The most significant statement on the recent India-Bangladesh border controversy did not come from New Delhi but from Dhaka.Speaking at a government press briefing, Bangladesh’s Information and Broadcasting Adviser, Zahed Ur Rahman, offered a reading of the ongoing push-in dispute that was revealing and unusually measured.While reports of people being forced across the border have inflamed public opinion in Bangladesh, he explicitly rejected the notion that India’s Union government is deliberately seeking confrontation.“I do not believe that the Indian government is doing this to create tensions with Bangladesh,” he said. Instead, he pointed toward politics in West Bengal. The issue, he argued, had featured prominently during the state’s election campaign, and the recent incidents appeared to be “a manifestation” of promises made to voters.His remarks suggest that Bangladesh’s government sees the problem not primarily as a product of Indian foreign policy, but as a consequence of Indian domestic politics. That distinction matters because it reveals a growing disconnect between what New Delhi may want diplomatically and what political incentives within India are producing on the ground.The timing could hardly be worse.Relations between the two neighbours have been strained since the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024. For more than a decade, India built its Bangladesh strategy around a single political partner. The collapse of that arrangement left New Delhi struggling to adapt to a rapidly changing political landscape. Suspicion replaced familiarity and diplomatic engagement slowed.Only recently have signs of a cautious thaw emerged under Bangladesh’s new BNP-led government. Geography, economics and security leave both countries little choice but to cooperate. India needs Bangladesh for regional connectivity and access to its northeastern states. Bangladesh relies on India for trade, energy and the management of shared resources. Estrangement is expensive for both.Zahed Ur Rahman’s comments reflected that reality. He indicated that both governments want to move beyond the tensions that characterised bilateral relations after the political transition in Dhaka. Yet events along the border continue to tell a different story.‘Push backs and push ins’According to Bangladeshi authorities, attempts to push people across the frontier have increased markedly in recent months. Border Guard Bangladesh has repeatedly reported incidents in which groups of people were allegedly escorted toward Bangladeshi territory without prior verification or formal repatriation procedures. India insists it is addressing illegal migration and has emphasised that established mechanisms exist for identifying and returning undocumented migrants.The dispute is therefore less about the existence of illegal migration than about the manner in which it is being handled. Bangladesh does not reject the return of verified nationals. What it rejects is what it sees as unilateral action that bypasses agreed procedures and infringes upon its sovereignty.That argument has found support well beyond official circles. Editorials in leading Bangladeshi newspapers have warned that domestic political pressures within India are beginning to undermine broader bilateral interests. Their concern is not limited to humanitarian or legal areas but is also strategic. Every border incident erodes goodwill at precisely the moment both countries need to rebuild it.The explanation most commonly offered in Bangladesh points toward the evolution of India’s electoral politics. For years, immigration served as a potent political issue in Assam. Increasingly, however, attention has shifted to West Bengal, where questions of citizenship, migration and identity carry substantial electoral value. Political parties that campaign on promises to curb illegal immigration eventually face pressure to demonstrate results.Seen from Dhaka, the recent rise in push-in allegations appears closely linked to that dynamic. Immigration enforcement may be a legitimate state function. Yet when enforcement coincides with electoral commitments and political messaging, it inevitably acquires a political character.Hindu vote consolidationThere is, however, a second and more sensitive interpretation gaining ground in Bangladesh.According to this view, the issue is not merely immigration control but electoral consolidation. The argument holds that portraying Bengali-speaking Muslims as outsiders, demographic threats or illegal migrants helps mobilise Hindu voters in politically important states. Whether or not this reflects actual policy intentions, it has become an increasingly influential perception within Bangladesh.Perceptions matter in international relations – often they matter more than official explanations.Every reported push-in strengthens the belief that Muslims are being selectively targeted for domestic political gain. Every new incident reinforces suspicions that electoral calculations are driving border policy. As these perceptions spread, they make cooperation with India politically more difficult for any government in Dhaka, regardless of its ideological orientation.This presents India with a growing strategic problem. If Bangladesh’s government is correct, and New Delhi genuinely wants to stabilise relations, then domestic political incentives are undermining national foreign-policy objectives. Diplomats may speak of partnership, connectivity and regional cooperation. Yet those messages lose credibility when images of disputed border actions dominate public discourse.The consequences extend beyond the immediate controversy. Bangladesh is no longer the country India dealt with during the Hasina years. Its political centre of gravity has shifted. It is pursuing a more independent foreign policy, cultivating stronger ties with China, the United States and other regional actors. The assumption that Dhaka will automatically accommodate Indian preferences is becoming increasingly obsolete.That leaves New Delhi facing a choice. It can align its border practices with its diplomatic objectives and treat Bangladesh as an equal partner whose concerns deserve serious attention. Or it can allow domestic political considerations to dictate behaviour along the frontier, steadily weakening the very relationship it seeks to preserve.The irony is that Bangladesh’s government appears willing to give New Delhi the benefit of the doubt. It is explicitly arguing that the problem lies not with India’s strategic intentions but with local political pressures. Such diplomatic generosity should not be mistaken for unlimited patience.Borders are often where grand strategy encounters political reality. Along the India-Bangladesh frontier, that reality is becoming increasingly clear. The greatest threat to bilateral relations may not be hostility between governments. It may be the inability of domestic politics to stop sabotaging diplomacy.Faisal Mahmud is a Dhaka-based journalist