Chandigarh: Remarkably, the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) proposed Rs 3.25 lakh crore acquisition of 114 Dassault Rafale fighters under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme has attracted little scrutiny in either the media or defence circles, despite effectively returning India to a requirement it first sought to fulfil through the 126-aircraft Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) programme launched in 2007, estimated at around Rs 42,000 crore.The absence of serious debate is striking for what is arguably one of the largest and most consequential military procurement decisions in India’s history. Nearly two decades after the original MMRCA programme was launched, India is poised to spend nearly eight times more money for fewer combat aircraft of essentially the same type – an outcome that, in almost any other sector of public spending, would almost certainly have triggered demands for explanation and accountability.Moreover, the accompanying irony is difficult to miss: the original MMRCA programme was never intended to be merely a platform acquisition. It was envisaged as a means of building domestic aerospace capability, absorbing advanced technologies, expanding domestic manufacturing and strengthening India’s defence-industrial base – the very essence of Atmanirbharta. Much of that vision has since dissipated, even as the cost of restoring the IAF’s declining fighter strength has escalated dramatically.Citing official sources, multiple media reports on Friday (August 7) revealed that Dassault Aviation had submitted its commercial and technical proposal to the Ministry of Defence for 114 Rafales, whose acquisition is being pursued through the government-to-government (G2G) route.The proposed frameworkUnder this proposed framework, which is expected to be finalised within the current financial year, 20 Rafales would be delivered to the IAF in fly-away condition, while the remaining 94 would be manufactured in India by a yet-to-be-designated domestic production partner – a first such manufacturing venture of this scale for Dassault outside France. The fighter’s indigenous content is expected to eventually reach around 50%, as Indian industry assumes a progressively larger role in its manufacture and integration.More importantly, the MRFA programme represents the latest iteration of a requirement the IAF first articulated nearly two decades ago and, in many respects, amounts to a return to the abandoned MMRCA project. The prospect of once again acquiring a large fleet of Rafales, therefore, inevitably raises questions about why the original programme failed to materialise and what strategic, financial, industrial and bureaucratic costs have flowed from that failure.The origins of that previous narrative date back to 2007, when the IAF issued its MMRCA tender for 126 fighters. After one of the most exhaustive combat-aircraft evaluations in aviation history, the Rafale was declared the winner in 2011-12, having outperformed five rival platforms, including the Eurofighter Typhoon, the US F-16 and F/A-18, Sweden’s Gripen and Russia’s MiG-35. The MMRCA proposal envisaged 18 aircraft being imported in fly-away condition and the remaining 108 manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) through extensive technology transfer and domestic industrial participation.Also read: What’s the Real Story Behind IAF’s Rafale ‘Bridge Support’ ContractNegotiations, however, stalled over disagreements regarding production responsibility, pricing, technology transfer and operational guarantees for aircraft manufactured by HAL. Political changes, following the BJP’s election to power in 2014 further complicated matters and, in 2016, instead of proceeding with the original MMRCA contract, India signed a Rs 59,000 crore inter-governmental agreement (IGA) with France to directly import merely 36 Rafales. And, though these aircraft significantly enhanced the IAF’s operational capability, they did little to address its more pressing problem of dwindling fighter squadrons, which in recent years have declined from an authorised 42 squadrons to around 29 presently.Additionally, the strategic consequences of the failure to conclude the original MMRCA programme promptly, too, were considerable.For, while Delhi debated contracts and procurement modalities, China rapidly modernised the People’s Liberation Army Air Force, inducting large numbers of advanced fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. It simultaneously expanded air bases across the Tibetan Plateau, improved logistics infrastructure and intensified military pressure along the bilaterally disputed Himalayan frontier in the Ladakh region. Simultaneously, Beijing’s military and nuclear ally, Pakistan, strengthened its own combat aviation by acquiring JF-17 ‘Thunder’ variants and enhancing integration with Chinese aerial missiles and sensor technologies.However, the damage was not confined to the strategic and operational realm alone, and in many respects the greater long-term loss was industrial.A defence industry official in Bengaluru, speaking on condition of anonymity, argued that the MMRCA programme was not merely about acquiring 126 Rafales, but about using a major defence acquisition to cultivate advanced aerospace skills, expand domestic design and manufacturing competence, and embed Indian industry more deeply into sophisticated global supply chains.And though legitimate concerns existed over HAL’s efficiency and workshare arrangements, abandoning the broader programme meant foregoing a rare opportunity to develop advanced aerospace manufacturing capabilities, systems-integration expertise and a deeper domestic supplier base that could have benefited future indigenous programmes like the nascent 5th generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).India’s dilemmaInstead, nearly two decades later, India finds itself returning to a broadly similar requirement under the MRFA programme, having lost not only time, but also the engineering and manufacturing advantage the original MMRCA project was intended to foster. Under the MRFA, it must now attempt to rebuild many of the partnerships, production ecosystems and technological pathways that MMRCA was intended to establish, albeit at a dramatically higher cost and without the benefit of the years of learning that timely execution would have delivered.A cross-section of senior IAF veterans, some of whom were involved in the MMRCA negotiations, said the most troubling aspect of the Rafale saga – past and present – was not merely its escalating cost, but the near-total absence of institutional accountability.They maintained that in private industry, a decade-long delay that resulted in paying several times more to acquire essentially the same capability while receiving fewer platforms than originally planned, would almost certainly trigger resignations, audits and structural reform.In public procurement, however, responsibility remains diffused across ministries, committees, negotiators, political administrations and layers of bureaucracy until no individual or institution bears meaningful culpability for the outcome. Ultimately, the taxpayer paid the bill, while those responsible for the failure of judgement and decision-making, on both the armed forces and government sides, simply moved on, unscathed.The consequences of that prolonged indecision are now becoming increasingly apparent.Also read: Why India Keeps Returning to Weapons It Spent Years RejectingThe IAF is believed to be seriously evaluating the possibility of acquiring two or more squadrons of Russian Sukhoi Su-57 fifth-generation stealth fighters, as an interim capability to address emerging threats until the indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme matures by the mid-2030s or beyond. Many fighter pilot veterans believe such a requirement might have been unnecessary had the original MMRCA programme proceeded on schedule, providing the IAF with the numbers, capability and technological momentum it had sought nearly two decades ago.More fundamentally, had the original MMRCA programme proceeded as envisaged, the IAF would, by now, have been operating India-built Rafales while, concomitantly, the country’s military aviation industry would have accumulated nearly two decades of experience in advanced aerospace manufacturing. Instead, the collapse of that vision resulted in a Rs 59,000 crore one-off purchase of 36 Rafales in fly-away condition – addressing an immediate operational requirement, but doing little to create the domestic capability the original programme was intended to establish.The MMRCA-MRFA journey, therefore, represents far more than the procurement of a fighter aircraft; it demonstrates the wider costs of indecision in augmenting military capability, industrial ambition and strategic preparedness.In the end, the most expensive element of the entire acquisition may not be the Rs 3.25 lakh crore price tag, but the two decades that preceded it. Aircraft, after all can be bought: lost time cannot.