Chandigarh: An alarming contradiction hung over the Indian Air Force (IAF) as it marked the 94th anniversary of its founding earlier this month, with a grand aerial spectacle over the Ganga at Varanasi celebrating its history, showcasing its combat platforms, and looking ahead to the next generation of fighters. Behind this impressive display and ambitious plans for the future lies an uncomfortable, disturbing reality: the IAF’s critical fighter programmes remain hopelessly dependent on US-origin engines, despite the government’s much-vaunted drive for atmanirbharta, or self-reliance. One of these critical engines is in short supply, and the other is the victim of contentious negotiations over technology transfer for domestic production rights and pricing. Supplies of General Electric’s 84-kN F404-GE-IN20 engines for the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk1A have been repeatedly delayed, while the proposed local manufacture of the more powerful, 98-kN F414-GE-INS6 engines for the upgraded 4.5-generation Tejas Mk2 and fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) remains stalled over the extent of manufacturing know-how GE is prepared to share, the degree of control HAL would have over domestic production and the commercial terms of the deal. The IAF’s difficulties do not just end there, with its operational predicament arguably even more alarming, as its fighter squadron numbers are at an all-time low, its ageing combat aircraft are well past their retirement date and their replacements are barely visible to stem the decline.In short, on its 94th birthday, the force – established as the Royal Indian Air Force in October 1932 and renamed the IAF in January 1950, after India became a Republic – is confronting a crisis that few in the government seem willing to discuss seriously, let alone tackle it with the urgency it demands.Widening disparityThe IAF’s fighter squadron strength has sharply dropped to just 28-29 against an authorised 42, even as its two militarily aligned adversaries, China and Pakistan, rapidly expand and modernise their air forces, not merely in numbers, but also in overall combat capability and efficiency.China presently fields substantial numbers of 5th-generation J-20 fighters and is developing still more advanced, 6th-generation platforms. Alongside, its strategic and military ally Pakistan is moving swiftly towards acquiring Chinese J-35AE (Export) stealth fighters, reportedly at significantly subsidised rates, and its pilots are believed to be presently undergoing instruction on these platforms in China. This widening platform disparity is not merely numerical. It is also evident in the advancement of Chinese and Pakistani aircraft types, their range, sensors, weapons and ability to operate as integrated combat systems, set against an IAF fighter fleet still largely made up of legacy platforms. The operational irony is further underscored by the fact that Indian military planners, particularly in the IAF, are continually preparing for a ‘two-front war’ against closely aligned adversaries to the north and west, with whom India has fought wars and skirmishes and endured prolonged military face-offs over unresolved border disputes.Yet, this growing predicament seemingly receives remarkably little public or official attention. The IAF’s predicament in such a critical security environment is further compounded by the impending retirement of its ageing combat fleet, foremost among which are six squadrons, or around 118–120 Anglo-French SEPECAT Jaguar strike fighters, inducted from 1979 onwards. The IAF is now the world’s sole air force still operating Jaguars, and its struggle to keep them flying is tellingly illustrated by its recent acquisition of nine retired Royal Air Force Jaguars from the UK, to be stripped down for engines, avionics, hydraulic systems and other components to keep India’s own fleet of this fighter type airborne.Moreover, three of the IAF’s upgraded Soviet-era MiG-29 squadrons, comprising around 65 aircraft, and three squadrons of retrofitted Mirage 2000Hs, accounting for another 44–46 fighters, are also advancing in years. Commissioned in the 1980s, both fighters have undergone extensive avionics, radar and weapons system modernisation to extend their operational lives, but IAF veterans are agreed that these improvements cannot indefinitely defer their replacement.“Their (MiG-29s and Mirage-2000Hs) eventual number-plating or retirement, along with that of the Jaguars, will impose yet another burden on an already depleted fighter fleet,” said a retired one-star IAF fighter pilot. He warned that their replacements were either caught in protracted delays or remained ‘forever’ under consideration, he remonstrated, declining to be identified.The situation regarding the IAF’s 13 Russian-origin Sukhoi Su-30MKI squadrons, comprising around 265 fighters that make up the backbone of its combat fleet, is scarcely more reassuring. Some 200 of these fighters are slated for a major mid-life upgrade to ‘Super Sukhoi’ standards, with 84 aircraft earmarked in the initial retrofit phase. This will include fitting the fighters with an advanced active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, improved avionics and mission computers, new cockpit displays, infrared search-and-track sensors and a more capable electronic-warfare (EW) suite.But this programme, like many others, is still awaiting final government approval. And, even if that comes soon, HAL, which licence-built most of the Su-30MKIs and will undertake the upgrade, has indicated that developing the initial operational-clearance version of the upgraded Su-30MKI could take another five years. Securing full operational clearance would require a further 18-24 months. Or, in other words, the IAF’s mainstay fighter is unlikely to receive the full benefits of its proposed upgrade for several years yet, by which time the widening technological gap with Chinese and Pakistani combat aircraft could become even harder to bridge.The Rafale questionHowever, in the meantime, the proposed Rs 3.25-3.65 lakh crore acquisition of 114 additional Dassault Rafales from France, supplementing the 36 acquired in 2016-17 via the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme, would provide only a modest boost to the IAF’s depleted fighter strength. Around 90–94 of these fighters are expected to be manufactured in India by a private sector enterprise, with the remainder delivered in fly-away condition.The Rafales procurement process is underway, with commercial negotiations with France ongoing, but even if concluded by the end of the current financial year, deliveries would take years to begin, offering no immediate relief to the IAF’s fighter squadron shortfall. In this muddled scenario, Russia’s Sukhoi Su-57 too remains a possible 5th-generation ‘interim alternative’ for the IAF to counter the aerial threat posed by China and Pakistan. Moscow has repeatedly offered India the Su-57, including its local licensed production, but New Delhi is prevaricating over the proposition, despite the IAF’s keenness in acquiring this stealth fighter. GE’s failure to supply F404 enginesAgainst this increasingly bleak operational backdrop, the Tejas Mk1A was expected to help arrest the decline in IAF fighter numbers, while the Mk2 and fifth-generation AMCA were intended to provide it with the next generation of combat platforms. The IAF has ordered 180 Mk1As in two tranches: 83 in February 2021, comprising 73 fighters and 10 trainers, for around Rs 48,000 crore, followed by another 97 in September 2025 — 68 fighters and 29 trainers — for Rs 62,370 crore.The first of the 83 aircraft was due for delivery in February 2024, but two years and a half later, HAL has still not handed over a single Mk1A to the IAF, as the principal bottleneck remains GE’s failure to supply F404 engines for the platform on schedule. By end-September 2026, GE had supplied just 14 of the 99 F404-GE-IN20 engines ordered by HAL in 2021 under a $716-million contract that also included support services. Engine deliveries were originally due to begin in March 2024, but the first powerpack arrived only in March 2025, a year late. This, in turn, has left several completed Mk1A airframes awaiting their powerplants.The problem, however, is not just confined to engine supplies alone.Senior IAF officers said HAL is struggling to integrate the Israeli-origin AESA radar with the Mk1A’s Angad electronic-warfare suite, weapons-firing controls and other mission systems. The IAF has informed HAL that it wants all the Mk1As radar and weapons systems adequately tested in actual missile-firing trials, and the aircraft cleared for all-round service before accepting delivery.Alongside, the Mk2 and AMCA are caught in a similar bind, as both fighters are planned around GE’s more powerful F414-INS6 engine. But HAL and GE have yet to agree on what it will cost HAL for the powerpacks’ manufacture, how much technological know-how the US conglomerate will part with, and what production rights India will eventually receive for the F-414.The F414-GE-INS6 was selected in 2010 by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), responsible for designing the LCA and its many variants, over the European Eurojet EJ200 engine following a competitive evaluation, to power its proposed Mk2 version – a twin-engine, 4.5-generation fighter. The initial requirement was for 99 such engines, in a deal valued at $650-750 million, with the option of procuring another 49.Under the original arrangement, GE was to supply the first eight engines off the shelf, while the remaining 91 were to be manufactured in India under a transfer-of-technology agreement announced with much fanfare during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington in June 2023.But ever since, the deal has run into disagreements over how much technical know-how and intellectual property GE is prepared to share, what production rights HAL would get and, not least, how much the engines would eventually cost. Technical discussions have reportedly made headway, but the commercial terms remain unsettled, and HAL is still waiting for GE to put a formal offer on the table, industry officials in Bangalore stated.The AMCA, on the other hand, involves a separate, though related, set of negotiations between GE and India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and ADA. These involve an initial requirement of around 14–15 F414 engines for AMCA prototypes and limited-series production aircraft. The first two AMCA squadrons, comprising some 40 units, are also expected to be powered by the F414s before a more powerful indigenously developed engine by local industry in conjunction with the UK’s Rolls-Royce and France’s Safran is developed around 2030-31 for subsequent AMCA versions.But industry sources said that all these varied discussions have reportedly been complicated by a sharp escalation in the estimated F-414 price, from around Rs70–80 crore to more than Rs 200 crore apiece. GE is also said to have sought around $800 million to establish a dedicated F-414 manufacturing facility in India.“Even as the IAF looks to acquire indigenous aircraft to replenish its shrinking fleet, the Mk1A is held up by holdups in F-404 engine supplies, while the two other atamnirbhar programmes- the Tejas MK2 and the AMCA-depend on a powerpack from the same company that is uncertain”, said an aviation industry official. The government touts self-reliance in its materiel needs, he added, requesting anonymity, yet its fighter programmes remain totally reliant on a foreign manufacturer for engines over which India has neither control nor a viable alternative.SanctionsThe risks of relying on American fighter engines first became apparent in May 1998, when Washington imposed sanctions on India following its nuclear tests. GE withdrew its technical-support personnel, while Lockheed Martin Control Systems (LMCS), which was working with Indian scientists on the LCA’s digital fly-by-wire flight-control system, terminated its contract and retained Indian equipment, software and technical information at its US premises. Supplies of other crucial components, including hydraulic actuators and ring-laser gyros, were also cut off, forcing Indian development agencies to scramble for alternative suppliers and, in many instances, develop their own replacements.The sanctions episode showed how easily India’s fledgling fighter programme could be thrown off course by a political decision in Washington. But, undaunted, six years later, in 2004, the GE F404-GE-IN20 was formally selected to power the Tejas some three years after sanctions were lifted. “The Tejas that was billed as the ultimate symbol of self-reliance has left India’s atamnirbhar dreams at the mercy of foreign suppliers, their corporate delays, and their shifting political winds”, said a three-star IAF veteran, associated with the Tejas project whilst in service.India’s defence establishment, he declared, declining to be named, has successfully figured out how to build the body of a fighter jet, but not how to power them. And, until it can do both, the dream of true atamnirbharta in combat platforms will remain stuck on the tarmac, held back by engines that still need importing.