Chandigarh: The recently agreed India-European Union (EU) Free Trade Agreement (FTA) marks more than an expansion of commercial ties, with defence and strategic cooperation emerging as one of its key pillars.While primarily aimed at boosting trade, investment, and civil industrial collaboration, the pact is viewed by Indian defence planners as laying the groundwork for deeper cooperation in defence manufacturing, technology transfer, and materiel procurement. In this context, Europe’s defence industry is increasingly viewed as a credible alternative to India’s traditional arms suppliers like Russia, Israel, and – though to a lesser extent – the US, each of which poses its own set of limitations and challenges.Industry officials in New Delhi and Bangalore argue that many European defence firms bring a distinct approach to military commerce, consciously separating such engagements from geopolitical agendas, prioritising industrial logic over strategic leverage.They emphasise that the political neutrality of most EU member states, along with their minimal engagement in global conflicts, positions them as lower-risk partners for sustained defence collaboration. This pragmatic approach contrasts with India’s major defence suppliers, whose security policies were shaped by broader strategic calculations, sanctions, or shifting alliances, thereby underscoring Europe’s value in boosting India’s military modernisation.“Smaller and technologically advanced European countries tend to separate defence commerce from geopolitical agendas,” said Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle (Retd) of Security Risks consultancy in Delhi. Their focus remains on industrial logic rather than strategic leverage, and their relative political neutrality and limited involvement in global conflicts make them lower-risk partners for co-development and sustained collaboration, he added.India’s reassessment of its military modernisation strategy has been sharpened by the experience of Operation Sindoor, which exposed vulnerabilities stemming from supply-chain disruptions and overdependence on a narrow pool of suppliers. The crisis highlighted the strategic necessity of diversifying procurement to include partners that are politically neutral, technologically sophisticated, and open to co-development and localisation – key elements in advancing India’s goal of Atmanirbharta or achieving augmented indigenous military capabilities.More than 60% of India’s current military equipment remains of Russian originAccording to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia, the US, Israel, and France together accounted for 84% of India’s arms imports between 2019 and 2023, with Moscow alone supplying 36%. However, despite a steady decline in acquisitions, more than 60% of India’s current military equipment remains of Russian origin.But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the US and EU-led sanctions on Moscow that followed, have severely disrupted deliveries of critical platforms to India, including two S-400 ‘Triumf’ air defence units, Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates, and the lease of a second Akula-class nuclear submarine.Moreover, enduring delays in providing spares for Indian’s frontline Su-30 MKI and MiG-29M multi-role air superiority fighters, assorted helicopters, transport and mid-air refuellers, submarines and tanks, amongst other platforms, had also adversely impacted operational readiness during periods of heightened tension, reinforcing concerns about Moscow’s reliability as a military partner.These multiple anxieties were further compounded by Russia’s proliferating strategic partnership with China, raising questions in Delhi about future access to advanced systems like additional S-400s, alongside uninterrupted logistical support for in-service defence equipment.Analysts recently noted that, as Russia’s defence industry struggles with sanctions and production bottlenecks, a growing proportion of S-400 system components are now being sourced from China. This has highlighted Moscow’s increasing dependence on Beijing, an aspect that, in turn, has intensified Indian concerns over the continuity of Russian defence supplies and its technological autonomy.Simultaneously, India’s defence relationship with Israel has been under pressure since the October 2023 Hamas attacks and the ensuing Gaza campaign, as its leading defence firms continue to redirect resources to meet domestic military equipment needs. Consequently, this had further delayed deliveries of components for Indian materiel involving loitering munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), air defence systems, and counter-drone technologies. Uncertainty also surrounded upgrades and long-term support for Israeli-origin aerial surveillance platforms, periodically deployed along India’s disputed northern border with China.And until recently, a close strategic partner, the US now faces a growing trust deficit in New Delhi. Technology transfers remain limited, end-user monitoring is stringent, and proprietary access to critical materiel is tightly controlled. Persistent delays in the General Electric – HAL F414 fighter engine programme – agreed in mid-2023 and vital for India’s next-generation combat aircraft – have further reinforced scepticism in Delhi about Washington’s reliability as a defence ally.Alongside, bilateral ties once framed as a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific stability have entered a more uncertain phase under President Donald Trump, marked by strategic friction, transactional fatigue and interminable trade disputes and punitive tariffs. And while cooperation within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) – featuring India, Australia, Japan, and the US – continues, engagement has become increasingly symbolic, heightening Delhi’s unease over security frameworks reliant on sustained political will in Washington.Collectively, these developments suggest that India-US relations are now guided less by shared values and more by Washington’s narrowly aligned security, political, and diplomatic interests. Such convergence of tensions and supply-chain uncertainty, too, had sharpened India’s turn towards European defence suppliers as reliable long-term collaborators.A further advantage for India in engaging European defence partners lies in their relative insulation from overt anti-China strategic agendas. Unlike the US, whose defence cooperation is increasingly framed within a broader Indo-Pacific competition with Beijing, most European countries approach military partnerships through a commercial and industrial lens rather than an ideological one.Aligning with EU members would, therefore, allow India greater functional flexibility, reduced political signalling, and fewer constraints on employment or integration of weapon systems. For Delhi, such operational pragmatism is particularly valuable, enabling defence cooperation that strengthens military capabilities without deepening strategic entanglements or provoking unnecessary escalation in an already delicate regional balance.Meanwhile, within this broader European context, France occupies a unique position as an established and trusted partner, as India’s principal defence equipment provider since the 1950s.“Over several decades, France has demonstrated a sustained commitment to long-term capability building, consistently shared technology, supported localisation, and insulated defence cooperation from political conditionalities,” said a senior industry official, speaking on condition of anonymity, for fear of being perceived as biased. This track record makes it a central reference point in India’s ongoing assessment of European defence options and reinforces its overall appeal as a reliable, collaborative partner.Building on this decades-long relationship, the Indian Air Force (IAF ) is reportedly on the verge of ordering an additional 114 Dassault Rafale fighter jets to supplement the 36 it acquired in 2016, alongside the Indian Navy’s (IN’s) order last year for 26 Rafale Marine carrier-based variants, scheduled for delivery 2029 onwards.Earlier, in the 1950’s France supplied the IAF 100-odd M.D. 450 Ouragan (Hurricane) fighter-bombers-locally nicknamed Toofani, followed by Mystere IVA’s a few years later, that ably executed themselves in the 1965 war with Pakistan. Thereafter, in 1979, India inducted SEPECAT Jaguars, jointly built by France and the UK, around 118 of which were currently operational, and Dassault later supplied three squadrons of Mirage 2000H jets in the mid-1980s, recently upgraded to Mirage 2000-5 standards.Beyond fighters, France has provided the IN with six Scorpène(Kalvari)-class submarines, Milan anti-tank guided missiles, and licensed production of Chetak and Cheetah helicopters in the 1960s, whose Turbomeca engines, developed with HAL years later, presently power Dhruv, Rudra, and a range of locally developed rotary platforms.India and France have further institutionalised defence cooperation through regular joint exercises, logistics support agreements, and an annual defence dialogue, underpinned by a coalescing strategic vision in the turbulent Indian Ocean Region. Paris’s political reliability – evident since its refusal to condemn India’s 1998 nuclear tests – has further cemented bilateral trust, reinforcing a partnership where, indeed, success has bred success.European countries offer advanced capabilities in submarines, precision munitions, radarFurthermore, countries like Sweden, Germany, Italy and Spain offer advanced capabilities in submarines, precision munitions, radar, electronic warfare, cyber defence, and network-centric warfare, often with fewer political strings attached.Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems is close to finalising Project-75(I) with Mazagaon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd to build six advanced diesel-electric submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion and land-attack capability. Beyond this programme, German firms are viewed as valuable partners in next-generation submarine design, cyber resilience, and electronic warfare, as well as small arms production.Spain’s partnership with Tata Advanced Systems to manufacture C-295 transport aircraft in Baroda further illustrates how European defence engagement aligns with India’s Atmanirbhar agenda. Potentially, future collaborations with Spanish companies could extend to advanced sensors, radar systems, and training platforms and simulators.Italy, for its part, has quietly built durable defence ties with India over decades. The Oto Melara 76 mm naval gun has been licence-produced in India since the 1990s and equips the indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant. Italian firms supported Vikrant’s propulsion and platform management systems, and Rome has expressed interest in involving India in the Global Combat Air Programme, alongside cooperation in UAVs, helicopters, and naval platforms.Sweden’s Saab has also emerged as a leading European defence partner, establishing a facility in Jhajjar in Haryana to co-produce the Carl-Gustaf M4 weapon system–the first instance of 100% foreign direct investment in India’s defence sector. Previously, Saab had pitched its Gripen-E fighter to the IAF, while offering collaboration on India’s fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) as well as radar, electronic warfare, cybersecurity, and AI-enabled military systems.Central European nations like Poland and the Czech Republic also have a history of defence engagement with India, and are now emerging as strategic partners in its diversification efforts. Poland had previously contributed to upgrades of the Indian Army’s T-72 tanks and its systems, while Czech firms supplied platforms like high mobility Tatra all-terrain military transport vehicles and other equipment aligned with Soviet-era platforms.Presently, India and Poland have elevated ties to a strategic partnership, covering defence modernisation, technology sharing, cybersecurity, and AI. Similarly, India and the Czech Republic, building on earlier industrial links, engage through a Joint Defence Committee on co-development, Make-in-India projects, and NATO-standard technologies, offering politically neutral and technologically capable alternatives.Viewed in the context of the recently concluded India – EU FTA, such a trajectory in defence ties with European states may soon unfold imminently, reflecting not a rupture in India’s traditional military relationships but a deliberate recalibration shaped by experience, risk, and evolving strategic realities.As India pursues military modernisation amid increasingly constrained global conditions, the focus is shifting from transactional purchases toward sustainable capability creation. In this light, Europe’s growing role may be seen not as a replacement for existing partnerships but as a stabilising counterweight within an increasingly fragmented and unpredictable defence ecosystem.