National security is one of the benefits cited by the regime for its continued stay in government and sway over politics. Here I look at how the regime measures on national security and find that it has taken advantage of an information environment that shows it in better light than warranted. Democratic accountability requires more access to relevant national security information for the electorate to take an informed position on its showing. Debunking pretensions is a first step to regime change.Institutional vandalismThe structural changes effected have flattered to please. A toothless chief of defence staff (CDS) has been in place for better part of the decade, with two generals fished out of retirement to successively tenant the appointment. The last CDS is on record lamenting the incomplete innovation in his recent recall of the planning and conduct of Operation Sindoor. Theaterisation that is to cap the endeavour is way away, since the command and control aspect at Delhi has not been thought through. The final bricks will be laid in the elevation of the CDS to whom theater commanders will report only when the regime believes the military will remain subservient even when so empowered. For now, the regime does not have the intellectual heft, even if it wanted to.The personnel policies have been equally bereft. Agnipath concept must be seen as a coup proofing measure, since the military was not involved in its conception. In one swell swoop it inducted a jugend-equivalent cohort into the military. At the tactical level, it has roundly busted cohesion, bonding being the bedrock of a primary group. Future cohorts will only have known the Modi era. From the current uncertainty surrounding an Agniveer’s second innings, it is likely that the tactical level will get too competitive to allow for camaraderie.Also read: The Many Failures of Operation SindoorAt the officer level, its exercise of choice of military leaders from a wider base of selection has led to circumspection. There is a post-retirement phase to be mindful of too, now that the regime controls all billets to which higher ranked retirees have traditionally auditioned for. The only known case of speaking truth to power has been in a post-retirement autobiography of an army chief, that has seen light of day only as a deniable copy. The regimen of information security has been made stringent by the threat of loss of pension, undercutting the vigour of defence-related discourse in a democracy.The military’s advisory role in fulfilling its professional responsibility surely suffers. It is not evident that there was even one cabinet committee on security (CCS) in the run up and during Operation Sindoor that the chiefs were invited to participate in, though the CCS reportedly met twice in the period. We know of only a meeting of the defence minister and the chiefs with the prime minister and one of the national security adviser (NSA) with the prime minister on the nuclear dimension of the conflict, with no mention of the presence of the military adviser to the national command authority present. The chiefs were undercut by a meeting on the eve of the final salvo of Operation Sindoor that had the prime minister conferring with a set of retired generals. The chiefs were present, but none thought it relevant to recall the Curzon-Kitchener controversy and register their objection to be second-guessed in the middle of a conflict by former colleagues, even if regime-compatible.Institutional nihilismMore importantly, it appears that the military is unmindful of the guardrails and self-regulation that should attend information operations. It rightly takes information as one the domains to conduct cross- and multi-domain operations. But, it is uneducated on the relationship of information and electoral choice in a democracy. The electorate can only make a reasoned selection of a party to lead the country if it has the relevant information to base such a critical decision on. Denial or manipulation of information in the open domain to make the ruling party look better than it ought, is a political act. The military might believe that being economical with facts helps preserve national morale and its own reputation. Non-trivial factors in themselves, these factors pale if at the cost of twisting the political playfield. Willing participation in such acts is evidence of politicisation.Also read: If Operation Sindoor Produced a Winner, it Wasn’t IndiaIn all three operations (2016, 2019, 2025) that signify a strategic shift under the regime, the narrative amplifies the significance of the military action to embellish the regime’s credentials as stronger-on-defence than predecessors. Surgical strikes that the regime uses for advertising its muscularity have always been an option and are not evidence of calling Pakistan’s ‘nuclear bluff’ as projected. Pakistan’s nuclear threshold has always been high enough for execution of local and limited military operations. As for the surgical strikes the regime has conducted, being too pat with peace offerings makes for an unbecoming tentativeness. The funk is from a potential reverse that could put back the regime’s domestic transformation agenda and damage its presiding demi-god. The regime could do without the distraction of war, but does seek dividend from military conflicts kept limited.The narrative on the China front has it that the regime stared down the Chinese bid for Indian territory, with the forces mounting a formidable logistics exercise to gain and stay-put at high altitudes in face of Chinese belligerency. It is clear from the unpublished memoirs of the then army chief that he took a decision in line with the regime’s thinking against upping the ante. This shows up a defensive mindset, even if with plausible strategic rationale. Being guarded with information on territory can be conceded if the purpose is to keep public attitudes in check, which if allowed to run riot can lead to pressure on the regime towards an uncalled-for military option. But with time, the facts must reach the electorate, if necessary through their representatives in legislature’s standing committees. It should not be an outgoing border guarding force commander informing the country obliquely of a situation on the border.Importantly, information must be adequately disseminated, lest the regime have its cake and eat it too: use the Pakistan front to show its muscles to compensate for quiescence on the China front. Compromise opens up a military to blackmail, which at a liminal level could be as innocent as provision of an air show over a politician’s constituency in a state going to polls. Pragmatism might justify such acts, but it is precedent setting – a wedge that political forces cannot but exploit and expand.Regime change means accountabilityFrom the capture of the state institutions, in particular the judiciary and the election commission, it is clear that the boast of the regime that it would last indefinitely is credible. That such matters are outside the pale of an apolitical military is quite right. However, the military is an institution of the state. Its probity is judged in relation to the constitution. The military exercises an deterrence against anti-democratic tendencies across the political spectrum. While for insurgents it has a more physical effect, for mainstream politics its very presence serves to deter. This does not require the military to have or take up a position on the matter.Also read: Ram Temple Picks Its First CEO: Operation Sindoor Veteran From Air Force, Jeetendra MishraThe forces out for a constitutional reset in India today are aware of the importance of suborning institutions to their political project. Their brazen take-over of most institutions is complemented by a surreptitious bid to pervade military culture under the guise of change in political culture necessitating accommodation and adaptation. The military may choose to prudently sway with the wind. However, it must exercise caution over collateral effects of information operations on the domestic arena. If the national security field cannot be pieced together – warts and all – by the attentive public, the ruling party can get away without democratic accountability.The necessity for regime change is heightened by the inevitability of an inter-generational change in the regime’s leadership. An extension in tenure of the regime would see younger contenders staying in saddle for longer. The political and administrative background of those leading the pack suggests they want a subordination to levels allowing the misuse of institutions. The handling by each of the police and rule of law should alert. Detox later would be challenging. Consequently, since worse is to follow, regime change at the appropriate time with the usual means, the ballot, is almost an imperative.The logic of the military being the last line of defence is that it must secure the state against all comers, including against those who may attempt appropriate it into perpetuity.Ali Ahmed is a strategic analyst. This article first appeared on his Substack, ‘ali’s version’.