Speaking during a cabinet meeting at the White House on March 26, US Vice President JD Vance justified the United States attacks on Iran by citing the risk of Iran using “nuclear suicide vests” to “kill tens of thousands“. That claim is far more ludicrous than the previous lie that Iraq possessed “Weapons of Mass Desctruction” (WMD). At least the WMD theory was purveyed using “sexed up” intelligence dossier on Iraq. In contrast, Vance’s warning does not attempt to even seek a basis – scientific, technological or intelligence.Nuclear devices can broad belong to two categories: a test-device (“bomb in the basement“) or a deliverable nuclear weapon. The former is something that can initiate an uncontrolled nuclear fission reaction and could be as large as a small room. The latter is a sophisticated, robust, reliable and miniaturised nuclear device that has the warhead, safety-arming-implosion-initiator mechanisms, tamper/reflector and casing – all capable of withstanding travel atop a missile at supersonic speed and re-entry heat.The path from even 90% weapons-grade Uranium (U-235) to a deliverable nuclear warhead entails surmounting very significant, time-consuming, scientific, technical and engineering hurdles, followed by testing. This is why experts know that the fabrication of a deliverable nuclear weapon requires a comprehensive commitment of national resources, apart from a fully functional industrial base. And reliable nuclear weapons cannot be miniaturised to “suitcase” size – leave aside a wearable vest.According to the May 2025 report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has around 408 kg of U-235 enriched to 60%. The IAEA and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists assess that, theoretically, a crude nuclear weapon can be fabricated with about 41.7 kg of 60% enriched U-235. On the other hand, a reliable compact nuclear weapon requires at least 25 kg of weapons-grade – enriched to 90% – uranium, or about 10 kilograms plutonium.Add to it the other mechanisms and the smallest and lightest fission bomb ever deployed was the US W54 ‘Davy Crockett’ warhead. It weighed 23 kilograms, and, along with its XM-388 casing (30x 11 inches), it weighed 35 kilograms. Not wearable “vest” material.The myth of “suitcase nukes” has its roots in the 1997 60-Minutes interview (and other public statements) given by General Alexander Lebed, once Russia’s national security chief, who resigned from the military in 1995 and entered politics. He claimed that the separatist government in Chechnya had portable nuclear devices, which allowed him to head a commission for “getting to the bottom of the Chechen arsenal”.In 1998, a former Russian military intelligence officer, Stanislav Lunev, defected to the US alleging Russian agents had smuggled in “suitcase nukes” and were hiding them around continental USA for use during a possible future conflict. But he never provided a specific location, even during a Congressional grilling in 2000. The Russians denied such things ever existed and in a 2004 interview with the Kremlin’s Federal News Service, Colonel-General Viktor Yesin, former head of the Russian strategic rocket troops, clarified that Lebed mistook the mock-ups of special mines used during training as “suitcase nukes”.Nevertheless, some Congress members, chief among them Curt Weldon, a GOP representative from Pennsylvania, continued to propagate that myth – and that drivel continues to be espoused – despite “suitcase nukes” being trashed by the IAEA as one of several examples of “scams” or “hoaxes” about such weapons existing.The other possibility is Iran using 60% enriched U-235, which is toxic and radioactive, in a Radioactive Dispersal Device – “dirty bomb”. However, for that, Iran will have to smuggle the U-235 into the US, a very daunting task. RDDs are not nuclear bombs, and no nuclear fission or fusion reaction occurs in them. They can be of two types:An aerosol device that surreptitiously releases radioactive material, slowly exposes people to radiation.An ordinary Improvised Explosive Device with radioactive material like HEU, plutonium, Cobalt-60, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, etc., wrapped around it. When triggered, the radiological material disperses. Studies suggest that 50 grams Cesium-137, could, depending on the weather and terrain, contaminate up to 13.5 square kilometres.But RDDs are also self-defeating: to expose large number of people to radioactive material, it must use a large amount of conventional explosive. The large resultant explosion would disperse radioactive material far and wide, thus diluting its toxicity. Conversely, if a lower amount of conventional explosive is used, the area covered and people exposed are limited. Further, unless the RDD contains a large amount of very strong radioactive material, its effects are unlikely to be immediate or dramatic. The conventional explosive content of the RDD is likely to bring higher casualties than the device’s radiological effect.An RDD inflicts an economic cost, making contaminated areas uninhabitable, making massive containment and clean-up operations essential. This had the US Nuclear Regulatory Committee give them the moniker “weapon of mass disruption“– not destruction. In 1987, in Goiania, Brazil, a very small radio-therapy capsule of caesium chloride salt was accidentally broken open. It caused four deaths due to sustained exposure, but USD 20 million in clean-up costs.The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Ukraine, where a 1 Giga Watt power reactor suffered a meltdown and released over hundred times the radiation of the Hiroshima bomb, caused 31 deaths in the immediate aftermath. Although about 5,000 were afflicted by cancer, the relocation and containment costs have exceeded USD 400 billion. In the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, there were no deaths due to radiation, though around 19,500 died in the earthquake and tsunami that triggered it. However, the cleanup and containment cost exceeded USD 200 billion.It is evident that like the “WMD in Iraq”, the US is again manufacturing fear-mongering narratives to allow it to retain its global hegemony through military means. It either that, or its apex leadership and the 16-organisation intelligence community suffer from poor intellect and abyssmal technical knowledge. This also needs to be seen in light of repeated statements (reported on June 18, 2025 and March 2, 2026) by Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, that while Iran had enriched uranium to 60%, nuclear inspectors found that it had “no systematic and structured programme to manufacture nuclear weapons”.And we must recall that the WMD claim about Iraq was not the only such absurdity. A report by RAND highlights, in a document narrating “five myths about the 9/11 attacks“, that a CIA source nicknamed “Dragonfire” reported that al-Qaeda terrorists had smuggled a nuclear weapon into New York. The source turned out to be stunningly wrong; yet it was claimed that al Qaeda was preparing to attack nine US cities and kill 4 million people in Operation “American Hiroshima”.In 2008, then-CIA Director Michael Hayden identified al Qaeda as the agency’s “number one nuclear concern” despite zero evidence it had nuclear capabilities. Nobody bothered to assess whether the outfit could acquire a deliverable nuclear weapon takes the best engineering, scientific, technological and financial efforts of a country for years. This highlights how narratives on terrorism work.Kuldip Singh is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army.