Chandigarh: The Indian Army’s (IAs) proposed frontline formations – Rudra, Bhairav and Shaktibaan – recently unveiled by Chief of Staff General Upendra Dwivedi and named after Hindu mythological figures, reflect more continuity with earlier, abandoned schemes than with any meaningful doctrinal shift.For beyond their Indic monikers, these formations amount to little more than a conceptual reboot of the old Integrated Battle Group (IBG) idea, first floated in 2019 by former Army Chief General Bipin Rawat, who later became India’s first Chief of Defence Staff .Wrapped in symbolism, the all-arms offensive Rudra (‘destruction’) brigades – two of which already exist – comprising infantry, armour, artillery, engineers, and signals units , for rapid thrusts into enemy territory, were announced by Gen. Dwivedi on Kargil Vijay Diwas in Drass on July 26.According to official sources, each of the proposed Rudra brigades of around 3,000-odd personnel were envisaged as self-sufficient units, capable of autonomously launching high-intensity, short-duration warfare, along India’s northern and western unsettled borders. Evoking aggression and spiritual symbolism, these Rudra formations were thus named to blend Hindu mythology with modern day military intent.What’s new?Unveiled some 10 weeks after hostilities with Pakistan were paused under Operation Sindoor, the Bhairav (‘ferocious’) light commando battalions were also introduced by Gen. Dwivedi as shock-and-awe units, likely tailored for urban warfare and close-quarter combat. Also announced were Shaktibaan (‘divine power’) artillery formations, augmented by Divyastra (‘precision’) surveillance UAVs, drone batteries, and loitering munitions to enhance hi-tech lethality.The Bhairav units appear to be scaled-up versions of Ghatak platoons – 20 to 30-man assault teams within regular infantry battalions – tasked with reconnaissance and behind-the-lines operations. Yet, beyond their fierce branding, little has been disclosed about the Bhairav formations, leaving their structure, role and doctrine somewhat opaque.The proposed Shaktibaan brigades, equipped with precision artillery and assorted ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) unmanned aerial systems, were intended for rapid cross-border strikes. Significantly, they are expected to include cyber and electronic warfare units, marking a departure from legacy structures where artillery and ISR were traditionally considered ‘support’ elements. In Shaktibaan, these become the primary strike instruments in a digital-first battlespace.Also read: From ‘Samudraraja’ to ‘Garuda Nayak’, Imagining BJP’s Vision of an ‘Atmanirbhar’, Sanskritised MilitaryFurthermore, at Shaktibaan’s core is the Divyastra unit – an integrated precision strike and drone warfare element, combining loitering munitions, swarm drones, and real-time targeting capability. Divyastra is designed for fast, disruptive attacks against enemy assets, including suppression of air defences and logistical hubs, all the while limiting troop exposure much like what transpired during Op Sindoor.IBGsOfficial sources said no fresh recruitments were planned for these aforementioned units. Instead, select units from the Army’s existing pool of 250-odd single-arm brigades would be reorganised and repurposed into these broader, multi-arm structures, without expanding manpower.Gen. Dwivedi’s unveiling of these ‘Sanskritised’ operational units marks a formal revival of the long-stalled IBGs originally conceived under the Army’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine. Designed for swift, limited offensives against Pakistan without triggering full-scale war, the doctrine gained traction after the 2001-2o02 Operation Parakram standoff, sparked by the terrorist attack on India’s parliament building which New Delhi blamed on Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).IBGs, led by major general-rank officers, were envisioned as agile formations of 5,000-6,000 troops each, combining infantry, armour, air defence, logistics, and attack helicopters. Their goal was to compress the lag time between political decision and military action, enabling rapid punitive strikes under a nuclear overhang before the adversary could respond or escalate.The Army’s revised 2018 Land Warfare Doctrine further refined the IBG concept, with Gen. Rawat advocating their deployment across both the Pakistani and Chinese fronts, but the project remained mired in doctrinal disagreements and bureaucratic inertia.Also Read: No Takers for Modi’s Plan to ‘Decolonise’ Navy by Introducing Kurta-Pyjama in Dress CodeOne of its most contentious proposals was the scrapping of the brigadier rank – an idea that faced stiff resistance from within the Army. Gen. Rawat also sidestepped a more pressing issue: the chronic lack of funding needed to operationalise these ambitious formations. Strategic agility, it turned out, was easier to theorise than to finance.Despite these limitations, the IBGs were formally validated in 2019 after multiple field exercises. But implementation soon stalled, due to defence ministry sluggishness, logistical ambiguity and doctrinal friction among various Army commands. The broader shift envisioned by Cold Start theorists never took root – until it was resurrected last week, rebranded in mythological garb as Rudra.What of Rawat’s proposal?Tellingly, these new brigades are to be led by brigadier-rank officers, whose status remains intact, reversing Rawat’s controversial proposal.Rudra’s nomenclature – like the other associated ‘Sanskritised’ formations and systems – also echoes the BJP government’s broader drive to ‘decolonise’ Indian military traditions and assert a Hindutva-inflected national identity upon it. And, while the political packaging has changed, the underlying military structure remains unmistakably IBG in design.What differentiates Rudra from its predecessor remains vague.Army brass describes it as an ‘upgrade’, while making no reference to the shelved IBG framework. They also maintain that over time, the Rudra brigades are expected to absorb advanced technologies – real-time ISR from drones, networked artillery, battlefield surveillance and high-speed communications – to speed-up the offensive kill chain and improve tactical autonomy.Strategically too, these innovations are eventually expected to align with the under-implementation vision of Integrated Theatre Commands under CDS Gen. Anil Chauhan. Yet, many of the challenges that scuttled the IBGs persist: doctrinal discord between commands, fractured logistics systems, patchy communication interoperability and unresolved air support coordination. Procurement delays – both indigenous and imported – of platforms and associated equipment only exacerbate these challenges.So the question remains: will the IA finally deliver on its promise of nimble, autonomous, integrated formations along its unresolved borders. Or will these mythologically named units – anointed with a tilak – become yet another repackaged slogan wrapped in political symbolism, to be unveiled once more with fanfare at a future Kargil Vijay Diwas by another Army chief with yet a new allegorical name?