For more than a month and half, the image of Bangladesh during the Iran war was defined by endless fuel queues. Motorcycles lined up for kilometres in Dhaka, transport workers spent entire nights waiting at petrol pumps, farmers struggled to secure diesel for irrigation, and delivery riders lost daily incomes while standing in queues that stretched across city blocks. The new Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government repeatedly insisted there was “no real fuel shortage.” Yet panic buying, rationing, hoarding allegations and visible scarcity created one of the most disruptive energy crises Bangladesh has witnessed since the 2022 fuel shock.Then something remarkable happened. Almost immediately after the government sharply increased fuel prices on April 19, the queues disappeared.That single development may be the clearest evidence yet that Bangladesh’s fuel crisis was not merely a consequence of the Iran war or global supply disruptions. It was also the product of a deeply flawed energy pricing and governance structure that encouraged panic, distorted consumption, delayed market correction, and weakened public confidence.According to government data, diesel prices jumped from Tk 100 (USD 0.82) to Tk 115 (USD 0.94) per litre, octane rose from Tk 120 (USD 0.98) to Tk 140 (USD 1.15), and petrol increased from Tk 116 (USD 0.95) to Tk 135 (USD 1.11). Within days, filling stations that had remained overcrowded for weeks suddenly returned to normal operations. Pump owners told Bangladesh’s Prothom Alo newspaper that increased supply and higher prices together immediately reduced abnormal demand and hoarding tendencies.The disappearance of queues after price adjustments destroyed the government’s earlier narrative that Bangladesh faced no supply problem. If there was truly no shortage, why did queues persist for weeks? And if panic buying alone created the crisis, why did the queues vanish almost instantly once prices rose?The answer lies in the contradictions of Bangladesh’s energy policy during the Iran conflict.Faulty energy policyWhen the US-Israel strikes on Iran escalated tensions around the Strait of Hormuz in late February, Bangladesh faced immediate vulnerability because the country imports nearly 95 percent of its fuel and LNG requirements. Global crude prices surged, freight and insurance costs climbed sharply, LNG shipments were disrupted, and fears spread across South Asia. Bangladesh responded with a confusing mixture of denial, rationing, administrative controls and delayed pricing adjustments.The government initially imposed fuel rationing. Motorcycles were limited to just a few litres daily, while public transport vehicles faced caps on purchases. Yet at the same time officials continued claiming that there was no shortage in the country. Energy minister Iqbal Hasan Mahmood blamed panic buying and illegal hoarding instead of acknowledging the obvious imbalance between controlled prices and rising international costs. This contradictory messaging proved disastrous.Also read: Lines, Purchase Caps and Support: How Bangladesh Is Managing a Fuel CrisisArtificially low prices during a global crisis encouraged excessive purchasing because consumers naturally feared future shortages and future price hikes. Businesses and transport operators tried to stock extra fuel whenever possible. Hoarding increased because the market signaled that fuel was temporarily underpriced relative to expected future costs. The government itself later admitted that sales doubled during early March compared with normal demand levels. Instead of correcting prices early and gradually, authorities attempted to suppress the market through administrative controls. Fuel passes were introduced, enforcement drives were launched against hoarding, and monitoring at filling stations intensified. Yet none of those measures solved the queues because they addressed symptoms rather than incentives.Once prices finally increased, abnormal demand immediately collapsed. Consumers stopped stockpiling. Opportunistic hoarding became less profitable. Artificial consumption normalised. Pump owners reported some stations were even selling below allocated quantities. This sequence exposed a central weakness in Bangladesh’s energy governance: the refusal to adopt transparent and predictable pricing mechanisms during crises.Policy on paperBangladesh already operates a monthly fuel price adjustment formula on paper. But during politically sensitive moments, authorities frequently delay adjustments to avoid public backlash. The result is policy paralysis. Prices remain artificially low while subsidy burdens explode, reserves decline, and panic spreads across markets.Reuters reported that Bangladesh spent more than Tk 5,000 crore on fuel subsidies in March alone while diesel import costs climbed near Tk 198 per litre, almost double the retail price at that time. Such subsidy-heavy crisis management may buy temporary political comfort, but it distorts the market and creates precisely the panic the government later blames on consumers.The economic damage was severe. Farmers could not secure diesel during peak irrigation season. Textile factories reduced operations due to fuel and power shortages. Mobile operators warned about service disruptions. Delivery riders lost incomes waiting in queues for hours. The crisis spread through transport, agriculture and manufacturing because energy policy lacked clarity and credibility.The government’s delayed response also revealed Bangladesh’s dangerous dependence on imported fossil fuels. The Iran war did not create this structural vulnerability; it merely exposed it. Bangladesh remains overwhelmingly dependent on imported oil, LNG and coal while domestic energy exploration stagnates and renewable transition remains painfully slow. Reuters recently reported that Bangladesh is now rushing towards solar expansion only after the crisis intensified. The queues disappearing after the fuel price correction should therefore be viewed as more than a temporary market stabilisation. It was a public demonstration of policy failure. The Bangladesh government spent weeks insisting there was no shortage while rationing fuel. It blamed citizens for panic while maintaining distorted pricing. It delayed necessary adjustments until panic itself became economically damaging.Faisal Mahmud is a Dhaka-based journalist.