Chandigarh: The Dassault Reliance Aerospace Limited (DRAL) facility in Nagpur, tentatively set to produce a bulk of the 114 Dassault Rafales recently proposed for procurement by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the Indian Air Force (IAF), is poised to emerge as the cornerstone of the country’s continually postponed Multi-Role Fighter (MRFA) programme.While few formal details of the Rafale acquisition have been publicly disclosed by either the MoD or the IAF, industry sources and other officials associated with the project revealed that 96 of these 114 twin-engine French fighters are likely to be built at DRAL, with the remaining 18 delivered in fly-away condition.Located in Nagpur’s MIHAN (Multi-modal International Cargo Hub and Airport at Nagpur) special economic zone, DRAL was established in October 2017 as a 51:49 joint venture between Reliance Infrastructure’s subsidiary, Reliance Aerostructure Limited – then owned by Anil Ambani – and France’s Dassault Aviation.Created amid controversy and legal challenges to fulfil the offset obligations from the IAF’s 2016 purchase of 36 Rafales for Rs 59,000 crore – under which Dassault was required to locally reinvest 50% of the overall contract value in India’s aerospace sector – DRAL began operations in 2018. From then onwards, it manufactured components for Rafale fighters and Dassault’s Falcon-2000 long-range executive jets, which were subsequently shipped to France for final fitment onto these two platforms.But in September 2025 – possibly presciently anticipating the 114-Rafale procurement – Dassault raised its stake in DRAL to 51%, acquiring an additional 2% stake for around Rs 176 crore and turning the joint venture into a Dassault subsidiary. Its infrastructure and expertise now position DRAL as a potential hub for Rafale production in India and possibly as a second fighter production facility outside France to execute export orders.However, Reliance’s future operational role in DRAL remains unclear, particularly as Anil Ambani and his associates face ongoing financial and regulatory scrutiny. Consequently, this uncertainty could complicate timelines and reputational optics for Dassault as the $30-35 billion Rafale deal proceeds through the high-visibility government-to-government (G2G) framework.Under projected schedules, local Rafale production in India is unlikely to begin before 2028-29, highlighting the programme’s prolonged gestation. But once underway, key fighter sections for the 96 Rafales under the 2018-19 MRFA programme guidelines – including incorporating 40-60% indigenous content – will be manufactured by Tata Advanced Systems Limited in Hyderabad, following four production transfer agreements it signed with Dassault in mid-2025.These include manufacturing the fighters’ fuselage sections at a complex in Hyderabad, covering key structural assemblies such as the front, central and rear sections, along with the lateral shells of the rear, with the first locally produced units expected by FY 2028-29.Alongside, some 30-odd domestic companies are expected to support the Rafale programme’s broader industrial ecosystem, supplying components and sub-assemblies to enable phased, locally driven production as part of the MoD’s Atmanirbhar push for self-sufficiency in military materiel.Official details, however, are still pending, with both the IAF and MoD being unavailable for comment.Yet, despite these provisional plans – drawn from industry, official sources and some media reports – no official details have been issued, as the entire Rafale programme remains shrouded in secrecy and marked by confusion.The only information available so far is that, on February 12, the MoD’s Defence Acquisition Council finally granted acceptance of necessity for the French fighter acquisition – merely the first of many procedural rungs in India’s labyrinthine materiel acquisition system.This belated decision was reportedly prompted by IAF insistence, as the Force faced a sharp drawdown in its combat squadrons, which had precipitously declined from a sanctioned strength of 42 to just 29 presently. This decline had rendered India’s frontline air combat capability dangerously vulnerable, besides underlining the fragmented, unfocused trajectory of the MRFA programme.Amid this uncertainty and opaqueness, industry officials, along with IAF and MoD sources, indicated that the final G2G Rafale purchase agreement is unlikely to be signed before late 2026 or early the following year. The deal’s completion remains predicated to completing complex negotiations over project costs, technology transfer protocols, industrial partnerships, delivery schedules and other contractual fine print.In such G2G defence deals, the purchasing state contracts directly with the selling state, which assumes sovereign responsibility for pricing, delivery timelines and performance commitments, amongst other obligations. The original equipment manufacturer (OEM) – in this instance, Dassault – then undertakes to supply the platforms or equipment under formal sovereign backing, effectively executing the order as though it were delivering it to its own government, rather than to an overseas buyer.Such arrangements typically extend beyond price and delivery to include training, technology transfer and long-term maintenance support and are generally employed for high-value or strategically sensitive platforms. They also minimise procedural risk, possibilities of wrongdoing and provide political and strategic weight to the entire transaction.In recent years, India has increasingly opted for G2G arrangements for major defence acquisitions to bypass delays, disputes and bureaucratic hurdles that often plague open global tenders. The IAF’s 2016-17 purchase of 36 Rafales, for instance, and last year’s Rs 63,000 crore deal for 26 maritime variants of the same fighter type for the Indian Navy, were both executed via the G2G route.Such arrangements, however, are often critiqued for being more expensive, partly due to a service or facilitation charge and the absence of competitive bidding. Proponents of such G2G arrangements, on the other hand, counter that the higher cost provides greater delivery assurance, lowers procedural risk and ensures direct state and not OEM accountability.Regardless of cost debates, attention now turns to the aircraft and its enhanced capabilities. Once the deal is signed, the IAF is expected to receive the newer Rafale F4 – and later F5 – variants, rather than the 3FR standard of the 36 aircraft acquired earlier, all of which were inducted by 2022. The F4 and F5 configurations bring incremental improvements over the F3R baseline, including upgraded software, enhanced connectivity, better sensor integration and a more advanced digital architecture.Nonetheless, delivering these advanced variants is constrained by Dassault’s production realities, which continue to be heavily burdened by existing orders.According to company disclosures, Dassault Aviation ended 2025 with a backlog of 220 Rafales – 56 for the French Air and Space Force and 164 for export customers, including the UAE’s $19 billion order for 80 aircraft, Indonesia’s $8.1 billion purchase of 42 Rafales (with the first three delivered in January 2026), Serbia’s $2.99 billion contract for 12 signed in August 2024, and the balance of Egypt’s 2021 follow-on order for 30 additional units to supplement the 24 it had acquired earlier.With annual Rafale production currently set at 26 units in 2026, analysts anticipate Dassault ramping output to a peak of 35 aircraft by 2030 to address this enduring backlog, implying that IAF deliveries of 18 off-the-shelf fighters and their subsequent licensed production too are likely to follow a highly staggered schedule stretching possibly into the late 2030s.With assembly lines fully committed to confirmed export contracts, credible media and defence-industry sources indicated that Dassault had informed the MoD and IAF in 2024 that taking on additional Rafale orders would be “problematic” without a major expansion of production capacity.Although no formal statement on these constraints was made public, industry observers noted that the manufacturer’s priority remained fulfilling existing commitments – a reality that partly explains the MoD’s shift toward a structured G2G framework and a phased domestic manufacturing plan involving the French government. This constraint effectively dictated the adoption of a phased, state-level procurement model, ensuring that the IAF’s requirements aligned with Dassault’s production realities.Meanwhile, beyond production limits, additional challenges loom, particularly in integrating advanced systems and weapons onto the proposed Rafales.Dassault has, as an accepted practice, withheld full source codes for the IAF’s existing Rafale systems – the underlying software instructions governing the aircraft’s sensors, avionics and weapons – limiting India’s ability to independently integrate new systems or upgrades.And, while the IAF can operate the aircraft using a controlled software interface, which allows external systems such as Indian missiles, electronic warfare suites or helmet-mounted displays to communicate with the fighter without exposing its core software, full operational control and deep customisation remain out of reach.This limitation is significant, as it constrains India’s ability to rapidly integrate emerging weapons or counter evolving threats independently. Consequently, it underscores why technology-transfer negotiations are a critical component of the MRFA programme, shaping both operational capability and long-term strategic autonomy.“This extended timeline in acquiring the MRFA, the programme that ultimately settled on the Rafale for a combination of logistical, operational and strategic considerations, reflects not only the complexity of India’s defence procurement process but also persistent technology-transfer challenges,” said an industry official.Speaking anonymously, he added that entrenched bureaucracy, layered clearances and protracted procedures routinely delayed projects, inflated costs and deferred operational readiness – even for programmes of urgent national importance like strengthening the IAF’s combat capability amid a potential collusive two-front threat from nuclear rivals Pakistan and China.A cross-section of senior IAF veterans associated with the MRFA programme during their service years observed that, over time, the acquisition became mired in shifting priorities, protracted deliberations and procedural ambivalence within both the MoD and the Force. They said the resulting inertia had cost valuable years, stalling capability enhancements the IAF had repeatedly flagged as urgent since the previous decade.Even Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh had underscored this urgency at his annual press conference in October 2024, remarking that the IAF needed the MRFA ‘as of yesterday’.In conclusion, bold and imaginative decision-making will be indispensable to the MRFA Rafale programme’s success. The MoD must effectively structure G2G arrangements, sequence domestic production and manage complex technology integration with unusual clarity and speed.Such resolve – rare within India’s layered procurement system – will determine whether the IAF receives its F4/F5 Rafales on schedule, avoids widening capability gaps in its operational activities and converts this high-stakes acquisition into a durable pillar of airpower in the 2030s.