As per a report, there are around 675 identified jhuggi jhopri bastis (slum clusters) in Delhi, housing at least 1.5 million people. The criteria for identifying a ‘jhuggi jhopri’ and a ‘jhuggi jhopri basti’ are provided under Sections 2(f) and 2(g) of the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) Act, 2010. These include that which is for residential use; not in conformity with the Master Plan of Delhi; unauthorised by law; if it is included by the DUSIB under a notified jhuggi jhopri cluster; if it is unfit for human inhabitation; unfit due to overcrowding, dilapidation, lack of basic facilities such as sanitation, light and ventilation, and the arrangement and space of streets, etc; and if it comprises at least 50 households as of March 31, 2002.These people form a significant share of the unorganised economy of the city, comprising street vendors, hawkers, daily-wage labourers and other menial-jobs workers. The jhuggi jhopri clusters that they reside in are spread across the city on land owned by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA), the Railways and other government agencies.While slum dwellers ensure provision of basic services for the privileged classes, concerns range across a whole spectrum, from their right to live and earn a livelihood in the city, to the development and beautification of the city and improving its standards of sanitation and hygiene, to the idea of slum dwellers’ rehabilitation and providing them with alternate means of accommodation.Judicial and the Right to LifeIn Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), the Supreme Court had emphatically observed the rights of pavement dwellers and held that Article 21 of the Constitution grants them the right to livelihood. The top court had observed that in the instances of eviction, the procedure must be carried out as per law, and priority should be given to the rehabilitation and resettlement of those evicted. Subsequently, in Chameli Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1995), the court expanded the definition of right to life to include the right to shelter, which should be guaranteed as a fundamental right. Right to life was recognised as a bundle of rights that includes shelter, food, water, a decent environment, and medical care. In Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan (1997), the Supreme Court, while opining that no person has a right to encroach and build on footpaths, pavements, streets or public places, held that the State has a constitutional duty to provide opportunities and adequate facilities through the distribution of wealth and resources for the settlement of life and construction of shelter for the poor and indigent sections of the society, to ensure meaningfulness and effectiveness of the right to life.In this regard, the Delhi high court in Sudama Singh and Ors. v. Government of Delhi (2010), held that jhuggi jhopri dwellers are not to be considered as “second-class citizens” and that the State should ensure that eviction and relocation of such people should not be to their detriment. The meaning of the right to life was broadened by emphasising that the relocation of slum dwellers should align with their rights to dignity and livelihood. The high court directed that the State should be diligent and considerate while seeking documents from slum dwellers. It should conduct a proper survey and consult the slum dwellers in the process of their rehabilitation. It was observed that the Master Plan of Delhi is binding, which proposes in-situ rehabilitation as the first choice for the rehabilitation of slum dwellers. This was later upheld by the Supreme Court.In Ajay Maken v. Union of India (2019), the Delhi high court held that “The right to housing is a bundle of rights not limited to a bare shelter over one‘s head. It includes the right to livelihood, right to health, right to education and right to food, including the right to clean drinking water, sewerage and transport facilities.” The court reiterated its previous stance and held that rehabilitation of slum dwellers should be a consultative process, with no place for forced evictions. Any eviction happening in the absence of a survey and without providing due consideration to in-situ rehabilitation and relocation would be contrary to the law. It directed all the relevant authorities not to consider slum dwellers as “encroachers” or “illegal occupants” but as normal and productive participants contributing to the city.Prejudicial lawsThe Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) Act, 2010, mandates the board’s role in the implementation of the statute and the Delhi Slum & JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015. Section 10 (1) of the Act provides for the removal and resettlement of jhuggi jhopri bastis, wherein it says that consent of the dwellers will not be required for the preparation of any such scheme. Further, Section 10 (3) of the Act provides that the assistance of the police may be taken for the implementation of the scheme. Similarly, Section 12 (2) provides that consent of the dwellers will not be required for any scheme of the redevelopment of a jhuggi jhopri basti. Finally, Section 42 (2) provides that necessary force may be used against an “illegal occupant” who does not comply with the eviction order, to evict such an occupant or to take possession of the property from them.These provisions make it clear that the Act is not only prejudicial and biased against slum dwellers but is also highly arbitrary. What was supposed to be a law for adequate development and rehabilitation of slum dwellers ends up alienating them from the process (no consent) and subjects them to violence and authoritarian force (use of police and necessary force). This depicts the draconian side of the law, which suppresses the voices of the weak and marginalised. It not only denies their dignity and rehabilitation but also subjects them to cruelty and harsh treatment.In sharp contrast, the Delhi Slum & JJ Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015, provides for the rehabilitation of slum dwellers in a “permanent and humane” manner, in line with the court jurisprudence on the right to life. It provides for rehabilitation through alternate housing for bastis existing before 2006 and jhuggi jhopris within them existing before 2015. The DUSIB also has the power for in-situ rehabilitation within 5 kms and even more, if required. It also states that for the relocation of a basti, the DUSIB would have a time of six months to relocate the dwellers, demolish the basti and provide the land to the land-owning agency, who will be responsible for covering the costs of constructing alternate accommodation for the dwellers.There exists a stark contradiction between the 2010 Act, and the Supreme Court’s vision on the right to life, along with the 2015 policy. While the court jurisprudence and 2015 policy espouse an inclusive and empathetic vision for Delhi’s slum population, the 2010 Act empowers government agencies, such as the Delhi Development Authority, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, the Railways, the Police Department and other concerned authorities, to act in a completely arbitrary, forceful and unreasonable manner. These government agencies have already carried out countless evictions and demolitions wherever they deemed fit, with utter disregard for the Supreme Court or the 2015 Policy. For instance, slum clusters across Delhi were demolished for “beautification” and for removing unwanted “blots”, ahead of the G20 Summit.Adding more woes to this grave source of lamentation, the Supreme Court has disregarded its own precedents on the right to life for slum dwellers. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (2020 SC), an order was passed directing the removal of 48,000 jhuggi jhopris built along the railway network spread all over Delhi, within three months and further observed that no stay be granted in this matter by any court. In Manoj Kumar and Ors. v. Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (2023), the Supreme Court dismissed an SLP, refusing to interfere with the interpretation made by the Delhi high court. In this case, the high court refused to interpret the proviso to Section 2 (g) of the DUSIB Act to rehabilitate and relocate the aggrieved residents of the demolished jhuggi jhopris. These were located within three kilometres from a notified jhuggi jhopri cluster but the Court held that “nearby areas” would not cover such jhuggi jhopris. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with this understanding even though the petitioners argued that “nearby areas” is a vague term and could be interpreted to cover a distance up to five kilometres that would benefit the aggrieved petitioners.The orders passed in both cases neglected and negated years of jurisprudence developed through landmark judgments upholding the right to life, dignity, rehabilitation, and shelter for the slum dwellers. They also overlooked the 2015 policy by neither adhering to the timeline of six months nor giving any directions for the adequate rehabilitation of the jhuggi jhopri dwellers. While the order in the MC Mehta case (supra) views slum dwellers prejudicially by holding them accountable for causing pollution in railway safe zones without any solid evidence on record, the order passed in the Manoj Kumar case (supra) highlights a sheer lack of an empathetic and purposive interpretation by the Court. The judges could have interpreted the “nearby areas” to include the jhuggis within the notified slum cluster, but they did not do so. The Supreme Court chose not to interfere with the narrow view of the High Court, despite the plethora of its own judgments that have held that beneficial legislation should be interpreted for the benefit of those it intends to serve.From an idealistic standpoint, on-paper policies, judgments promoting the ideals of justice, equality, dignity and inclusive development may seem to have a catalytically positive effect on the condition of those on the fringes. However, contradictions in the law and judicial viewpoints result in the negation of all that is well-meaning and well-intentioned. It requires a deeply empathetic and considerate understanding on the part of the legislature, judiciary and the executive functions to practically improve the situation of the poor, weak and marginalised. This is hugely missing in the entire interaction between the State and the slum population of Delhi. The ideal of the right to life remains an unfulfilled dream for the slum population of Delhi. It is completely defeated by arbitrary and biased actions. Both law and policy become mute witnesses as elite and apathetic perspectives of development are imposed on all without acknowledging the plight of those on the fringes of society and development. As long as there is an institutional bias and arbitrary action against the poor, weak and marginalised, the law will facilitate development, but it will only be for the benefit of those who are elite, privileged and hold power. Mohneesh Rai is an independent legal researcher.