Six months into the war between Iran and the United States, the fight over Gulf oil has two fronts. Iran has pressed on the Strait of Hormuz, the main exit for Gulf crude. Saudi Arabia answered by sending oil through pipelines to its Red Sea ports, which gave the kingdom a second route to world markets. That second route now runs past a coastline controlled by an armed movement allied with Tehran. In September, the Houthis of Yemen took about 115 kilometres of the Red Sea coast, including the port of Mokha and islands near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and they have fired missiles at Saudi cities. Recall, Saudi leaders expected to remove them from power within weeks when they intervened in Yemen in 2015. But the situation today is entirely different with the war on Iran launched by the US reaching nowhere.How the Houthis beganThe Houthis, formally Ansar Allah, come from the Zaidi Shia community of northern Yemen. In the 1990s they organised around local complaints – corruption, weak government and the sidelining of Zaidi areas under President Ali Abdullah Saleh. They fought several wars with the state and grew quickly in the chaos that followed the Arab uprisings.In 2014 they took Sana’a, and President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi was forced out. Saudi Arabia saw an armed movement friendly to Iran taking over its southern neighbour. In March 2015, Riyadh formed a coalition, and the United Arab Emirates became its main military partner. Years of bombing did not dislodge the Houthis from the capital or the north. The war killed an estimated 3,77,000 people by the end of 2021 and displaced around four million. A UN-brokered truce in 2022 cut the fighting, though no peace deal followed.Iran became the Houthis’ chief backer and supplied missiles, drones, training and money. The Houthis reject the label of Iranian proxy, and the record supports some caution. They have their own goals – holding power, controlling Yemen’s resources and forcing Riyadh to deal with them as equals. Tehran provides tools, and Houthi leaders choose when to use them. An Iranian official said that the move on Mocha was a Houthi decision, and he also said it benefited Iran.The Gaza war and the Iran warThe Houthis became a major concern after the Gaza war began in late 2023. They attacked ships in the Red Sea, and shipping companies rerouted vessels away from the Suez Canal. Those attacks stopped after the Israel-Hamas ceasefire of October 2025. When the US-Israel war with Iran began in 2026, the Houthis started slowly, then fired missiles at Israel on March 28. The decisive break with Saudi Arabia came in July. Saudi-backed forces bombed the runway at Sana’a airport to stop an Iranian flight from landing. The Houthis declared the ceasefire over, announced a blockade of Saudi ships and launched missiles and drones at Riyadh. Their September claims also include strikes on Aramco facilities at Yanbu, and Saudi Arabia says it intercepted six ballistic missiles aimed at Taif and the Yanbu area. What the Houthis gainedThe main gain is territory. In less than 48 hours in September, Houthi forces took about 115 kilometres of the Red Sea coast, including the port of Mokha and islands near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, according to an Associated Press investigation. Ships bound for the Suez Canal pass through this narrow strait. Whoever holds its shores can threaten the traffic. Several things produced the advance.AP’s sources say Revolutionary Guard advisers worked in the field, helping with command, communications analysis and satellite intelligence. Reuters reported similar findings, citing Yemeni government and regional sources, and named a senior Guard commander as the director. Iran publicly denies directing the group. If the reports are right, Iran has moved from supplying weapons to helping fight the battle.The National Resistance says the Houthis fired 130 ballistic missiles and 145 drones at its positions over about a month. These figures come from one side of the war. The anti-Houthi forces had no unified command. The National Resistance had roughly 30,000 fighters, but its leader fled and its troops left Mokha before the Houthis arrived. Saudi aircraft did not strike the advancing columns.Meanwhile, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi entered the war as partners and then split over southern Yemen. The UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council seized eastern territory near the Saudi border in late 2025. Saudi Arabia struck back, supported government forces in reversing those gains and watched the UAE withdraw its remaining troops in January 2026. Riyadh won that argument, but it also took apart the southern security network that had helped hold the Houthis in check. The Houthis then attacked a front with no common command.Two chokepoints at onceIran has pressed on the Strait of Hormuz, and Saudi Arabia answered by sending crude through pipelines to Red Sea ports. A Houthi grip on Bab el-Mandeb threatens that second route. Reports put oil above $100 a barrel at some stage. The Houthis have said ships from other countries may pass, which isolates Saudi Arabia and offers a bargaining chip. They have also said they do not intend to hit US vessels under an Oman-mediated understanding. The Houthis do not have to defeat the Saudi army. Their missiles and drones can raise costs for insurers, shipping lines and exporters. A poor movement can pressure a rich state through a coastline.The Saudi responseSaudi Arabia is speaking in two directions. On September 30, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told the Shura Council the kingdom would make “no compromise” on its security and would answer attacks firmly, while Riyadh still says it favours de-escalation. King Salman called the Houthis a “terrorist militia” after a drone was reported heading toward Mecca. The Houthi leader called that claim a lie. Riyadh has also backed a multinational maritime coalition for the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. This is a change. For several years Saudi policy treated Yemen as a war to settle by talks. It now looks like a direct threat to Saudi territory and exports again.What the Mecca pact can doOn August 7, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, which treats an attack on one as an attack on all. The three foreign ministers held their first committee meeting in Istanbul on August 31. Pakistan’s defence minister, Khawaja Asif, said that aggression against Saudi Arabia, or a spillover of the Yemen war into the kingdom, would activate the pact. After Saudi Arabia reported the missile and drone strikes, Pakistan’s foreign ministry called the pact defensive and said no military response had been discussed. It added that Pakistan would act when the time comes. Pakistani and Turkish officials told AP that Riyadh had not asked for help. Pakistan’s parliament voted against joining the Yemen war in 2015, and that memory still influences the debate in Islamabad. Pakistan has since said it would provide “whatever means” are needed if attacks on Saudi Arabia continue, which sounds firmer.But does the pact give Saudi territory some protection? A missile or drone hitting a Saudi city is an attack on a member. It does not cover the Yemeni coast, and it does not reverse the territorial gains. The pact’s main value is diplomatic and psychological. Pakistan can press Tehran to restrain the Houthis, and Türkiye brings a large army and a defence industry. A mutual defence pledge can discourage strikes on Mecca and Medina. It cannot take Mokha back. A security check on the Houthis would need ground forces in Yemen, and none of the three partners has offered them.What this means for YemenCivilians are, ultimately, bearing the cost. The renewed fighting has displaced about 125,000 people, and more than half of Yemen’s population needs aid. Fighting has also moved toward Marib, the oil-rich province that Houthi forces have tried to take before. A war on the coast and in the highlands can bring back the famine and displacement of the earlier years. The Houthis likely want a deal that confirms their rule in the north and gives them access to money. Analysts described negotiation as Riyadh’s most logical choice. Seven years of Saudi bombing did not remove the movement, so another campaign has little to offer. Talks now would start from a weaker Saudi position. Riyadh must choose between a costly war and a deal that leaves the Houthis in charge of much of Yemen.What this means for WashingtonThe United States has spent years trying to protect Red Sea shipping with warships and air strikes. Strikes can destroy launchers, drones and depots. They do not change who controls the coast. Axios reported that the Crown Prince called President Trump twice, urging strikes on the Houthis. Washington has shown little interest in a ground role in Yemen, and it keeps an Omani channel open. That caution makes sense. A larger US campaign in Yemen would add a front to a war that already reaches Iran, Israel and the Gulf. A better plan would use three tools together. The first is naval protection for shipping with a coalition that includes European and Asian states, who also depend on the strait. The second is pressure on Iran, where the diplomacy has to cover Yemen along with Hormuz. The third is support for Yemeni anti-Houthi forces under one command, which may require Saudi Arabia and the UAE to settle their quarrel. Without that, the Houthis will meet the same divided opponents.Where this leaves the regionThe Houthis have gained ground and control strategic points. They hold more coast, they have shown that anti-Houthi forces can collapse, and they have tied their fortunes to Iran’s war with the United States. Their position still has risks. Holding territory is harder than taking it, and Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani pressure could grow if attacks on holy cities continue. Yemen is again a main front in Gulf security. The next moves belong to Riyadh, Tehran, Washington and Muscat. The price falls on Yemenis.K.M. Seethi is director, Inter University Centre for Social Science Research and Extension and academic advisor to the International Centre for Polar Studies at the Mahatma Gandhi University (MGU) in Kerala. He also served as ICSSR senior fellow, senior professor of international relations and dean of social sciences at MGU.