New Delhi: The recent approval by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to acquire 114 additional Dassault Rafale fighters is being presented by the Indian Air Force (IAF), the Union government and much of the media as a decisive move to rebuild depleted combat strength.But in reality, it effectively revives – albeit in altered form – the long-abandoned, 2007-8 tender for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), which had thereafter shortlisted the twin-engine Rafale 14 years ago, only for that entire process to be derailed by procedural drift and institutional indecision by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in 2016.In its place, the government arbitrarily opted for a sharply reduced, off-the-shelf purchase of 36 Rafales as an emergency capability infusion into the IAF in September 2016, for Rs 58,000 crore (around €7.87 billion/$8.8 billion at the time).Instead, what is presently being projected as fresh momentum in the Rafale buy, under the Multi Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) procurement programme, underscores a harsher reality: years were squandered, costs climbed, squadron strength eroded, and the same solution was rediscovered after a full bureaucratic loop in what can only be qualified as zero foresight.If the MMRCA programme had been executed as originally structured, the IAF would by now, almost certainly have been operating a sizeable fleet of domestically-built Rafales, backed by deeper industrial participation and genuine technology absorption to augment domestic military aviation capability.What further sharpens the irony is the cost curve.The original MMRCA negotiation was estimated at roughly $10–12 billion for 126 aircraft, including licensed domestic production of 108 units, via a considerable technology transfer.The proposed 114-aircraft purchase is commercially costed at $30–35 billion, even before the customary additions – weapons packages, infrastructure and technician training. After years of delay and repeated warnings over force depletion, the MoD and the IAF are now poised to procure fewer aircraft than first planned, at several times the aggregate cost.Set against this is the $8.8 billion purchase of 36 Rafales, an amount uncomfortably close to the projected cost of the original 126-aircraft MMRCA package. In effect, a fraction of the originally planned MMRCA fleet absorbed nearly the same financial outlay – but without the scale of licensed production, the industrial ecosystem build-up, or the depth of technology transfer that constituted its core rationale.Equally striking is what remains publicly unclear in the details revealed by the MoD on Thursday in announcing the AoN for the 114 Rafales.The original MMRCA structure rested heavily on licensed production by the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), which was designated the principal manufacturing partner: an arrangement that later became one of the central friction points in negotiations with the French side over responsibility, quality control, and liability, and eventually the alibi for the BJP government for its termination.Conversely, the 114-fighter project, under the original MRFA proposal, is expected to proceed under the MoD’s Strategic Partnership (SP) model. Yet, there has been no reporting, let alone mention whatsoever by any media outlet on how – or whether – that framework will actually be applied in this case. According to the original 2019 MRFA proposal, 18 of the shortlisted platforms- in this case, Rafales- would be acquired off-the-shelf and the remaining 86 constructed locally.Into this fog of opaque MoD activity, it also remains uncertain who the Indian production partner would be, how workshare would be divided, what level of technology transfer is envisaged or whether assembly would again fall to HAL.That silence is not a minor detail. In the event of HAL again emerging as central to the Rafales licensed production, the procurement story circles right back to the very industrial and contractual complications that helped derail the earlier MMRCA deal, making the entire episode even more ironic and paradoxical.And, if, instead, a different Indian partner is chosen, that raises a separate set of political, industrial, and capability questions that deserve scrutiny but have so far received no attention whatsoever. Either way, the absence of clarity suggests that the hardest parts of the programme – industrial execution, liability, delivery timelines – are once again obscure behind the laudatory headlines and chest thumping.Under the SP model, the realistic private-sector contenders are drawn from a small pool of large industrial groups with proven defence manufacturing depth, systems integration experience, and the financial capacity to absorb a long-gestation aerospace programme.The frontrunner by capability and track record is Tata Advanced Systems Limited, which already operates extensive aerospace manufacturing lines- including the Airbus Defence and Space C-295 transporter-produces aerostructures, works with multiple global original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and has demonstrated the ability to execute complex aviation programmes at scale.Close behind is Larsen & Toubro, a highly regarded defence industrial integrator with major experience in submarines, missiles, launch systems, radars, and precision fabrication – even if its direct fixed-wing aircraft exposure is more limited.Adani Defence & Aerospace, for its part, has recently signed a cooperation agreement with Brazil’s Embraer, strengthening its aerospace credentials and expanding its footprint into fixed-wing aircraft sectors beyond helicopters and drones. This partnership is part of Adani’s strategy to move up the value chain in aerospace systems and leverage Embraer’s design, manufacturing, and certification expertise – potentially positioning the group as a credible contender under the SP model for combat aircraft production like Rafale.Mahindra Defence Systems remains a plausible, but second-tier candidate, with experience in aerostructures and defence platforms, yet would almost certainly require a heavily OEM-driven production model to handle fighter assembly. Bharat Forge, given its strengths in precision engineering and artillery systems, is more likely to emerge as a major tier supplier than a prime integrator, while Reliance Defence – selected as the principal Indian offset partner by Dassault Aviation for the earlier 36-Rafale buy – now reportedly faces financial problems, thereby reducing its standing relative to rival SP contenders.Another key unresolved dilemma is who selects the SP- the MoD or Dassault Aviation. If the government names the SP, the choice risks being seen as politically steered and commercially contested. If the OEM chooses, it raises concerns over transparency and alignment with national industrial policy. Each route invites dispute – one over discretion, the other over sovereignty and until this is clarified, the industrial structure of the deal will remain uncertain. In a programme of this scale, ambiguity over who picks the SP too is not just a detail – it’s a fault line.Taken together, the entire sequence culminating in the proposed 114-aircraft Dassault Rafale buy is difficult to present as coherent planning by either the IAF or the MoD, but traces a pattern of drift rather than design: decisions deferred, negotiations reset, leverage lost, and costs compounded.A cross-section of IAF veterans said that what should have been a single, integrated, industrially transformative programme via the MMRCA tender has fractured into multiple premium purchases with reduced domestic industrial gain and delayed force restoration. One such three-star officer, involved in the MMRCA deal, termed the upcoming 114 Rafale buy not as a course correction, but a vastly expensive return to the starting block that merited scrutiny rather than hysterical celebration.