Issues like ethnic connectivity, transit rights and the Great Wall of security have until now been neglected in China’s Belt and Road Initiative discourse.
As the Doklam stand-off continues, is Nepal set to make another foreign policy shift away from India and towards China, as it did in the 1960s?
How have the Indian and Chinese media been covering the Doklam standoff?
She also accused China of building roads using bulldozers and excavators, which has been protested by Bhutan in writing to China.
As China builds rail and road infrastructure up to its borders, Nepal eyes its role in connecting India and China, as well as the wider world.
Modi’s remarks aimed to put across an India that was ready to synchronise itself with the Trump administration’s goals, but the US president made it clear he wanted India to commit to “free and fair trade”.
More than 2000 companies registered last year alone, enjoying their first 5 years of tax exemptions.
India, along with the US under the Donald Trump administration, is hesitant about the proposed investment facilitation up for discussion at the upcoming G20 Summit in Germany.
One of the ways China is seeking to achieve global dominance is through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the 21st-century Silk Road.
The Trump administration has resuscitated the ‘New Silk Road’ initiative and and the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor linking South Asia with Southeast Asia.
Given the quantity of investments, China can’t afford to have the OBOR initiative fail. Sceptics like India can use that to persuade China to make modifications.
China’s involvement in coal power projects abroad casts a shadow over its first Belt and Road Forum.
In the 52nd episode of Jan Gan Man Ki Baat, Vinod Dua talks about why India should have joined the One Belt One Road, and the political dishonesty in all Indian parties.
Since the 1960s, the risk of conflict has increased every time both India and Pakistan were at the same level of geopolitical buoyancy.
India will likely be the only major country not to have any significant representation at the summit, which is China’s biggest diplomatic event this year.
China wants to move its manufacturing up the value chain to become a producer and exporter of high-value goods, for which Europe can be the best market.
Indian strategic thinkers have been quick to conclude that China’s goal is to cut India off from the rest of Asia. But this is a frog-in-the-well kind of perspective.
China’s policies have aided its own economic development and also benefitted the Southeast Asian nations it trades with. India should learn from that.
Less than a day after making an offer to rename the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to allay Indian concerns about Beijing’s wider One Belt, One Road initiative, the Chinese side appears to have quietly dropped the idea.
With the Belt and Road summit set for May 14-15, Chinese officials have increased their lobbying, through public diplomacy and behind closed doors, to get New Delhi to attend.
The initiative’s success ultimately depends on what regional players get from it in terms of economic, political and security benefits.
Analysts have viewed the OBOR more as a strategic dominance ploy than an economic cooperation agenda, but that doesn’t mean Indian industry has nothing to gain.
In his inauguration speech at the second Raisina Dialogue, the prime minister took a stand on China’s grand connectivity project and urged Pakistan to shun terrorism if it wants good relations with India.
It is important to support and maintain the capital that we have as a champion of the developing world, India’s foreign secretary said.
Rather than focusing on Pakistan and issues with China, India would have done well to look towards matters of strategic importance, such as OBOR and the Eurasian Economic Union.
The US hopes India will aid its attempts to confront Chinese assertiveness in the region, but Sino-Russian bonhomie and Beijing’s plans for the South China Sea could prove tough to navigate.
“India feels isolated in the region after the CPEC as part of greater One-Belt One-Road (OBOR) was launched,” Gilgit-Baltistan chief minister Hafizur Rehman said.
The US sees the relationship in the context of India’s larger role in Asia, first as a counter-weight to China, and then as a partner in the US-led order. India, unsure of its future role in the region, is mainly looking for transactional benefits.
China’s industrial overcapacity and economic and social difficulties can be an advantage for India, but for that the Modi government will have to change the thrust of its foreign policy
Feeling that its overtures for closer ties have been rebuffed, China is now resuming its policy of isolating and neutralising India
It would make more sense for Beijing to explore some of the peaceful coexistence options that have been hinted at by Manila.
In the second part of his interview with The Wire, former foreign secretary Shyam Saran discusses why China acted the way it did at the NSG and what India can do about it.
Clearly, there has been a change of mind, making India’s path to membership to the Eurasian body more thorny.
Nearly eight years ago, after being left in a minority of one, China backed down under intense pressure from the United States and acquiesced to the exemption for India in the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG). With India’s membership up for consideration this week at the NSG’s plenary meeting […]
India has to improve its connectivity with growth markets and link into Asia’s production and supply chains. We cannot be left isolated in our own backwater.
New Delhi is concerned about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project, part of the new ‘Silk Road’, but it need not despair as India is an important part of the existing multi-polar Asia architecture.
The electricity generating projects are likely to saddle the Pakistani government with a massive fiscal burden but the real cost of CPEC is likely to be felt in the changing civil-military balance.
The Maldivian opposition is unhappy but New Delhi’s desire for rapprochement is driven by China-linked strategic concerns.
After having done some legwork on the connectivity front, India needs to take ownership of its ideas and articulate them cogently, making it clear to regional partners that it is not vying for influence against China or other powerful actors.
While the leaders have been careful in public, the terms in which foreign and security policy are discussed in China, India (and Japan) have become much more shrill.