Chandigarh: The Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) approval to induct 114 French Dassault Rafales, under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) procurement programme, is being presented as a decisive break from the past – but in reality, it is anything but.What was actually cleared by the MoD on Friday, January 16, at the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) behest, is essentially a repackaged version of the August 2007 USD 10-12 billion Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal, which had been scrapped by the BJP-led government after it assumed office in 2014. The MRFA project follows an identical strategic logic and involves virtually the same aircraft type – albeit 12 platforms fewer than the original MMRCA, which had included 126 – over a decade later, and comes with a price tag of USD 30-35 billion, nearly three times the original estimate.The acquisition programme’s acronyms had certainly changed, but the eventual outcome has circled back to where it began nearly two decades ago, years after procedural churn was touted by both the BJP-led government and the IAF as genuine progress in fighter fleet modernisation. In essence, this latest MRFA process merely ended up substituting bureaucracy for capability, leaving the IAF to pay more, wait longer, and continue operating with a fighter fleet stretched well below sanctioned strength and rapidly dwindling in times of burgeoning regional hostility.A cross-section of senior IAF veterans associated with the MMRCA project noted wryly that Dassault would be “laughing all the way to the bank” with the IAF’s order book. It has already received 36 Rafales, costing Rs 58,000 crore (USD 8.8 billion), and the Indian Navy has ordered 26 of its Marine variants for Rs 63,000 crore (USD 7.6 billion).And, now with the proposed induction of 114 additional F3R fighters, along with upgraded and costlier F4R and F5R models, the IAF’s Rafale fleet would eventually exceed 176 aircraft – and may grow even further.Also read: Why India Can’t Close Key Submarine and Fighter Deals“Eventually, India will end up paying a hefty premium for the MRFA deal – a cost born of the BJP’s political bravado in scrapping the MMRCA buy,” said a veteran three-star fighter pilot formerly involved in the latter process. It’s a textbook case of political pride over prudence, with the Indian taxpayer left footing the enormous bill for such a gross miscalculation, he said, requesting anonymity.Mistaking expediency for strategy, this present MRFA outcome followed years of political self-congratulation by the BJP government over scrapping the 126-aircraft MMRCA programme, originally initiated by the Congress party-led federal coalition, in favour of a supposedly “decisive” purchase of 36 flyaway fighters in September 2016. It also highlighted the arrogance – and strategic short-sightedness – of the BJP letting political convenience override long-term defence planning, a domain best left to professionals.“Had the original MMRCA deal proceeded – which it clearly should have – the IAF would today be operating a fleet of ‘homegrown’ Rafales,” said the aforementioned veteran.Instead, years of political manoeuvring and bureaucratic delays have left the force struggling to recover its fighter squadron strength that had reduced from the sanctioned 42.5 to just 29-30 combat squadrons.When the MMRCA was launched, it envisaged 126 medium fighters selected through an exhaustive competition, with 18 to be acquired off-the-shelf and the remaining 108 aircraft to be licence-produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in Bangalore via a substantial technology transfer. Rafale emerged as the winner in user trials in 2012, besting five rival fighters from Europe, Sweden, the US and Russia.Thereafter, Dassault-MoD and IAF negotiations centred on delivery timelines, overall cost, liability, technology transfer and India’s insistence that the French manufacturer operationally guarantee HAL-built Rafales – all issues that MoD officials at the time claimed were ‘knotty, but resolvable’.But before these discussions could conclude, the 2014 general elections brought a change of government. Consequently, one of the BJP-led administration’s first major moves was to scrap the UPA-era MMRCA tender – not for strategic or operational reasons, but simply to signal a political break with the previous government, disregarding military realities tied to sensitive materiel production and procurement timelines.Instead, the BJP government chose to acquire 36 flyaway Rafales amid much fanfare – a move many IAF officials and analysts dismissed at the time as a ‘politically convenient’ but costly shortcut, which ultimately forced the initiation of the MRFA programme in 2018-19. Framed, at first as an open competition among eight fighter types from multiple manufacturers, it gradually narrowed over time, quietly converging late last year on the Rafale.Originally, the MRFA plan envisaged the direct import of 18 fighters, with the remaining 96 to be built in India through a joint venture between Dassault and an Indian strategic partner (SP) from either the public or private sector. Whether negotiations will adhere to this structure – or modify it – remains unclear, as does the eventual role of a domestic SP.That choice, if made, will carry significant consequences, particularly as it could involve industrial groups with close ties to the government that have only recently entered the defence manufacturing space.HAL too could emerge as the default partner under technology transfer, but its heavy commitments to ongoing fighter and helicopter programmes may limit its capacity, despite its eagerness to participate. However, if a private-sector partner is shortlisted instead, additional vetting, capability assessments and contractual arrangements would be required – likely extending the MRFA projects timelines further, since such an arrangement has never been attempted in India.Meanwhile, under the MoD’s Defence Acquisition Procedure–2020, the immediate next step in the MRFA programme is for the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), chaired by defence minister Rajnath Singh, to grant an Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for the 114 Rafales – a mandatory prerequisite before commercial negotiations can begin.Also read: Tejas Turbulence: The Gaps in India’s Fighter Programme GovernanceOnce the AoN is secured, the MRFA enters its most demanding phase: detailed negotiations on pricing, delivery schedules, technology transfer, local production, indigenous content, industrial offsets, and the tentative selection of a domestic partner under the MoDs overarching Atmanirbharta rubric.Moreover, the question on whether the deal would follow a government-to-government (G2G) model, as with the earlier 36-Rafale purchase, is likely to become clearer during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to New Delhi, for the AI Impact Summit on February 19.Whether negotiated directly with Dassault or via a G2G route, the deal would multiple hugely complex facets for such a major deal, with experts estimating 12-18 months being needed to resolve its many components and strands. The final agreement would then require political clearance from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), chaired by Prime Minister Modi, before being inked by the MoD – meaning that even with compressed timelines and official fast-tracking, conclusion could take 2-3 years.Hence, initial flyaway deliveries to the IAF of an unspecified number of Rafales for now may begin in 2028-29, domestic assembly could ramp up around 2030-31. Full delivery of all 114 aircraft – including India-built units – might stretch into the early to mid-2030s, depending on how swiftly local production scales and how efficiently negotiations on technology transfer, possible SP selection, and likely offsets and locally-sourced equipment to be included on the fighters, were concluded.The MoD and the IAF will also have to confront another, less discussed reality.A spate of recent media reports had indicated that Dassault faced industrial capacity constraints, with substantial pending orders for Rafales from multiple foreign air forces, limiting its ability to commit early delivery slot for the IAF. Such production bottlenecks, analysts caution, could stretch delivery timelines and complicate the MRFA programme’s objective of rapidly rebuilding the IAF’s depleted fighter squadron strength.The IAF’s fighter squadron shortfall arises from the predictable ageing of its fleet – six Jaguar squadrons nearing retirement, and three squadrons each of upgraded MiG-29UPGs and Mirage 2000-Hs increasingly maintenance-intensive and operationally overstretched. This was exactly the scenario the MMRCA was designed to address as a structured, long-term recapitalisation plan.Abandoning the MMRCA midstream by the BJP government only compounded the IAF’s operational difficulties. Delays in Tejas light combat aircraft deliveries mounted even as combat strength continued to erode, culminating in the retirement of the last two MiG-21 ‘Bis’ ground-attack squadrons last September.It was against this backdrop of shrinking numbers and mounting operational strain that the MRFA emerged – not as a bold new initiative, but as a belated attempt to arrest a decline that need never have occurred or at least could have been considerably mitigated.The MRFA programme does not break new ground. It is, instead, a delayed effort to recreate the original MMRCA framework on far less favourable terms. Had the MMRCA programme gone on stream as planned, the IAF would today be inducting fighters faster, at lower cost, and with a smoother operational transition, steadily replenishing its depleted squadrons.Instead, political expediency imposed a costly shortcut, leaving the force scrambling to recover lost time and capability. What should have been a structured fleet renewal devolved into a patchwork solution, with the MRFA now chasing – nearly two decades later – the very logic the MMRCA had already laid out, but at a far higher operational and financial cost.