the Strait of Hormuz into the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The IRGC has also threatened vessels using southern maritime routes close to the Omani coast, including those involved in shuttle-tanker operations. These developments have increased the risks even for operators attempting to move oil under US protection.A substantial American strike would almost certainly invite an Iranian response. Tehran could seek to impose costs not only on US forces but also on regional infrastructure and energy facilities. The consequences could extend across a region already suffering considerable damage, further undermining the assumption that American military superiority can contain the conflict at a manageable level.Iran’s longer-term ambitions are more expansive. Tehran would like to see US forces leave the Persian Gulf, the removal of American sanctions and recognition of Iran as a power whose interests must be accommodated in regional security arrangements. Above all, it wants to preserve lasting leverage over Hormuz. Whether it can achieve these objectives is uncertain, but the ability to threaten commercial shipping gives it a means of imposing costs that cannot easily be eliminated through air strikes alone.The battle for HormuzWashington believes it has made substantial progress in the battle for Hormuz by restoring oil flows towards wartime highs. This was reportedly one reason Trump rejected an Iranian proposal to end the war and reopen the strait last month. The US president has repeatedly portrayed the campaign as a major success, arguing that the naval blockade and other measures under Operation Economic Outcast will eventually force Tehran to yield.But this risks confusing a tactical achievement with a strategic outcome. Oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz is not the same thing as the strait being open. The real test is whether commercial shipping can operate safely, predictably and at something approaching normal cost. Until that happens, the Hormuz problem remains unresolved.The current system of moving oil is exceptionally expensive. Producers have resorted to shuttle-tanker operations, in which vessels enter the Persian Gulf to load oil and then transfer it to other ships waiting outside the strait. These operations allow exports to continue, but expose crews and vessels to considerable danger and require extraordinary expenditure on freight, protection and insurance.According to The Wall Street Journal, oil producers are paying between $30 million and $40 million for a round trip through Hormuz, equivalent to roughly $15–20 a barrel before insurance costs. Some sailors have been offered bonuses of up to $25,000 for a single trip. These figures capture the extraordinary cost of keeping oil moving through a waterway that remains dangerous.The burden extends beyond the direct cost of shipping. Naval protection ties down military resources, while elevated insurance premiums and freight charges feed into the wider cost of energy. Reports suggest that the US is committing 30 per cent of its naval force to sustaining these operations.There is also a political dimension to Iran’s approach. Tehran has strong reasons to avoid disrupting every flow of oil through the strait, particularly where doing so would damage neighbouring countries with which it maintains important economic and political relationships. Iraq is a particularly significant case, given Iran’s extensive influence and network of partners there. There has also been speculation that Gulf states may have incentives to negotiate arrangements that allow oil shipments to continue without direct Iranian interference.Iran’s renewed attacks on tankers nevertheless demonstrate that it retains the ability to threaten the maritime system. Even if oil exports continue, repeated attacks can raise prices, increase shipping costs and undermine confidence in the security of Gulf energy supplies. Washington may be able to facilitate the movement of oil for a time, but sustaining that arrangement indefinitely is a different proposition.Gains and lossesThere is little doubt that Iran has suffered grievous losses in the US-Israeli campaign. Decapitation strikes have eliminated much of its senior political and military leadership. Its air force and navy have been severely degraded, while air-defence and radar systems, ballistic-missile launchers, drones, oil infrastructure and industrial facilities have sustained extensive damage. Its nuclear infrastructure has also suffered catastrophic setbacks.Yet military destruction does not automatically translate into political capitulation. Iran’s capacity to resist must be assessed not only in terms of the forces it has lost, but also in terms of its ability to continue imposing costs on its adversaries. Its maritime operations demonstrate that, despite the damage inflicted on its conventional military capabilities, it retains ways of disrupting regional security and the global economy.But in relative terms the Americans have also suffered a lot of damage, something they did not quite expect. They have been forced out of their bases in the Persian Gulf area. They have more or less abandoned Sheikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain; likewise their presence in Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar has come down drastically, They have evacuated and dispersed personnel from Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, the Al Shafra Air Base in UAE and the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. And to cap it all, they were forced to retreat from the Fairford Air Base in the UK. A recent Congressional report suggests that they have lost or damaged over 81 aircraft in the fighting and have acknowledged losing some 25 personnel. The Iranians say that this is an undercount.Central paradox of this warEscalation cannot be an end in itself; it must serve a political or security objective. Yet renewed military action increasingly appears to be an option Washington is unwilling to relinquish.A renewed offensive could widen the conflict, disrupt energy supplies further and deepen the strategic problem Washington is trying to resolve. It could also strengthen arguments within Iran for abandoning the restraints that have so far limited its nuclear options.Tehran could withdraw formally from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or move towards weapons-grade enrichment. Neither step is inevitable, and neither by itself would prove that Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon. But both could become more plausible if its leaders conclude that existing restraints have failed to protect the country from attack.This is the central paradox of the war: a campaign ostensibly intended to eliminate Iran’s nuclear threat could strengthen the case for acquiring a nuclear deterrent. Military force can degrade capabilities and raise the costs of resistance, but it cannot by itself determine the political choices of an adversary. Unless Washington can articulate a credible endgame that connects its military operations to a sustainable settlement, another offensive may deepen the very strategic problem it is intended to resolve.The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi