As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) passed the Hong Kong National Security Law (HKNSL) on June 30, democracies around the world began to reassess their view of China.The HKNSL puts the newly formed ‘Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’ at the helm, its decisions not open to any judicial review or accountability. This Committee is directly funded by the Central government in Beijing and its officers enjoy immunity from any existing HK laws, essentially replicating the colonial structure of governance under the British.With this, the CCP has reneged on the assurances under its own ‘One Country Two System’ formula as well as the provisions of the 1984 Sino-British Treaty granting HK a special status within the People’s Republic of China.This is an ironic unfolding of events that can be traced back to the 19th century when the British imposed extraterritoriality in China. In 1842, following its defeat in the Opium War, China was forced to cede Hong Kong to the British under the Treaty of Nanjing. This treaty laid the political foundation for subsequent treaties and agreements that operationalised British extraterritoriality in China until the colony returned to China in 1997. This seems to now have come a full circle with the HKNSL, where China is claiming the right to implement its own laws outside of its own territory, both against Hong Kong residents as well as foreigners.HKNSL is not very different from the existing laws that repress populations of Tibet and Xinjiang, criminalising dissent. However, given that Hong Kong is a global finance and logistics hub, global opinion is overwhelmingly against this law. What is the likely impact of HKNSL on China’s foreign policy and for other countries? For this, we must look beyond the political criticism of the law to specific provisions of the law that address foreign businesses, organisations and individuals.Also Read: What You Need to Know about Hong Kong’s National Security LawImpact on foreign nationalsArticles 36 to 38 of the law address foreign entities and individuals and that are based in or operate out of Hong Kong. Article 36 expands the scope of HKNSL to include shipping vessels and aircraft registered in Hong Kong. This means that if you are aboard a vessel/aircraft that is registered in Hong Kong, and you express an opinion critical of the CCP or the law itself, you can be arrested on charges specified under this law ranging from public disorder to terrorism.This is of concern because Hong Kong is the fourth largest flag state by tonnage in the global shipping industry and a major international hub for aviation. Shipping companies and airlines are big business, often with some lobbying heft in their countries of origin. Given that both these industries are undergoing severe strain due to the pandemic, it is arguable that they are likely to comply with the new law without contest.Even if countries of their origin take a different political position on it, many companies are likely to emulate the example of Apple or Cisco. Both of these companies have complied with and enabled the implementation of draconian Chinese censorship laws to protect their bottom lines in China. During the 2019 citizen’s protest in Hong Kong, Apple complied with Beijing’s demands to restrict access to specific apps that citizen groups used for mobilisation. Cisco, of course, has had long-standing allegations of customising its routers in China with filtering and monitoring capabilities to enable China’s censorship regime.The Cisco logo is seen at their booth at the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona, Spain, February 26, 2018. Photo: REUTERS/Sergio Perez/File PhotoCurrently, Facebook and Twitter are reviewing their policies on request for user data from Hong Kong government agencies. However, given that Mark Zuckerberg has spent the last decade cozying-up to the CCP, it is quite possible that Facebook will work out a deal that Beijing might be comfortable with.Article 37 and 38 of the HKNSL extend the reach of Chinese law enforcement to acts committed by Hong Kong residents outside of China as well as to foreigners. If you are an Hong Kong resident or a foreigner and have criticised China or supported independence to Hong Kong or its autonomy – when you were not in Hong Kong – you can still be charged by China if you either travel to Hong Kong or if your country has an extradition treaty with Hong Kong.Also Read: Why Hong Kong’s Security Law Will Not Upend Its Status as a Global Financial CentreUsing extradition treaties to gain global political acceptanceSince the 1990s, China has used extradition treaties as a political conduit to gain global political acceptance for its authoritarian politics, mainly built on the argument that China was pursuing corrupt officials who flee China. Many democracies like France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have extradition treaties with Beijing, despite the EU’s concerns about compromised Chinese legal and justice systems. In the last decade, both Canada and Australia came close to concluding extradition agreements with China, with the latter signing it but not ratifying it.Over the years these extradition treaties have become channel targeting Chinese dissidents and minorities, especially Uighurs abroad. China has made extradition requests of Malaysia, Turkey, and Italy to either extradite or detain Uighurs residing there. Uighurs face genocide-like conditions in China and despite widespread Chinese atrocities in Xinjiang, this did not translate into countries rescinding their extradition treaties with China.Many countries including the US, Australia, Germany, New Zealand, India, the UK, Canada, South Africa, Finland, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea also had extradition agreements with Hong Kong. Following the passing of the HKNSL, Canada suspended its extradition with Hong Kong, followed by Australia, the US and most recently the UK.However, the global community did not step up when Hong Kongers were engaged last year in a David versus Goliath fight with the mainland, resisting the imposition of an extradition law that undermined the city’s political autonomy. Since March 2019, Hong Kong had witnessed sustained citizens’ protests against an extradition Bill that the CCP was trying to foist on the city to enable trying HK political dissidents in sham courts on the mainland.Protesters in Hong Kong, in October 2019. Photo: Reuters/Umit Bektas/File PhotoWhile there was global condemnation of the CCP’s proposed extradition Bill, none of the countries followed it up with any substantive measures like rescinding their own extradition arrangements with Hong Kong. Most democracies including the US, Japan, the EU, Australia, New Zealand and India have all but accepted Chinese authoritarianism as long as its impact was contained within Chinese borders and specifically on minorities.With the HKNSL, the impact of China’s domestic law enforcement has leaked into an arena of international law hitherto dominated by the US and its allies. The US has over a 100 extradition treaties, followed by other political arrangements that protect its troops abroad from prosecutions by the International Criminal Court. China is now piggybacking on this abhorrent but accepted practice to advance its domestic concerns in its foreign policy. Countries that are critical of China’s power projection through these means must acknowledge that their consistent accommodation of the Chinese authoritarianism has facilitated this.Since the passing of the HKNSL, Britain and Australia have offered residency leading to citizenship for Hong Kongers leaving the city. Taiwan has offered proactive rescue to people facing peril in Hong Kong under the new law. The Donald Trump administration has announced an end to Hong Kong’s special status and withdrawn preferential economic, visa and technology policies. This has given rise to a discussion about the possibility of a concerted front in countering China’s aggressive behaviour both at home and abroad. Is this a turning point with Trump mending fences with traditional US partners to fashion an effective China policy?Also Read: Editing History: Hong Kong Publishers Self-Censor Under New Security LawClosing the barn door after the horse has boltedAs of now, the responses from the US, UK, Canada and Australia seem like closing the barn doors after the horse has bolted. While all these countries have shared concerns about China, there continue to be serious differences. The response of each country is now largely within a calculation of its bilateral relationship with China. Significantly, the US announcement of sanctions on Hong Kong made no reference to consultation with allies or partners.In a similar vein, while Britain has recently banned Huawei from its 5G network, there is no consultation between the Five Eyes coalition about a coordinated response on the issue. Similarly, while Germany had been criticised for dragging its feet on China, the EU is considering the possibility of suspending extradition treaties with Hong Kong and opening immigration for Hong Kong residents.This lack of coordination between the US and its partners will work to China’s advantage. To offset the impact of the global political reaction to the HKNSL, the CCP will look to consolidating its relationship with its traditional allies in Hong Kong, the business conglomerates. Since the British times, Hong Kong’s government has been packed with banking, real estate and shipping elites, a practice that continues till date. HSBC, the largest Hong Kong bank, has already declared open support for the HKNSL and many other tech companies are currently hedging their bets. The CCP is likely to offer individual deals to the big business entities rather than relax the stringent conditions of its ambitious national security law.China does have the economic clout to carry this through, the political will to accept the damage and the political opportunity to play off western countries against each other. CCP’s inflexibility on HKNSL means that either they did not expect the sharp international reaction, especially from the Trump administration or that they have factored in the possibility and costs of international capital leaving Hong Kong. It is most likely the former. It seems that Xi Jinping has severely miscalculated the impact of the pandemic on China’s credibility as a reliable economic or political partner and bitten off more than he can chew. Now he doesn’t have the option to back down on the HKNSL without compromising his power within the CCP. The party’s control over Hong Kong is an important part of the narrative of recovering lost territories and addressing historic wrongs of the unequal treaties imposed on China. Therefore, backing down on Hong Kong will mean a loss of face for Xi personally.US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping at bilateral meeting during G20 summit in Osaka, Japan, Photo: Reuters/ Kevin LamarqueFinally, Trump’s sledgehammer approach to China might be effectively over in the short term. But facing up to China requires a vision of global leadership intent on combating China’s export of authoritarianism abroad. And this global leadership cannot be expected of leaders who are wannabe dictators within their own countries. How the world’s democracies handle the Hong Kong issue will decide the limits of Chinese export of authoritarianism abroad. And possibly, the future of the world order.Sonika Gupta is associate professor, IIT Madras China Studies Centre.