Bangladesh’s new government is set to convene its first parliamentary session today (Thursday, March 12), and the atmosphere will likely be anything but a routine opening of a legislative term, overshadowed by unresolved differences on several fundamental issues between the treasury and opposition benches.This parliament assumes office after an unusual interlude in the country’s political life. For more than 18 months, Bangladesh was governed by an interim administration that took charge following a political settlement after the 2024 uprising, which brought an end to Sheikh Hasina’s 16-year rule.Even before the session begins, disagreements have surfaced over the ceremonial opening of parliament itself. Under constitutional convention, the first sitting of a newly elected parliament is inaugurated by an address from the president. But the decision to allow President Mohammed Shahabuddin – appointed during the previous Awami League government – to deliver that address has triggered objections from sections of the opposition. Leaders of the student-led National Citizen Party (NCP) have argued that the president, having been chosen during the Awami-era administration, lacks the moral authority to preside over the opening of a parliament that emerged from the uprising that ended that government.The ruling side, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) however, maintains that the constitution clearly mandates the president to address the opening session and that bypassing the office would create a new constitutional complication at the very start of the parliamentary term.Signs of deeper disagreements are also evident in how lawmakers themselves have taken office. Members of the BNP, which secured a two-thirds majority in the February election, have taken the conventional constitutional oath as members of parliament. Opposition lawmakers – primarily from Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and the NCP – have taken two separate oaths: one as parliamentarians and another as members of a proposed Constitution Amendment Council, a reform body envisioned in the July Charter drafted after the 2024 uprising.As a result, the new parliament begins its first sitting with two distinct interpretations of its role. One group of lawmakers views the chamber as functioning entirely within the framework of the existing 1972 Constitution. The other regards parliament as part of a broader transitional arrangement in which a separate reform council will play a central role in reshaping the country’s constitutional structure.This divergence reflects a broader uncertainty about how the political commitments made after the uprising should be implemented. The July Charter, negotiated among major political forces during the transition period, set out a programme of structural reforms aimed at reshaping Bangladesh’s political institutions. Among its proposals were the decentralisation of the judiciary, electoral reforms and the creation of a bicameral legislature that would include an upper house elected through a proportional representation system.Those proposals were endorsed in a national referendum held alongside the parliamentary election on February 12. The referendum provided a political mandate for reform but did not itself amend the constitution. That has left open the question of which institution will carry out the reform process.Supporters of the proposed Constitution Reform Council argue that a separate body is necessary because several reforms envisioned in the July Charter could conflict with established constitutional doctrine. Courts in Bangladesh have repeatedly upheld the principle that parliament cannot alter the “basic structure” of the constitution through ordinary amendments. In practice, that doctrine has limited attempts to introduce institutional changes such as restructuring the judiciary or altering the core architecture of the state.From the perspective of reform advocates, a temporary council backed by parliament would provide a mechanism to deliberate on broader structural changes without immediately running into those constitutional constraints. In their view, the body would function similarly to a constituent-style forum, allowing political actors to negotiate institutional changes before they are formally incorporated into the constitutional framework.The ruling BNP has rejected that approach. Although the party signed the July Charter during negotiations following the uprising, it has since argued that constitutional reform should be handled entirely through parliament. Government figures have maintained that the constitution already provides mechanisms for amendment and that any reform body exercising constitutional authority would first need to be created through parliamentary legislation.This position reflects both legal and political considerations. With a two-thirds majority in parliament, the BNP already has the numbers required to pass constitutional amendments under existing rules. Keeping the reform process within parliament therefore allows the governing party to maintain direct control over the pace and scope of institutional change.The tension over reform mechanisms has spilled into other parliamentary decisions, most visibly the question of who will serve as deputy speaker. The BNP has publicly indicated that it is willing to offer the deputy speakership to the opposition, particularly to the Jamaat-e-Islami, which holds the largest bloc of opposition seats. The offer was framed as recognition that the post-uprising political arrangement should allow opposition parties a meaningful institutional role in parliament.Yet the proposal has quickly turned into another point of contention. Jamaat leaders have said they have not yet received a formal written offer and therefore cannot decide whether to accept the position. They have also questioned whether the proposal reflects the spirit of the July Charter or simply the ruling party’s own political calculation.Under the reform blueprint endorsed during the transition period, the parliamentary structure itself was expected to change. The July Charter envisioned a system with two deputy speakers – one representing the government and the other representing the opposition – as part of broader institutional restructuring designed to reduce the concentration of power in the hands of the ruling party.The BNP’s offer of a single deputy speakership therefore falls short of that framework. For opposition parties, accepting the position without clarity on the broader reform agenda could be interpreted as legitimising a parliamentary arrangement that does not fully reflect the commitments made after the uprising.The uncertainty has been compounded by the emergence of a legal challenge to the July Charter itself. A writ petition filed in the High Court has questioned the legality of both the charter and the referendum that endorsed it. The court has issued a rule asking why the charter and referendum should not be declared invalid.The case introduces the possibility that a political disagreement could evolve into a constitutional confrontation involving the judiciary. Because the referendum and the parliamentary election were conducted on the same day and within the same electoral process, a judicial ruling invalidating the referendum could raise broader questions about the legal foundation of the election itself.Judicial involvement in such disputes has historically been sensitive in Bangladesh’s political environment. Court rulings on constitutional questions have often intensified political disagreements, particularly when those rulings intersect with issues of electoral legitimacy or institutional authority.A classic example of this is the abolition of the caretaker government system, a mechanism that had been introduced in the 1990s to oversee general elections. In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that the caretaker system was inconsistent with the constitution, even though it allowed the arrangement to remain temporarily in place for two more elections. The Awami League government of the time used the ruling to remove the system through a constitutional amendment.The then-opposition BNP rejected the move, arguing that elections without a neutral caretaker administration could not be credible. The dispute over the court ruling became a central factor in the opposition’s boycott of the 2014 general election, which led to a parliament largely uncontested by major opposition parties.For now, however, the immediate risk of institutional paralysis appears limited. The BNP’s parliamentary majority gives it firm control over legislative proceedings, committee assignments and the legislative agenda. Opposition parties collectively hold enough seats to meet the threshold envisioned in the July Charter for forming the proposed reform council, but without the governing party’s participation the body’s practical authority remains uncertain.Whether the situation escalates into a broader political confrontation will depend largely on how the competing interpretations of the July Charter evolve inside and outside parliament. If the governing party proceeds with reforms solely through parliamentary mechanisms, opposition groups may argue that the commitments made during the post-uprising transition are being diluted.Faisal Mahmud is a Dhaka-based journalist and analyst.