For over seven decades, until the end of 2019, India’s armed forces had a convenient scapegoat for their myriad shortcomings: the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and its babus, particularly those in its finance wing, who were frequently accused of deferring most decisions by invoking a veto, which in reality they do not possess.Whether it was procurement delays, overambitious materiel requirements, inadequate infrastructure, equipment shortages, or institutional shortcomings of their own making, they routinely laid the blame at the MoD’s door. Each of the three services routinely cited its entrenched bureaucracy, byzantine rules, and supposed ignorance of and indifference to military modernisation and the broader ethos of the armed forces as the cause of almost every failing.For its part, the military was seldom, if ever, inclined to examine its own culpability for these enduring shortcomings. There may have been good reason for some of its grievances against the civilian establishment, but for commentators and analysts to suggest that the services were also complicit and should be held accountable was considered sacrilegious, if not downright heretical, and actively discouraged.Most significant restructuring of higher defence managementThat comfortable arrangement changed on 31 December, 2019, with the appointment of the newly retired Indian Army Chief, General Bipin Rawat, as India’s first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and head of the newly instituted Department of Military Affairs (DMA), with the rank of Secretary. These far-reaching institutional measures, undertaken in response to the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee in 1999-2000, represented the most significant restructuring of higher defence management in decades. For the first time, the military leadership was placed squarely within the government’s decision-making machinery.The four-star CDS became primus inter pares, or first among equals, in the military hierarchy and served as the government’s principal military adviser on tri-Service matters. He was also Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), with responsibility for promoting jointness among the three services, rationalising their resources, prioritising capital acquisition proposals and overseeing designated tri-Service organisations and commands. The CDS was also a member of the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) and the Defence Planning Committee (DPC), the government’s two key bodies for defence procurement and integrated long-term defence planning, respectively, and served as the military adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).Concurrently, the DMA became the MoD’s fifth integrated component, alongside the Departments of Defence, Defence Production, Defence Research and Development, and Ex-Servicemen Welfare. To establish it, the government had amended the Allocation of Business Rules, 1961, which govern the distribution of responsibilities and functions among ministries and departments, giving the DMA a formal mandate over a wide range of higher defence management functions that located the military leadership directly within the government’s decision-making machinery with clearly delineated responsibilities.These included oversight of the respective Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters, the Territorial Army, service-specific works and procurement, and promoting greater integration in military procurement, training and staffing. The DMA was also tasked with restructuring commands to facilitate joint operations, including the proposed establishment of Integrated Theatre Commands or ITCs.To reinforce this arrangement, the DMA was staffed by an Additional Secretary drawn from the three-star military ranks of Lieutenant General, Vice Admiral or Air Marshal, and three Joint Secretaries, one each from the Army, Navy and Air Force from the two-star ranks of Major General, Rear Admiral and Air Vice Marshal respectively. Two civilian Joint Secretaries, responsible for comparatively routine matters relating to establishment and coordination, and parliamentary affairs, were also part of the DMA, further embedding the military establishment within the government’s overall administrative machinery.Thus, the institution of both the CDS and the DMA brought the military leadership directly into the government’s decision-making structure, replacing the earlier arrangement under which the Service Headquarters had functioned merely as ‘attached offices’ of the MoD. At last, the armed forces had secured what they had been demanding for decades – a substantial presence within the government senior administrative hierarchy, with a direct role in shaping decisions.In effect, after a 72-year hiatus and hectic lobbying, the military had finally secured a place at the government’s decision-making high table.Crucially, this should have deprived the services of their long-standing and convenient alibi of blaming the MoD bureaucracy for their own inadequacies and failures, forcing them to own their decisions and answer for their actions, rather than hide behind the civilian establishment whenever military reform or modernisation fell short.Military leadership continues to speak like an aggrieved outsiderYet, as the age-old French saying goes, plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose (the more things change, the more they remain the same), and seven years later, the military leadership continues to speak like an aggrieved outsider, seemingly powerless in a decision-making process of which it is now an integral part. Its ingrained habit of holding the civilian bureaucracy responsible for its own limitations, while keeping itself beyond scrutiny, has proved remarkably difficult to shed.There are ample instances of the CDS and DMA continuing to hold the civilian establishment responsible for the military’s own shortcomings, but space constraints preclude an exhaustive examination. However, two particularly significant and contemporary examples suffice to illustrate this abiding contradiction.The recent retreat on the Agnipath scheme for recruiting personnel below officer rank (PBOR) into the military is the most glaring and latest instance of blame-shifting by the CDS and DMA. Much has been written in recent days about the long and short-term adverse ramifications of the DMA’s decision to extend by two years the tenure of three-quarters of the first batch of Agniveers, who were due for demobilisation in December after completing their four-year tour of duty.Introduced in June 2022, the scheme required all Agniveers to serve for four years, after which only 25% would be retained in the regular cadre, with the remaining 75% released with a modest, tax-free Seva Nidhi package of around Rs 11.71 lakh.The revised terms now include the prospect of all Agniveers being eventually absorbed into regular service after six years, subject to their individual willingness and selection under “prescribed objective criteria”, as announced by CDS Gen N. S. Raja Subramani in New Delhi on November 4. Few commentators or analysts, however, have questioned the role played by the DMA, as part of the government machinery, in initiating, processing and finalising the original scheme, or in formulating its latest and equally troublesome modification. Confusion continues to persist over the terms under which future Agniveers will be recruited, leaving the entire PBOR recruitment system clouded by uncertainty.While the political leadership was driven by Agnipath’s broader objectives of reducing the average age of the military, particularly the Army, from around 32 to 26 and curbing the growing pension liability, which accounted for roughly a quarter of the annual defence budget, the DMA was hardly a passive instrument of that agenda.In fact, soon after Agnipath became public in 2021, it proactively involved itself in designing, processing and pushing through this scheme that fundamentally altered the military’s well-established PBOR recruitment, tenure, retention and manpower management. For the Army, such enrolment had evolved over the 18th and 19th centuries and endured effectively for generations.“Staffed by experienced officers, the DMA could hardly claim ignorance of the military’s manpower requirements or the consequences of a radical change like Agnipath, particularly the difficulties of recruiting short-service personnel into technically oriented services like the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Indian Navy (IN),” said a three-star naval veteran, who declined to be named.He also questioned the absence of credible data from the DMA on how much Agnipath would save in pension expenditure, when those moneys would begin to accrue, how they would build up over time or how they would be channelled into military modernisation. Even while announcing the scheme’s partial reversal, the DMA offered little clarity on its implications, let alone any acknowledgement of its own role in pushing through the original scheme, the officer added.The lead-up to Agnipath’s inauguration, too, is edifying.When Agnipath was initially being considered, the DMA, under Gen Rawat, is believed to have proposed it as a pilot scheme in the Army’s South-Western Command, headquartered at Jaipur, to test the concept before extending it to the other Army commands and the two other services. But once the BJP-led government signalled its preference for Agnipath, the DMA appeared more intent on endorsing the political leadership’s choice than pressing its own initial reservations, becoming an active participant in the scheme’s formulation and implementation, without insisting on the proposed trial or even a more measured rollout.Gen M.M. Naravane, who was Army Chief when Agnipath was launched, captured the military’s initial reaction in his unpublished memoirs, describing it as a ‘bolt from the blue’ for all three services.Meanwhile, a similar accountability deficit is evident in the prolonged delay in creating ITCs, a key military reform expected to follow swiftly from the appointment of the CDS and establishment of the DMA and aimed at bringing together the manpower, assets and resources of all three services for greater operational integration and efficiency.The DMA is now part of the very establishment it once blamedThe fundamental rationale for ‘theatreisation’ and ‘jointness’ was straightforward: to replace the existing improvident 17 single-service commands – seven each in the Army and the IAF and three in the IN – with a smaller number of integrated and tightly-knit tri-service commands. Under the proposed ITCs, formations, personnel and equipment from all three services would be brought under a common theatre commander, responsible for operations within a designated geographical area.The proposed structure envisages three geographical commands – Northern, Western and Maritime – headquartered respectively at Lucknow, Jaipur and Thiruvananthapuram/Karwar, with responsibility for China, Pakistan and the Indian Ocean Region. Each would be headed by a four-star commander and, under the ITC model, the three service chiefs would focus on recruiting and training personnel and providing them logistical support; operational deployment of forces would fall to the respective theatre commanders.Almost seven years after the ITC planning began, the entire project remains a work in progress, making haste incrementally. Recent media reports, quoting unidentified official sources, claim that the proposal outlining their overall structure is currently with the MoD, but little is known about its contents, the extent of agreement among the three services over ITCs and, particularly, the glaring and vital issue that remains unresolved: who will be the operational head of the three ITCs?Many veterans and analysts maintain that resolving this fundamental impasse over the ITCs’ operational manager requires political will, citing the landmark 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act in the United States, on which India has substantially modelled its higher defence management reforms. The US military establishment fought these changes every step of the way, but determined political leaders eventually got them through Congress, overhauling America’s armed forces, strengthening the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, most importantly, erasing confusion from the chain of operational command.Given the differences between the two political systems, a comparable legislative process was neither attempted nor likely in India. The onus, therefore, falls squarely on the DMA to undertake the rigorous preparatory work that had preceded Goldwater-Nichols: examine the proposal in depth, reconcile the competing institutional interests of the three services and build a consensus around the proposed restructuring and its operational head, before forwarding it to the Cabinet Committee on Security, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for final approval.But given the DMA’s recent record, expecting it to abandon the military’s time-honoured habit of holding the civilian establishment responsible for its own failings may be asking too much. After all, old habits die hard, even when the DMA is now part of the very establishment it once blamed.