Chandigarh: It is instructive to recall the enduring legacy of Field Marshal S.H.F.J. Manekshaw on his 111th birth anniversary on April 3 – precisely because it throws into sharp relief how far the Indian Army he once headed has drifted from the standards of institutional honour, apolitical-ness and the uncompromising secularism that once defined it.Better known as Sam Bahadur – or Sam the Brave, an honorific bestowed on him by his beloved Gurkhas – the highly decorated Manekshaw was the quintessential soldier: magnificently moustachioed, charming, dapper, decisive and above all, impervious to political pressure.In today’s Indian Army, widely critiqued by veterans and serving personnel alike for growing politicisation and creeping religiosity, Manekshaw’s example shines all the brighter. Cool, bold and decisive, he was deeply considerate of those under his command and, above all, untouched by sectarian influence across a military career spanning four decades.Sam, as he was affectionately referred to by all, was also refreshingly droll and irreverent – traits now all but extinct in the Indian military, replaced by obsequiousness and unquestioning deference to political authority. As army chief, he listened to his juniors, valued their perspectives and led by example – a stark contrast to the servility of senior servicemen toward officials and politicians that has become commonplace in the country’s armed forces today.Manekshaw rarely stood on ceremony. With his plain-speaking and earthy style, he inspired an army that achieved what no other force in the world has since World War II: the creation of a new nation, Bangladesh. His leadership fostered genuine jointness among the three services, exemplified by his well-coordinated operations that decisively routed Pakistan in 1971. As Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Manekshaw used his influence to ensure the armed forces’ operational readiness, whilst ably insulating the military from political interference.Such inter-service integration stands in stark contrast to two successive Chiefs of Defence Staff –General Bipin Rawat and his re-commissioned successor, General Anil Chauhan – who, despite the creation of elaborate defence planning and monitoring structures in late 2019, including the Department of Military Affairs (DMA), have struggled to achieve true jointness.Also read: When Cohesion Becomes Coercion: The Indian Army’s Case Against ConscienceCoordination among the three armed forces remains a work in progress, even as General Chauhan prepares to demit office in May, reflecting not only structural and administrative constraints, but also the absence of the firm, unifying leadership that Manekshaw exercised. Without a commanding figure capable of decisively aligning the services, even the most sophisticated frameworks risk underperformance, leaving joint operational effectiveness incomplete.However, even when confronted with intense political pressure, most notably from prime minister Indira Gandhi, who pressed for immediate action against East Pakistan to stem the influx of Bengali refugees in early 1971, Manekshaw refused to be hurried. One oft-retold account has Gandhi, after visiting the overcrowded refugee camps, asking Manekshaw what the Army could do to address the crisis. “Nothing,” Manekshaw is said to have replied, an answer that stunned her entourage of senior officials and ministers.Few, if any, had ever spoken so bluntly to a leader accustomed to unquestioned deference, making the episode emblematic of his composure, candour, and professional resolve, a stance totally phantastic and unimaginable in today’s political environment.India, Manekshaw maintained in his now much-discussed briefing to Mrs Gandhi and her ministers, needed to guard against the prospect of fighting a war on two fronts. “That,” he had declared, “would present me with problems far more complex than what had been the bane of the German general staff for more than fifty years across two World Wars. It would be unwise, he went on to state, to rely on diplomatic assurances that the Chinese would not react in support of Pakistan. “We must wait for the snow to block the northern passes before we mobilise”, he cautioned.A compliant Mrs Gandhi grudgingly conceded and ordered the general to move his formations into position and be ready to engage in battle later in the year. In the ensuing months, a whispering campaign was mounted by senior officials and politicians against Manekshaw, accusing him of cowardice, vacillation and shoddy generalship.Fully aware of the calumny unleashed against him, Manekshaw maintained his composure. While preparing for combat by strengthening communication lines around East Pakistan, Mrs Gandhi secured a friendship and military treaty with the Soviet Union, India’s principal materiel provider and strategic backer. This effectively neutralised the possibility of interference from either a hostile US under President Richard Nixon, who was sympathetic to Pakistan and grateful for its role in opening a conduit to Beijing, or an antagonistic China.The campaign’s postponement also enabled the establishment of a formal Bangladesh government in exile in India and the arming and training of Bengali Mukti Bahini guerrilla fighters, who were trained jointly by Research and Analysis Wing and Army Special Forces personnel. Over the next few months, till war erupted in December 1971, these guerrillas successfully harassed and engaged the Pakistani army, confining it to hunker down in garrison towns cut off from the capital, Dacca [Dhaka], making Manekshaw’s eventual task tactically easier.And, when the Pakistani Air Force conducted a pre-emptive strike on Indian airfields in December 1971 from West Pakistan, Manekshaw instantly unleashed his campaign that ended in a fortnight with the liberation of East Pakistan and the capture of over 90,000 Pakistani soldiers. This only reaffirmed that the blunt exchange involving Manekshaw’s refusal to launch immediate operations despite Mrs Gandhi’s pressure was not an aberration, but a reflection of a deeper professional ethos that placed military judgment above political expediency.Several veterans today warned that this ethos was under strain.Also read: Army Bosses’ Views Are Now in Total Sync with the Political EstablishmentThey also pointed to the creeping influence of personal faith within the armed forces, a marked departure from the norms prevailing in Manekshaw’s time, when belief remained strictly private and the uniform was insulated from overt displays of the majority Hindu religion. What was once a private matter, they argued, had increasingly seeped into the institutional domain, with visible expressions of devotion by military officers – mostly from the army – and jawans, raising serious and alarming questions of perception and propriety.Besides, senior officers presiding over award-giving ceremonies led by godmen or politically aligned questionable religious figures, or incorporating texts like the Bhagavad Gita and other ancient scriptures and texts into formal lectures, ran the risk of turning military uniforms into a prop, rather than a symbol of service. Moreover, in an era of instant visibility, such moments no longer remained contained but acquired a permanence and reach on social media that detrimentally reshaped how service personnel were perceived.“This prevailing trend is directly at odds with the foundational principles that have long guided the Indian armed forces,” said a retired officer of colonel rank, who requested anonymity. He noted that even at the prestigious National Defence Academy (NDA), from which a majority of Indian military officers graduate, the daily prayer still invokes secular ideals of duty, discipline, courage and service – instilling universal values rather than promoting any particular faith. Its emphasis is on character, sacrifice, and country before self, deliberately avoiding all sectarian references and reinforcing the uniform as a unifying identity above all religious divisions.The NDA prayer, recited each morning within their respective squadrons by gentleman cadets –future officers – invokes God to keep the honour of the services untarnished, to awaken an admiration for “honest dealing and clean thinking” and to guide them in choosing the “harder right over the easier wrong”.It continues with a pledge to seek new opportunities to serve God, the nation and the men under their command, asking for guidance to always place service above self. In doing so, the prayer presents faith in universal, non-sectarian terms, rooting it firmly in duty, integrity and commitment rather than aligning it with any single religious tradition.Many veterans said the contrast today between the restrained, non-sectarian values instilled during training and the conduct now evident in sections of the serving officer corps, especially at senior levels, was stark. And though cadets, they said, were shaped by an ethos of secularism and restrained, non-sectarian values, parts of this present officer corps were increasingly seen engaging in overt religious rituals, platforming godmen, and invoking Hindu scriptures in formal military settings. In their view, such practices risked eroding institutional neutrality, blurring professional boundaries, and rapidly politicising the uniform.Also read: Why the Narrative on Manekshaw – India’s Uncrowned CDS – Is Captivating Military Veterans Now“Standing up to political pressure was once treated as a given – almost a standard operating principle – within the Indian Army. Today, however, it is increasingly rare to the point of becoming routine,” said a retired two-star army officer, requesting anonymity. He recalled that earlier Army chiefs like K.M. Cariappa, K. Thimayya, Mankeshaw and K. Sundarji, amongst others, invariably stood their ground with political leaders, placing the army’s professional interests above their expediencies.“Sam Bahadur would scarcely recognise today’s Army, where military professionalism has frequently been sacrificed to political deference and public religiosity over the past decade or so” he stated. Manekshaw’s legacy, he ruefully added, remains a reminder of what the service could be – uncompromising in the face of both the enemy and domestic political pressure alike.Returning to Manekshaw, he was born in Amritsar on April 3, 1914, the son of an eminent Parsi doctor and was schooled at Sherwood College, a public school in Nainital. In 1932, he joined the first batch of 40 cadets at the fledgling Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun and was commissioned two years later into the Royal Scouts and transferred later to 12 Frontier Force Rifles, also known as the 54th Sikhs.Years later, as army chief Manekshaw issued instructions that if anyone from the 54th Sikhs came visiting Army House on King George’s Avenue (present-day Rajaji Marg), he was to be escorted straight to him, irrespective of the time or whatever he might be involved with.Occasionally, these grizzled veterans would arrive at Army House with a string of ‘sifarish’ requests, ranging from wanting a bag of sugar for their daughter’s wedding, or asking for a note to the local administration for assistance. All were received with a full-bodied burst of colloquial Punjabi, which Manekshaw spoke like a native and none of these soldiers returned unrequited.Deployed to Burma during World War II, Manekshaw was badly wounded during a successful attack near the Sittang River on 22 Feb 1942 to capture a vital hill whilst leading two companies. As he charged forward with his men, a Japanese soldier emerged from the nearby jungle and pumped seven bullets into Captain Manekshaw.The Division Commander, Major General D.T. Cowan, who was witness to the action, whipped off his own Military Cross ribbon and pinned it onto Manekshaw, declaring that a dead person could not be awarded one of the most coveted bravery medals in the British army. After recovering from his wounds, Mankeshaw was once more dispatched to Burma as part of General (later Viscount) Slim’s 14th Army and was wounded yet again. In the final days of the Second World War, he was appointed staff officer to General Daisy in Indo-China, where, after the Japanese surrender, he helped rehabilitate over 10,000 prisoners of war.Appointed to the Military Operations Directorate after independence in 1947, Brigadier Manekshaw was responsible for Planning and Logistics during the 1947-48 war with Pakistan over ownership of Jammu and Kashmir. He was also reportedly the only military officer and one of three people present, albeit in an ante-room in the palace in Jammu, when Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession ceding his kingdom to India in October 1947. The third was V.P. Menon, the political advisor to the Governor General Lord Louis Mountbatten at the time of independence. But to his credit, Manekshaw kept his counsel on this landmark event, and reportedly never ever commented on it publicly.A series of staff and command postings followed, but in 1961, Manekshaw’s outspokenness offended Defence Minister Krishna Menon and his favoured Lieutenant General B M Kaul and almost resulted in ending his career following a court of inquiry into a nebulous charge, for which he was exonerated.India’s 1962 defeat by the Chinese followed, and Manekshaw was hastily given command by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of the army’s retreating 4 Corps, ironically commanded earlier by Gen Kaul, and is believed to have performed wonders in salvaging their battered morale. Manekshaw became army chief in June 1969.After the surrender of Pakistani forces in Dhaka on December 16, 1971, Manekshaw visited prisoner of war (PoW) camps, where he directly questioned the inmates about their food, sanitation and overall treatment to ensure compliance with the Geneva Convention.In a widely recounted anecdote, Manekshaw went even further. He personally tasted the food served to the 90,000-odd prisoners to check its quality and moved among the camps, speaking to soldiers and sanitation staff alike, even inspecting cleaning areas to understand conditions first-hand.The impact on the PoWs was profound: Pakistani soldiers, unaccustomed to such engagement from senior officers, were struck by the contrast and some are reported to have remarked that they now understood why the Indian Army had fought so effectively as their own commanders, leave alone an Army chief, rarely interacted with them at such a level.Yet this conduct was not without controversy at home. Manekshaw faced criticism from some Indian politicians in parliament, who accused the Army of treating Pakistani PoWs like “jawais” – sons-in-law. But for Sam Bahadur victory did not give India licence to dole out indignity. Instead, he believed that humane treatment underlined discipline, strengthened institutional credibility and demonstrated that the Indian Army’s lofty standards extended even to its enemies.Manekshaw was appointed Field Marshal on January 1, 1973. He retired a fortnight later.An unconventional and at times risque dresser, he once hosted his senior Lt Gen Kulwant Singh, then commanding the Western Army at Shimla, at an inspection in a ‘wholly unsuitable’ jacket that was a cross between a regulation shirt and a bush shirt. When Gen Singh referred to it disparagingly, he quipped, “Have you come to inspect my formation or my dress?”.Manekshaw passed away in June 2008 in Wellington, near Connor, leaving behind a model of military leadership defined by integrity, audacity, and an unwavering commitment to the soldierly code – one that today’s army would do well to recall, not least because it starkly underscores how far those standards he once set and upheld have since significantly eroded.This article was updated with more information at 4:39 pm on March 30.