‘But tell us something positive,’ said an attendee at a discussion in Dhaka in early 2025 on the experiences of Sri Lanka’s state reform attempt during the ‘Good Governance’ government that was in power from 2015- 2019. This was an informal gathering during one of my visits to Bangladesh to undertake an assignment for the United Nations for which I engaged with a wide range of entities, sectors and groups. The response was a reaction to my (supposedly negative) presentation on what went wrong with Sri Lanka’s state reform experiment, and the lessons Sri Lanka’s mistakes hold for Bangladesh as it embarked on what was viewed as a progressive trajectory after the July 2024 youth uprising that led to the collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s government.The assassination of Sharif Osman Hadi – an aspiring politician and leader of the July youth uprising who died on December 18, 2025 after being shot six days earlier – along with the subsequent attacks on The Daily Star and Prothom Alo and the cross-party allegations that followed, appears to have been the catalyst for critique of the mistakes and missteps of the last year and a half, which have entrenched and exacerbated deep-seated structural and systemic barriers to progressive change.How not to reform the lawFollowing the collapse of the Awami League government on August 5, 2024, an Interim Government (IG) led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was established on August 8, 2024. Despite legal challenges regarding its constitutionality, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh upheld the IG’s legitimacy in an advisory opinion by invoking the “doctrine of necessity”. It should be noted the advisory opinion was not published and was only reported in the media. At the time the interim government was formed, the Bangladeshi constitution lacked specific provisions that allowed for the establishment of an interim government. The non-party caretaker government system was introduced in the 13th Amendment to the constitution in 1996 and was abolished via the 15th Amendment to the constitution in 2011.More than a year after the establishment of the interim government in November 2025, the high court overturned the 2011 ruling which found the 13th Amendment ultra vires and void and led to the repeal of the provision through the 15th amendment. There is widespread assumption in Bangladesh that the November 2025 judgment has automatically revived the constitutional provision on the caretaker government. Even if that is the case, the provision would not be applicable to the interim government which was established prior to the judgment.Also read: In Bangladesh’s History, Begum Khaleda Zia Is an Entire EraSupported by the international community, the interim government initiated a programme of legal reform. However, those involved appear to have overlooked a critical factor that renders such reforms temporary: without an elected parliament, laws must be enacted through presidential ordinances. These ordinances remain valid only until a new government is elected, at which point they expire if not ratified within 30 days of the parliament being constituted. Despite historical precedents where such ordinances, such as the Attorney Services Ordinance in 2008, failed to be enacted by subsequent governments, the interim government – with international backing – continued with this approach.The law reform process initiated by the IG left untouched several laws that do not adhere to international human rights standards, such as the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Special Powers Act and the Narcotics Control Act, which have been historically abused by successive governments. Other laws that were subject to reform, such as the Cyber Security Act (which was renamed the Cyber Protection Ordinance) retained and/or introduced human rights deficient provisions. New laws that were passed, such as the Enforced Disappearance Prevention and Redress Ordinance 2025 included the death penalty as punishment; a punishment that has been abolished for all crimes by more than 85 countries. During conversations with stakeholders there was consensus that abolishing the death penalty could not be done prior to the sentencing of Hasina and any attempt to do would be perceived as an attempt to save Hasina.Civil society groups I conversed with expressed concern that the law reform process was undemocratic and overly bureaucratic, echoing past failures that raised fears of new repressive laws. They pointed to the Cyber Safety Ordinance, where the government failed to provide an official public version despite the circulation of multiple unofficial drafts. The government similarly bypassed meaningful consultation with key stakeholders when drafting the Enforced Disappearance Prevention and Redress Ordinance.The futility of reforming the law while repeating the practiceThe spirit of the July uprising, during which protestors demanded equity, was anti-authoritarian. When the IG was established a ‘system change’ that included reform of not only institutions but also extra-legal and arbitrary state practices that undermined the rights of citizens was expected.To the contrary, in parallel with law reform efforts, extra-legal practices continued. For instance, laws were misused and weaponised mirroring practices of previous governments. Key instances include the April 2025 detention of model Megna Alam under the Special Powers Act, the banning of the Awami League via the Anti-Terrorism Act in May 2025, and various Cyber Security Act arrests involving individuals like writer Nahid Hassen Knowledge and imam Md Ebadul Islam. Additionally, after mob attacks on the Daily Star and Prothom Alo on December 18, 2025, authorities reportedly filed charges against 350–400 unidentified individuals under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The application of the Anti Terrorism Act is questionable, since these attacks do not align with the standard international definition of terrorism.Also read: My Brief Brush With Osman HadiSeveral practices that undermine basic legal principles continued under the interim government. During my engagement with different actors in Bangladesh I heard of instances of bail being refused to those arrested in connection with violations related to the July uprising due to the fear of mob justice, which people referred to as ‘mobocracy’.Persons have been arrested for broad and undefined reasons which can be interpreted subjectively, particularly persons associated with the Awami League. An example is Operation Devil Hunt, which was launched on February 9, 2025 and targeted persons “who attempt to destabilise the country, break the law, and engage in criminal activities”. The operation saw the arrest of mainly Awami League supporters who have been repeatedly referred to as “devils” by senior officials. These actions indicate that the police are being used for political ends rather than impartial law enforcement. Phase two of the Operation began on December 13, 2025.Furthermore, on December 18, 2025, Home Affairs Adviser Lieutenant General (retd) Jahangir Alam Chowdhury instructed police to apprehend Awami League members on sight without verifying existing charges, threatening disciplinary action against officers who failed to comply. This directive essentially commands the police to bypass due process, undermining the fundamental principle of equity: that justice must be guaranteed for all members of society, regardless of public opinion.Many stakeholders and senior officials urged the depoliticisation of public institutions, viewing it as the source of dysfunction and legal decay. However, the formation of the interim government and the filling of critical roles actually intensified politicisation due to a lack of established procedure and transparency. For example, the appointment of activists and non-political elite to ministerial roles occurred with minimal political party engagement. The interim government’s frequent disregard for legal norms and perceived impunity further weakened the rule of law.The failure of the international community to highlight the transgressions of the IG and call for elections was likely due to the need to showcase a ‘success story’ in a world where democracy is rapidly eroding and countries are fast descending into authoritarianism. Sri Lanka too was a victim of the poster child syndrome, which drove the international community and human rights organisations to ignore undemocratic, anti-human rights actions by the Good Governance government, which ultimately led to its ouster.The role of civil societyStriking similarities exist between the behaviour of Sri Lankan civil society during progressive administrations and Bangladeshi civil society during the interim government. In Sri Lanka, because of personal ties to individuals within progressive regimes, the majority of civil society temporarily abandoned their watchdog responsibilities during certain governments. Their selective silence was driven by two factors: a need to align with international efforts to portray the government as a success, and a strategic desire for direct access to state officials to influence reform. However, this approach restricted consultation on the reform process to a small circle of government insiders, ultimately excluding many of the people most impacted by the changes.In Bangladesh, very few civil society members initially criticised the interim government (IG) because they wanted to “give the IG a chance.” This approach is flawed, as holding leadership accountable and suggesting alternatives provides them with the necessary opportunity to course correct. It was also assumed that a Nobel laureate would have the magic pill to solve decades long deep seated issues where previous leaders who were not as educated or accomplished had failed.The muted civil society response was particularly notable on issues considered controversial, such as the inclusion of the death penalty in the Enforced Disappearance Prevention and Redress Ordinance. Moreover, there was no pushback against the death sentence given to Hasina following her trial in absentia by the International Crimes Tribunal. While this trial represented a major effort to address the serious violations committed during the regime, the use of the death penalty casts a shadow on accountability measures.Punitive culture and violent actionsThe demand for the death penalty for Hasina and increasing incidents of violence are part of a continuum and the inevitable outcome of the normalisation of violence at the macro level (nationally). This embeds violence within state structures, which bleeds into societal behaviour and leads to inter-personal violence at the micro level. For example, on January 1, 2026 a lawyer whose car collided with a motorcycle was beaten to death by a mob on the road.Civil society and youth activists expressed concern about “the mobs” which were trying to exercise control, especially over the media narrative. This they said resulted in self-censorship due to fear of potential mob violence. There is considerable debate and speculation in Bangladeshi society about the drivers of the mob; are the organised? Are they being directed? Do they originate from one source or many? While violence seems to be triggered easily, the vandalisation of the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) during protests against the launch of the National Equipment Identity Register (NEIR) to block illegal handsets nationwide on January 1, 2026, the scale of violence against the Daily Star and Prothom Alo indicate some level of organisation. Violating the constitution and undermining the rule of law, enabling or ignoring vigilante justice, meting out collective punishment and the targeting of certain communities, such the lynching of Dipu Chandra Das, a Hindu, for blasphemy, are demonstrations of the embedded nature of structural violence and impunity.A recent example of growing impunity and the normalisation and deeply embedded nature of organised intimidation and threat of violence is a group of young men allegedly from the Anti Discrimination Party who visited the offices of Global TV on December 21, 2025, which they threatened to burn unless the Head of News Naznin Munni was fired. It should be noted that the student groups, which engaged in the July uprising, have splintered during the last year due to the lack of common values or ideology that binds them. Militarisation- the elephant in the roomLike in Sri Lanka, in Bangladesh too the law has been used to militarise the state, which contributes to entrenching within society a masculine, hierarchical, militarised, violent and control-based ethos. In Sri Lanka, the president issues a monthly gazette under the Public Security Ordinance, circumventing parliamentary approval, to call out the armed forces to maintain law and order, thereby creating a defacto state of emergency. Similarly, in Bangladesh, the interim government has consistently extended the magistracy power of commissioned officers in the Army, Navy and Air Force, with the latest extension granted in November 2025 until February 28, 2026, purportedly to ‘improve law and order’.Historically, the armed forces have overstepped their bounds by engaging in civilian roles, which has normalised militarisation and led to the overlooking of military roles in abuses during Hasina’s administration. Concerns remain in Bangladesh regarding human rights violations during joint police-military missions and the placement of active or retired officers in public institutions – the latter evidenced by a serving army officer being appointed Inspector-General of Prisons in August 2024.Also read: In Bangladesh’s History, Begum Khaleda Zia Is an Entire EraThis societal acceptance of militarisation is highlighted by January 2025 protests at Jagannath University, where students requested the military to manage hostel construction due to their reputation for efficiency and integrity. The interim government’s launch of “Operation Devil Hunt” on February 9, 2025, which utilises both police and military forces, underscores how deeply ingrained militarisation has become within the Bangladeshi national psyche.Mirroring the situation in Sri Lanka under the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime, numerous stakeholders in Bangladesh said that during Hasina’s government the security sector had expanded with a number of entities being created to engage in extra-legal activities, particularly to surveil political opponents and civil society. Just as in Sri Lanka, where multiple military entities were not dismantled during the Good Governance government, in Bangladesh too it was alleged these entities, which have largely functioned outside the remit of the law, may have continued to function post-Hasina regime. In this context, less than two months prior to the election the IG has approved the Bangladesh Telecommunication Ordinance that has been critiqued by Article 19 for expanding the remit of surveillance, centralisation of executive oversight and weakening of the regulatory authority amongst other shortcomings.State reform is a marathon, not a sprintLaw reform is only a part of the broader state reform process initiated by the interim government. Their most ambitious initiative was the establishment of thematic reform commissions to consult with the public and provide recommendations for reform. The international community urged and supported the IG in this process without considering the virtual impossibility of a temporary entity achieving results within a short period. Expecting quick results from a temporary entity creates unrealistic expectations amongst the public and places unreasonable pressure on the IG. An example is Inqilab Mancha’s demand for the killers of Hadi to be brought to justice within 30-days, which reflects a lack of understanding amongst the public of current judicial realities. Since the existing criminal justice system requires systemic reform, any attempt to force a rapid resolution will inevitably result in further injustice.Moreover, rapid state reform efforts can lead to the circumvention of good practice, such as sacrificing inclusion and transparency for expediency and the need to produce rapid results. Instead, discussions should have centered on how to create socio-political conditions conducive to progressive reforms, which would have required more dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders.It is however notable that for the first time in the history of Bangladesh, reform commissions consulted with stakeholders; this should be acknowledged as a positive development despite critique about the substance of the recommendations presented. The concern is that in the absence of ground work to build broad socio-political consensus on the recommendations for reform, their implementation depends not only on the referendum on the July National Charter, which includes some of the key recommendations of the reform commissions, but most critically on the political will of the new government.However, very few women were appointed to the reform commissions, except the Women’s Commission. The recommendations of the Women’s Commission were opposed by religious groups that staged protests and demanded an end to anti-Islamic activities and claimed ‘men and women can never be equal’. The interim government did not denounce these protests nor did they publicly support the recommendations of the Women’s Commission.The international community too did not vociferously raise gender issues, most likely because they believed it would attract the opposition of conservative groups. Young women who had participated in the July uprising expressed frustration that the space they had during the uprising within the youth movement had shrunk as young men were given political positions and opportunities while most women, particularly those who were non-elite/not privileged were sidelined.Mindset change and repairing the social contractConversations with stakeholders showed a clear consensus: enacting legislation and building institutions will not automatically protect human rights or the rule of law. Since elite interests have compromised public institutions in Bangladesh, leading to their collapse, stakeholders stressed that progress requires more than structural changes – meaningful social change is only possible if the underlying political culture and practices are transformed.Political change in contexts where formal institutions are weak or inaccessible, like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, have to contend with informal systems that have stepped in to provide services and handle grievances. These unofficial structures are highly resilient because they are frequently mistaken for formal ones, making it difficult to challenge the power inequities they create. In some instances, these informal norms take precedence over official rules, fundamentally shifting the organisational culture toward the normalisation of violence and the abandonment of due process.Meaningful transformation cannot be achieved by reforming a single public institution in isolation. Due to interconnected institutional dependencies, isolated improvements are often neutralised by unreformed sectors. For example, judicial reform will be insufficient if it is not accompanied by parallel changes in law enforcement, the prosecutorial service, and the penal system. The interim government’s failure to disband the Rapid Action Battalion is the perfect example of the impossibility of rapid state reform, particularly by a non-elected, temporary entity.In countries such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh the relationship between citizens and the state – along with foundational elements like political trust – has been fractured by years of authoritarian rule, human rights violations and corruption. The weakening of the rule of law has further damaged these ties by undermining the social order. Hence, repairing the social contract, especially between historically and structurally marginalised groups, such as minorities and women, is an integral part of state reform; one which requires commitment and resources. Institutional transformation is paradoxical because it relies on a strong social contract that it is simultaneously trying to rebuild. Success, therefore, hinges on both structural and ideational shifts. While this process is long and painful rather than immediate, it is the only necessary path toward achieving durable, long-term results.Ambika Satkunanathan is a fellow at the Open Society Foundations and was a Commissioner of the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka from 2015-2020.