Dhaka: Bangladesh votes on February 12 in what is widely seen as its most consequential election in a generation. It is the first genuinely competitive national poll since 2008, taking place alongside a referendum on a sweeping package of constitutional reforms known as the July Charter. Voters will elect 299 members to the 13th Jatiya Sangsad and decide whether to endorse reforms aimed at curbing executive power, strengthening independent institutions and embedding lessons from the 2024 uprising in the country’s basic law.Together, the two ballots will decide whether the political rupture of 2024 leads to a reset of the country’s political order or a new phase of instability.This explainer sets out why the election is happening, why it has taken so long to get here, who is on – and off – the ballot, what the main blocs are offering, and how India figures in both the campaign and the calculations of key actors in Dhaka and New Delhi.From the July uprising to a delayed electionThe road to this election runs through the student‑led uprising of July–August 2024. Protests that began over job quotas for descendants of 1971 war veterans swelled into a nationwide revolt against Sheikh Hasina’s 15‑year rule, marked by deadly clashes, mass arrests and allegations of extrajudicial killings. Under pressure from students, civil society and parts of the security establishment, army chief General Waker‑uz‑Zaman announced on August 5, 2024 that Hasina had resigned and left the country, and that an interim government would be formed.Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was sworn in as chief adviser to head this interim administration, with a mandate to stabilise the country, investigate abuses and oversee a transition back to elected rule. Since the old caretaker system had been abolished in 2011, there was no ready‑made constitutional script for what followed.Why did it take 18 months to hold an election?From the start, there was a tug‑of‑war over sequencing. Student leaders and opposition parties wanted not just elections but structural change: a more independent Election Commission (EC), a less powerful prime minister’s office, more autonomy for the judiciary and safeguards against the abuse of police and intelligence agencies.The Yunus administration responded by setting up multiple commissions and, later, a National Consensus Commission to negotiate a reform package with parties and civil society. This process produced the July Charter, a document with more than 80 reform proposals, nearly 50 of them constitutional.Yunus and his allies argued that enshrining at least some reforms first would prevent any future government from simply reverting to the pre‑2024 status quo. Parties insisted that only an elected parliament should have the final say over the constitution. Initial hints that elections might be delayed into late 2026 triggered unease at home and abroad, and by the end of 2025 the interim government had committed to a February 2026 poll.What is the July Charter referendum actually about?The July Charter seeks to lock in structural changes flowing from the uprising. Its core proposals include term limits for the prime minister, stronger guarantees of judicial independence, new appointment mechanisms for bodies like the EC and Anti-Corruption Commission, and clearer civilian oversight of the security forces.It also envisages a somewhat more empowered presidency and a requirement that the next parliament sit, for a defined period, as a kind of constitutional reform council to translate the Charter into amendments. If parliament fails to do so within set deadlines, parts of the package could automatically enter into force through a special implementation order.Also read: Campaign Ends For Bangladesh Elections, a High-Stakes Battle AheadA “yes” vote on February 12 would give the next government a dual mandate – to govern and to complete this reform process. A “no” vote would be a major blow to Yunus and the reformists, and could reopen fundamental questions about the balance of power between executive and legislature and about security-sector accountability.Who is – and who isn’t – on the ballot?The most notable absence is the Awami League, which dominated politics for over a decade and was India’s closest ally in Dhaka. Swept out of office by the July uprising, its organisational network has since been dismantled, key leaders are abroad and the interim authorities have effectively frozen the party out of formal politics.In practice, the election is a contest between three main groupings. At the centre is the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), now led on the ground by Tarique Rahman. On the other side is an 11‑party alliance anchored by Jamaat‑e‑Islami, rehabilitated and re‑registered after the lifting of its ban. Between them, and sometimes alongside them, is the National Citizen Party (NCP), born out of the 2024 student movement, plus a scattering of independents and smaller outfits.Smaller secular and left‑leaning forces that were prominent in the anti‑quota protests are present mostly through individual candidates or tacit alliances, rather than as a coherent third front.How tight is the race?The race has clearly tightened over the campaign, and different polls are now converging on a much narrower gap. A late-December survey by Eminence Associates for Social Development (EASD) found that 70% of respondents wanted BNP to form the next government and 19% preferred Jamaat-e-Islami, with NCP on 2.6% and others in low single digits. The EASD poll, based on 20,495 face-to-face interviews across all 300 constituencies from December 20 to January 1, is at the more pro-BNP end of the spectrum, but it probably captured the surge in support for the party after Rahman’s return and the death of Khaleda Zia.By contrast, a large pre-election survey and seat projection by the International Institute of Law and Diplomacy (IILD), with technical support from Projection BD and Jagaran Foundation, shows a much tighter race. That poll, conducted among 63,115 voters between January 21 and February 5, projects that a BNP-led alliance could win about 44.1% of the vote, while the Jamaat-led 11-party alliance could take roughly 43.9%, with 6.5% of voters still undecided. On IILD’s constituency-level modelling, the Jamaat alliance is ahead in 105 seats and the BNP bloc in 101, with about 75 constituencies classed as genuine toss-ups.Youth-focused surveys point in the same direction: BNP remains ahead among young voters overall, but Jamaat is disproportionately strong among those voting in a national election for the first time since 2008. A nationwide study by the Communication and Research Foundation and Bangladesh Election and Public Opinion Studies found that 37.4% of first-time voters intend to vote for Jamaat, against 27% for BNP and 17% for NCP, while an earlier SANEM youth survey still placed BNP as the most popular party among potential young voters, with Jamaat second. That mix, a modest BNP edge in overall vote share, a highly competitive Jamaat machine, and a large pool of undecided and first-time voters, makes the final outcome genuinely hard to call.What do the logistics of the election look like?The operation on February is challenging. According to the EC, 127,711,793 voters are registered, including about 64.8 million men, 62.9 million women and a small number of hijra voters, formally recognised on the rolls. Voting will take place at 42,766 polling centres across the country, with around 247,000 individual polling booths to accommodate the dual parliamentary and referendum ballots.To run the process, the EC has appointed 42,779 presiding officers, 247,482 assistant presiding officers and 494,964 polling officers – a total of 785,225 civilian polling officials. A briefing report by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, based on EC data, estimates that roughly 939,000 members of various law‑enforcement agencies – police, Border Guard Bangladesh, Ansar and others – will be deployed for election duties. Polling hours have been set from 7.30 am to 4.30 pm, and field officers have been told to report turnout figures every two hours.Following Jamaat candidate Nuruzzaman Badol’s death in Sherpur‑3 on February 3, the EC has postponed voting in that constituency under Section 17(1) of the Representation of the People Order. Ballots will, therefore, be cast in 299 constituencies on February 12, with Sherpur‑3 to be filled later.What does the BNP stand for in this election?BNP’s pitch blends three themes: restoring democracy, cleaning up corruption and reclaiming national history. Tarique Rahman has framed the election as a chance to “return ownership of the state” to citizens after 15 years of one-party rule, promising to depoliticise policing, strengthen parliament and re-empower the judiciary. He has also, in a notable departure from older BNP rhetoric, acknowledged past “unintentional mistakes and shortcomings” and tried to turn contrition into an argument for a stricter anti-corruption regime.On history, BNP is working to reclaim the Liberation War narrative long monopolised by the Awami League. Tarique’s speeches honour the martyrs of 1971, highlight that religion did not divide those who fought, and repeatedly invoke his father Ziaur Rahman’s role as a sector commander and proclaimer of independence. This is aimed at presenting BNP as a legitimate heir to the liberation legacy and at drawing a contrast with Jamaat’s wartime record.At the same time, BNP is walking a line on religion and pluralism. Its leaders have promised that “religion belongs to the individual, but the state belongs to all,” and that citizens of every faith will be free to practise their religion. Rahman has also talked of reinstating more explicitly Islamic language in the constitution, signalling to conservative voters.On the July Charter, BNP has officially endorsed a “yes” vote but with caveats. Some senior figures have publicly aired reservations about proposals that could significantly enhance presidential powers or entrench interim‑era institutional designs, and Tarique’s own speeches have put more emphasis on his party’s governance agenda than on the Charter text. His final broadcast speech on the eve of the campaign blackout did not mention the referendum.What about Jamaat‑e‑Islami and its alliance?Jamaat is campaigning as the vehicle for clean governance, Islamic ethics and generational change. Party leaders argue that an Islamic moral framework can deliver social justice and curb corruption more effectively than the secular parties that have alternated in power since 1991. But they have also worked to soften the party’s image, repeatedly stressing that Bangladesh “belongs to Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Christians alike” and promising to resist any attacks based on religious identity.The party’s history remains a major liability. It opposed Bangladesh’s independence and several of its leaders were executed for 1971 war crimes under Hasina. In his speeches, Jamaat ameer Shafiqur Rahman has largely sidestepped that history, mentioning the Liberation War only briefly before pivoting to the July 2024 uprising – the event from which he wants the party to draw its mandate. Opinion polls and reportage suggest that many of Jamaat’s new supporters, particularly younger ones, are driven less by ideological Islamism and more by anger at corruption and a perception that the party is better organised and less tainted by recent scandals.On the July Charter, Jamaat is an enthusiastic supporter. It presents a “yes” vote as essential to preventing any future authoritarian turn, and its leaders have campaigned aggressively on the referendum, folding it into their message of resetting the rules of the game.What are the parties saying about India?India is never far from Bangladeshi politics, but in this election it is more of a subtext than a campaign slogan. Under Hasina, Dhaka–Delhi ties were closer than at any time since independence: the Awami government cracked down on insurgent groups from India’s northeast, agreed to transit and connectivity projects and often withstood domestic criticism for deals seen as favouring India. BNP has long been viewed in India as unreliable or hostile, shaped by the 2004 Chittagong arms haul and the presence of Indian insurgents on Bangladeshi soil during its last term in office. Since Hasina’s ouster, however, senior BNP figures have tried to recalibrate, talking of India as a “friend” but insisting on “equal and respectful” relations and rejecting what they call the “big brother” attitude of the Awami era. In April 2025, for example, standing committee member Abdul Moyeen Khan told a Dhaka roundtable that BNP wanted “positive relations” with India but would review agreements that, in its view, had compromised Bangladesh’s interests.Awami-aligned commentators and outlets continue to frame BNP’s stance as fundamentally anti-Indian, pointing to calls by some of its supporters to boycott Indian products and its sharp criticism of security and transit arrangements signed under Hasina. BNP, for its part, has attacked India for hosting Hasina after her ouster, a grievance that plays well with parts of its base but sits uneasily with its message of wanting stable ties.Jamaat’s rhetoric towards India has historically been more openly adversarial. In August 2023, its acting ameer denounced what he described as Indian characterisations of Jamaat as a fanatical threat to border security, calling such statements interference in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. As its electoral prospects have improved, however, the party has begun to temper its language. In an October 2025 statement, Shafiqur Rahman said that relations with India under a Jamaat‑influenced government would be based on mutual respect and recognition that “neighbours cannot change their geography.” In more recent interviews, he has promised “peaceful and cooperative relations with neighbouring countries, including India”.How is India reading this election?For India, the end of the Hasina era meant losing a government that consistently delivered on its security and connectivity priorities. New Delhi’s public line after the July uprising and Yunus’s appointment was cautious – it described developments as Bangladesh’s internal matter and called only for peace and a restoration of democratic processes.At the same time, India maintained working contacts with the interim administration, which drew criticism from some rights groups and Bangladeshi commentators who argued that this risked legitimising a non‑elected regime presiding over serious abuses. As the transition dragged on, friction surfaced. Dhaka alleged that exiled Awami activists were operating politically from Indian territory; India rejected these allegations as “misplaced” and insisted it did not allow its soil to be used for activities against friendly states.By late 2025, the MEA was issuing sharper statements about attacks on minorities in Bangladesh, saying such incidents “could not be brushed aside” and calling on the interim authorities to protect Hindus, Buddhists and Christians. At the same time, Indian diplomats and analysts were openly acknowledging that, with Awami League out of the picture for now, New Delhi would have to work with whoever emerged from a credible election – including a BNP‑led or BNP‑Jamaat coalition.Officially, India’s position going into the vote is limited to a call for a peaceful, free and inclusive election. Unofficially, policymakers are gaming out scenarios – a clear BNP majority, a hung parliament with Jamaat as kingmaker, or a fragmented outcome that complicates everything from transit and water‑sharing to border security and minority protection.What is ultimately at stake?Domestically, the election and referendum will decide whether the extraordinary mobilisation of 2024 turns into lasting institutional change or merely produces a rotation of elites. A credible vote followed by an orderly transfer of power would mark the first widely accepted alternation of governments through elections since 2008 and give the next Sangsad a mandate to tackle constitutional reforms. A chaotic or contested outcome would deepen questions about the legitimacy of both the interim period and whatever government follows.Economically, Bangladesh’s export-dependent economy – and particularly its garment industry – needs political stability, predictable policy and credible institutions to manage debt pressures, sustain foreign investment and navigate shifting trade preferences. International partners will watch closely not only who wins but how the winners govern.For India, the vote will determine whether it can preserve the security and connectivity gains of the Hasina years under a very different political dispensation, or whether it faces a more transactional and volatile partner in Dhaka.