The crisis in Nepal is part of a wider wave of unexpected popular uprisings and regime changes in South Asia. It was preceded by a similar phenomenon in Sri Lanka in 2022 and Bangladesh in 2024. This wave is the fall out of an explosive cocktail of domestic turmoil and occurs against the backdrop of regional and global geo-political rivalries.South Asia’s domestic terrain is on the boil owing to demographic and developmental changes. States in the world’s most populous sub-regions have not been able to meet the aspirations of this demographic bulge. The pace of development is slow and highly inequitable. Governance is fraught with corruption, nepotism, inefficiency and repression. Frustrated by their conditions, people are reacting with huge demonstrations, aggressive uprisings and violence. In the hands of tech savvy youngsters, social media is facilitating networking and the mobilisation of widespread popular dissent.Fuelling this domestic fire are regional and global geopolitical rivalries, with China on one side and the US and India on the other competing for strategic presence and influence. Over the past decade, particularly under President Xi, China has built high stakes across Asia. Its stakes in South Asia, a densely populated, fast-growing and strategically located region bordering its turbulent western frontier and the Indian Ocean, have become sharper and deeper. Through economic incentives, cultural outreach and diplomatic moves, Beijing has sought to shape and sustain friendly regimes in the region.This growing Chinese presence is not palatable to India and the US, and both of them have used all their diplomatic and political capabilities to contain Beijing. In supporting the popular uprising against the Rajapaksa regime in Sri Lanka, both India and the US appeared to be on the same page. In Bangladesh however, the US dislike for the Hasina regime and preference for the BNP was in direct conflict with that of India’s. In Nepal too, there seems to be a degree of convergence between the US and India in the disapproval of the Oli regime, seen by them as overtly pro-China.The wave of regime change in South Asia must be seen in the context of domestic turmoil amplified by geopolitical rivalries. Recent political shifts in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal share striking similarities: sudden uprisings of unexpected scale, triggered by economic hardship for ordinary people and the repressive methods of ruling regimes.The uprisings have been led by largely unconventional, marginalised and youthful leadership, but extensively supported by wider sections of society. In all three cases, varying degrees of violence, arson, targeted attacks on political leadership and governing systems have been witnessed. The political explosion against the regime was the loudest and most brutal In Nepal. Sixty lives and counting are estimated to have been lost and more than a thousand casualties are being treated in hospitals. A large number of public and personal properties have been burnt and damaged, the private homes of the president and former prime ministers. Many prominent business leaders and political activists were attacked and their houses and properties destroyed. Key political leaders from both the ruling and opposition parties are under the army’s protection to save their lives. Nepal’s parliament, central secretariat (Singh Durbar) and Supreme Court were gutted along with many police stations and the Central Bank. The establishments of principal media groups like that of Kantipur newspaper and television were also destroyed.This uprising was led by various Gen Z groups, spearheaded by Sudan Gurung of the Hami Nepal NGO. For the past decade, these groups have been raising questions about the corruption, nepotism and misgovernance of the regime. They were exposing their misdeeds. The display of arrogant and affluent lifestyles of the children of ruling elites have offended the sensitivities of Gen. Z who have been creating networks of dissenting groups through social media. During these years, three parties and their leaders, K.P. Sharma Oli of the United Marxist-Leninist (UML) party, Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ of the Maoist Centre and Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress have been circulating themselves on the seats of power, all indulging in extensive plunder of public resources at the cost of public good and the country’s economic well-being. The anger and frustration of the Gen Z (generation Z) groups erupted in the form of political upheaval on September 8, in reaction to the Oli government’s ban on 26 social media platforms which failed to register themselves with the government. By doing so, the Oli government also blocked the campaign by young Nepalis of dissent mobilisation as also their employment avenues and social communications. Support for the Gen Z groups came from the wider public. The mayor of Kathmandu Municipality, Balendra Shah emerged as a strong inspiring source of support for his bold, independent (non-political) and critical stand against corruption and inefficiency of the government. The agitation of the Gen Z groups resulted in the collapse of the Oli regime in less than 48 hours.The tone and tenor of the two-day political upheaval in Nepal needs a careful look. On the first day, the movement started peacefully but ran into clashes with the security forces. On the second day, the agitation became violent and almost barbaric. On the first day, the focus appeared to be on misgovernance and corruption, but on the second day, all icons of the democratic republic – like Parliament, the secretariat and Supreme Court were targeted. There were two factors behind this transformation. One was that on September 8, the police reacted brutally – killing 20 youngsters and injuring hundreds of others. This angered the Gen Z groups, provoking a strong and violent reaction. The second is the possibility that anti-social elements and vested political interests wanting to discredit the ‘genuine’ protest infiltrated the agitation to vitiate the movement by creating mayhem. The role of royalist activists cannot be denied in this as they were to be the only beneficiaries of the destruction of the Republican order. The pro-monarchy agitations have also been aggressive on previous occasions. The idea of an aggressive agitation with violent action was occasionally circulated on social media by some individuals linked to the Gen-Z group, but the main thrust of the latter’s leadership has been on peaceful and democratic, but drastic, change. Their leaders, including Gurung admitted that their movement was infiltrated by vested interests. The Nepal army came into action on the third day to restore peace and order. It quickly emerged as the key negotiator for an interim arrangement and the future order. The agitation has clearly precipitated a three streamed polarisation in Nepal’s polity consisting of the old establishment, the diverse and fragmented Gen Z groups led by Gurung, and the royalist vested interests. The old establishment insisted on an interim arrangement within the framework of existing Constitution without dissolving parliament. The Gen Z groups wanted to have their own representative to lead the interim government after dissolution of parliament and the royalists wanted to abandon the republican order and restore the monarchy. Army chief General Ashok Raj Sigdel held marathon negotiations, under the guidance of President Ramchandra Paudel to evolve a consensus among the three streams. Both the president and the army chief soon converged on the name of Sushila Karki, a retired Supreme Court chief justice. But the old establishment had reservations on her name as the constitution does not permit a retired judge to take any other position. It also lays down the process of appointing a new prime minister only through parliament. The Gen Z groups were initially divided about Karki but arrived at a consensus on her name after seeking the opinion of thousands of active cadres through their popular social media platform, Discord. Both the president and the army chief ignored the royalist stream. They also did not take the parliamentary course which would have been a recipe for indefinite delay, intense politicking and political uncertainty. Karki was sworn in as interim prime minister and parliament has been dissolved. President Paudel has mandated the interim government to hold elections within six months, i.e. by March 5, 2026.In the traumatic unfolding of events in Nepal, two sets of questions have surfaced that need be probed carefully for their future implications. First, while the army chief has played a generally constructive role, why did the security forces not come forward to control the mayhem on September 9? There are also reports that when Prime Minister Oli, before resigning that day, asked the army to take charge of the capital and control the violence, the chief asked him to resign first. Nepali media reported that in a security meeting with the president, Gen. Sigdel even urged him to resign so the army could deal with the situation freely. Did the army want the collapse of the republican order to make room for the royalists? Or was it seeking a political role for itself in Nepal?The second set of questions are related to concerns about the role of external forces. It is known that some Gen. Z groups have external funding. On its website, Hami Nepal acknowledges the support of the US company Coca Cola but also of a number of local Nepali businesses. Some individual donors are controversial, like the arms trader Deepak Bhatta, while others are famous and well-regarded, like the Magsaysay award winning ophthalmologist, Sundak Roit. All Gen-Z groups use ‘western’ or ‘global idioms and icons in their conversations for mobilisation of the movement but one need not read too much into that. While the channeling of dissent and public agitation through local interest groups and media is standard operating procedure for any externally driven regime change operation, the impact of globalisation and the growing exposure of Nepali youth to the world outside is likely the key factor influencing the Gen Z movement’s political vocabulary and methods of mobilisation rather than any pre-fabricated external ‘toolkit’. As for India, the Indian army has close fraternal linkages with the Nepalese army. The Nepali Congress, of which President Paudel was a leading leader, has always been sensitive to India’s concerns. India’s Hindutva constituency led by the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) has had years of close links with Nepal royalty. The RSS maintains a regular presence in Nepal and supports the revival of monarchy. The government of India, however, has maintained a studied distance from the recent political upheaval in Nepal and promptly declared its support for the interim arrangement headed by Karki. Both Gen Z groups and Karki have also appreciated Prime Minister Modi and the position of his government. It is safe to assume that Oli’s ouster drew no tears in New Delhi or Washington. Yet India would prefer that the US – or any other external power – plays no role in shaping Nepal’s future.India, the US and China have all welcomed Karki’s interim arrangement. The new government has set a precise but challenging agenda for the coming six months with its focus on bringing to justice the perpetrators of the mayhem in Nepal, investigating cases of corruption involving top leaders and holding free and fair elections to a new parliament. The interim government faces the challenge of rebuilding the destroyed political and administrative organs and structures, while coping with political opposition from the ousted parties as well as royalists. They question Karki’s appointment as both unconstitutional and unparliamentary. Let us hope that with the support of the president, Nepal’s security establishment, her Gen Z associates, the bureaucracy, business community and Nepal’s immediate neighbours, Sushila Karki will be able to meet the expectations of the Nepali people.S.D. Muni is Professor Emeritus, JNU, and former Ambassador and Special Envoy, Government of India.