Chandigarh: Everlasting investigations by successive governments into numerous alleged corruption cases in material procurement over the past four decades have rarely, if ever, failed in establishing criminality or securing convictions, but have impeded India’s military modernisation and adversely impacted the operational efficiency of all three services.Instead, such proceedings have invariably become mired in overlapping jurisdictions and procedural delays, hampered by a weak investigative capacity, a limited understanding of complex technical, military, and contractual issues, and a diffused accountability. Ultimately, they have, in most instances, tended to expose systemic failure rather than establish individual guilt.Nothing illustrates this more starkly than the AgustaWestland VVIP helicopter case, involving the February 2010 procurement of 12 AW-101 aircraft from Italy’s AgustaWestland for the Indian Air Force (IAF) for Euro 570 million, to undertake VVIP transportation.Cancelled three years later, in 2013, amid corruption allegations, the helicopter import case – centred on British middleman Christian Michel James, the accused in the matter, who has been in jail since his deportation from Dubai in 2018 – has wound its way across multiple investigative agencies, including the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Enforcement Directorate (ED), as well as special courts, and remains nowhere near closure. This investigative and judicial failure was underscored yet again on April 8, when the Delhi high court dismissed James’s petition seeking release on the grounds that his nearly eight-year incarceration since extradition had already exceeded the maximum possible sentence for the charges against him. The court held that his plea “lacked merit” and also declined to examine his challenge to Article 17 of the India–UAE extradition treaty, which permits prosecution for offences beyond those listed at the time of his extradition.Also read: India Builds Nuclear-Powered Submarines with Ease, but Stalls on Less Complex FleetAnd, though James had secured bail from the Supreme Court in February 2025 in both the CBI and ED cases, he remains in custody for failing to meet stringent release conditions. Earlier, while granting James bail, the Supreme Court expressed clear disquiet over the Briton having spent over six years in jail without trial, with investigations still incomplete and no credible timeline for conclusion, highlighting the wider problem of prolonged incarceration amid delayed prosecution, even as it admonished the CBI and the ED for the pace of proceedings. “Given the pace at which the case is proceeding, the trial will not be completed even in the next 25 years, going by what your conduct has been,” the court had acerbically observed.In the same prolonged cycle of delay and unresolved outcomes that has come to define the AW-101 case, the fallout of the deal itself – referred to arbitration after cancellation – also remains unsettled 13 years later, with no clarity on its final disposition. This uncertainty extends to the status of the four AW-101 helicopters delivered to the IAF, which remain mothballed in Delhi, their future still contingent on the unresolved corruption proceedings involving James. And in the absence of the AW-101, the IAF has continued to rely primarily on its legacy and interim rotary-wing platforms for VVIP transport. The core of this arrangement is Russian-origin Mi-17 V5’s imported 2011 onwards and adapted in limited numbers for VVIP roles with upgraded interiors, secure communications, and defensive systems. For shorter routes, the IAF has occasionally used the indigenous Dhruv helicopter in VIP configurations, though its operational constraints limit broader use. And while both these rotary-wing assets fill the gap left by the terminated AW101 procurement, they do not entirely replicate its intended high-altitude, long-range VVIP capability. Consequently, India’s VVIP rotary transport architecture remains an interim, mixed solution rather than a purpose-built replacement fleet.Meanwhile, far from being an aberration, the ongoing AW-101 corruption case reflects a broader systemic pattern. Across decades, successive governments have probed high-profile defence imports – from Swedish Bofors howitzers and German HDW ((Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft) submarines to South African Denel rifles, Israeli Barak missiles, Brazilian Embraer aircraft, UK Rolls-Royce engines, Czech Tatra vehicles, and Swiss Pilatus trainers – yet have rarely reached conclusive findings of culpability. In almost every instance, investigations have been prolonged and inconclusive, often fading without closure, while carrying significant ramifications for military modernisation and operational readiness.This recurring ineptitude brings to mind The Times of India headline – “Nobody killed Jessica (Lal)” – later immortalised in a Hindi movie as a biopic on the murder of this 34-year-old model in 1999 at a South Delhi restaurant. Despite dozens of eyewitnesses who saw her being shot at point-blank range by an inebriated guest after she refused him a drink, the case initially descended into the absurdity of a murder without a perpetrator: an outcome that echoes the investigative paralysis and lack of closure apparent in these defence equipment-related probes.CBI inquiries into alleged kickbacks of Rs 64 crore in the Bofors case – which erupted in 1986–87 and contributed significantly to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress party losing the 1989 general elections – dragged on for over a quarter of a century, cost the exchequer more than Rs 250 crore, and were formally closed in 2011 without a single conviction. The case has since become emblematic of corruption allegations in Indian defence procurement, remaining a reference point in public discourse even presently.Yet, in a development that borders on the surreal and strains credulity, the Bofors case remains active. News reports in 2025 revealed that the CBI had issued a letter rogatory, or judicial request, to the US seeking information from a private investigator probing alleged kickbacks in the Bofors howitzer deal – nearly four decades after the illegal payments were allegedly made to Swiss bank accounts, and 14 years after the case itself had been formally closed.Equally shocking were claims by Geneva-based journalist Chitra Subramaniam, who broke key aspects of the scandal in The Hindu and The Indian Express in the eighties and nineties, that several “unopened boxes” of Swiss documents remain in the CBI’s possession. In her book, Bofors Gate: A Journalist’s Pursuit of Truth, released in February 2025, she stated that these sealed boxes, containing 500–1,000 pages of ‘sensitive material’ associated with the howitzer deal, were handed over to then CBI director Joginder Singh in 1997 but, for reasons that remain unexplained, were never opened.From a military standpoint, the Bofors scandal also triggered lasting battlefield consequences for the Indian Army, as it led to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) deferring, for over two decades, the option of locally licence-building the FH-77B 155mm/39 calibre howitzers using blueprints transferred to the then Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) alongside the original gun purchase.This prolonged hesitation exacerbated the Army’s acute artillery shortfall during the 1999 Kargil War and for several years thereafter. Eventually, a year after the case closure, the MoD in 2012 resurrected the original gun specifications and design documentation to develop the upgraded 155mm/45 calibre ‘Dhanush’ howitzers, currently being inducted to partially bridge the enduring artillery gun shortfall.Similarly, the disruption to the Indian Navy (IN)’s urgently needed submarine acquisition mirrored the artillery deficit, with investigative overreach and prolonged indecision eroding a critical combat capability.CBI inquiries into the HDW submarine contract – which involved the outright purchase of two Type 209/1500 diesel-electric ‘hunter-killer’ submarines (SSKs) from Germany’s HDW and the licensed construction of two more by Mazagaon Dockyard Limited (MDL) under transfer of technology – proved gravely detrimental to the Navy’s underwater force levels.They resulted in what IN officers still ruefully describe as a ‘lost decade’ between 1995 and 2005, when MDL’s submarine production lines, established at significant expense, lay idle pending investigations that were eventually ended without outcome.The consequences of this disruption hollowed out MDL’s specialised industrial base, with skilled submarine engineers and underwater welders seeking employment abroad. Consequently, when India signed a contract with France in 2005 to licence-build six Scorpene-class submarines, MDL was forced to rebuild its submarine construction ecosystem and reconstitute a trained workforce at substantial cost.Moreover, the AW101 case once again negatively affected the Scorpène programme through the collateral termination of associated contracts following the CBI’s probe. This included cancellation of all agreements with AgustaWestland’s 38 subsidiaries, notably Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS), which had been contracted to supply 98 Black Shark heavyweight torpedoes (HWT) for the Navy’s Kalvari/Scorpène SSKs, specifically designed for employment on these platforms.Accordingly, the abrupt cancellation of this HWT contract in 2016 – amid eventually unproven corruption allegations – forced the Navy into an operational compromise with the Kalvari boats being armed with upgraded German-origin SUT torpedoes acquired in the mid-1980s, widely regarded within the service as a distinctly inferior substitute.Eight years of delay followed, during which no immediate replacement was forthcoming, and it was only in December 2024 that the MoD signed a Rs 877-crore contract with France’s Naval Group to integrate Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO)-developed Varunastra HWTs across the fleet, as an interim corrective at substantially additional cost.But the HWT story does not end there.In a striking reversal that highlights the fragility and inconsistency of procurement continuity, compounded by repeated disruptions and prolonged investigative inquiries that added to delays and uncertainty, the MoD subsequently announced a second contract worth Rs 1,896 crore with WASS for the procurement and integration of 48 Black Shark heavyweight torpedoes for the Navy’s six Kalvari-class boats. Ironically, these are the same torpedoes originally selected over a decade earlier – when the Navy’s requirement stood at 98 units – before the deal was scrapped.That the requirement has now effectively been halved, even as operational demands have grown, underscores the cumulative cost of delay and indecision. Torpedo costs had also escalated sharply due to inflation and currency fluctuations, leaving the Navy paying a significantly higher price for reduced capability that should have been inducted years earlier.“This HWT episode encapsulates the broader consequences of inefficient, protracted investigations that stall decision-making”, said a retired two-star IN submariner. It not only disrupts procurement and degrades combat readiness but also creates a cycle of avoidable financial and operational penalties, he added, requesting anonymity. Earlier in 2008, the CBI’s preliminary enquiry (PE) into the procurement of three Brazilian Embraer EMB-145 aircraft by the DRDO, for its Indigenous aircraft early warning and control (AEW&C) programme, had revealed that $5.5 million was illegally paid as commission to an ‘overseas agent’ to facilitate the sale. The CBI, for its part, was reacting to a report by the Brazilian newspaper Folha De S Paulo, but then it seemed the trail went cold and the entire inquiry floundered inconclusively, but contributed to the AEW&C project exponentially slowing down.Subsequently, in late 2013, the CBI filed a closure report on its eight-year-long inquiry into alleged wrongdoing by South Africa’s state-owned armaments maker Denel, to secure the contract to supply 1,000 NTW-20 anti-materiel rifles and 398,000 rounds of ammunition in 2005 to the Indian Army, for an estimated USD$40 million. In its report filed before a special CBI court in Delhi after eight years of inquiry, the investigative agency claimed it had failed to uncover any ‘credible’ evidence of corruption in the rifle procurement, as a consequence of which Denel, which produced a range of competitively priced weaponry which India needed and could have acquired, was blacklisted for years.Also read: Without an Engine in Sight, India’s Sixth-Gen Fighter Talk Rings HollowAnd in May 2023, the CBI filed a corruption case against Rolls-Royce, two London-based Indian expatriates- deemed ‘middlemen’ or agents- and ’unnamed’ officials from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and the MoD for supplying Adour Mk871 engines to power licence-built BAE Systems Hawk 132 advanced jet trainers for both the IN and the IAF. This occurred a whopping 19 years after the engine deal was signed in 2004 and nearly eight years after the CBI’s PE into their import in 2016.Controversies surrounding the Pilatus trainer aircraft and the aborted Pegasus howitzer deal involving Singapore Technologies Kinetics (STK) further reinforced this pattern of disruption without resolution. In 2012, the IAF had procured 75 Pilatus PC-7 Mk II basic trainers to address a critical pilot training gap, but the deal later came under scrutiny over alleged irregularities and the possible use of intermediaries. A CBI PE launched in 2016. However, it failed to produce conclusive findings, even as it cast a shadow over follow-on acquisitions. In both these instances, allegations triggered investigations and bans, but without definitive outcomes, producing a familiar cycle of stalled procurements, disrupted planning, and persistent capability gaps – once again underlining how prolonged scrutiny, in the absence of closure, has repeatedly undermined military preparedness without delivering commensurate accountability.Space constraints preclude a full listing of analogous investigations pursued inconclusively by the CBI. But these extend to probes into the Barak-8 surface-to-air missile programme with Israel Aerospace Industries and the DRDO, as well as aborted tenders for air defence guns and repeated attempts to procure light utility helicopters – all of which failed to establish definitive culpability.Across several such cases, arrests have been made, including that of a former IAF chief of staff, but convictions have seldom followed, with most proceedings ending in acquittals or being quietly dropped due to insufficient evidence. In a significant majority of instances, CBI proceedings have remained unresolved, and outcomes have been left incomplete, entrenching a cycle of delay, uncertainty, and operational drift.The outcome is a system where accountability is routinely invoked, often amid considerable fanfare and political signalling, but resolution is seldom, if ever, delivered.