On August 7, 2026, the Standing Committee on Defence (SCoD) submitted five Action-Taken Reports (ATRs) to parliament conveying that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had accepted 108 of its 109 observations and recommendations made in March 2026 on the annual defence budget for financial year 2026–27. On the sole exception, concerning the operationalisation of theatre commands, the ministry offered only an interim response, saying that the matter was under consideration.Such a broad acceptance might, on a cursory assessment, appear to be a reassuring endorsement of the MoD’s performance. But considered alongside the committee’s original reports, it raises a more awkward question: is parliamentary scrutiny making any meaningful difference to the management of India’s defence?The five ATRs covered the budgetary allocations of individual services, the Coast Guard and other MoD organisations, along with a range of assorted subjects. These included employment of local labour by the Border Roads Organisation and litigation over defence land to ex-servicemen’s welfare, women’s empowerment in the Defence Research and Development Organisation, the Armed Forces Medical Services, defence public sector undertakings, Sainik Schools, defence exports and pensions.The committee also evaluated aspects like female intake in the National Cadet Corps, overall quality control standards and the information technology infrastructure that manages the Ex-Servicemen’s Health Scheme.Also read: Too Many Four-Stars, Too Little Clarity on Who Commands the CommandersThe breadth of issues appraised by the SCoD is commendable, but the depth of analysis is less evident. Notably, the SCoD did not consider any of the 108 matters worthy of further pursuit, although it asked for additional information on some of them in subsequent action-taken statements. Consequently, the impression is of a committee willing to delve into administrative minutiae but less inclined to ask whether policies are working, finances are being efficiently deployed or long-standing capability gaps are being plugged.IAF squadron decline barely addressedThe Indian Air Force (IAF) offers a telling example. Its fighter squadron strength has declined sharply from a sanctioned strength of 42.5 squadrons to merely 29 presently, yet the March and August reports provide virtually no insight into how the MoD intends to arrest that slide.The committee records, in effect, that the IAF is pursuing new aircraft acquisitions and considering participation in the 5th-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) and 4.5 generation Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk II programmes, but that is hardly an assessment of how the force will cope with the enduring fighter shortfall.Both these latter programmes are at relatively embryonic stages, while the supply of US-origin General Electric GE-F414-INS6 after burning turbofan engines for both AMCA and the Tejas Mk II are rooted in uncertainty. Deliveries of the upgraded LCA Mk1A fighter too have been delayed by disruptions in the supply of GE F404-IN20 engines to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), its manufacturers.The SCoD reports offer no meaningful insights into these problems or into the delays in the acquisition of 114 Dassault Rafales from France under the long-deferred Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRFA) programme. Instead, attention gravitates towards budget utilisation, indigenisation, joint exercises and airfield modernisation.No doubt, these are legitimate subjects, but they do not answer the central question: how does the IAF intend to maintain its combat capability while the platforms it desperately needs remain delayed or years away?Tanks advance with helicopter support during Exercise Amogh Jwala 2026 conducted by the Indian Army’s Southern Command, March 18, 2026. Photo: PTIEven on the question of allocation and utilisation of the MoD’s capital allocation, the SCoD’s observations are mundane, at best. For while it welcomed the increased allocation for military modernisation in financial year 2026–27 and noted the MoD’s assurance that it would seek additional funds, if required, it also asked the ministry to provide details of the additional allocation sought and the utilisation of funds initially allocated at the commencement of the financial year.Also read: Why the Standing Committee on Defence Can do BetterSuch information may be useful, but what is missing is a more searching and detailed assessment of whether the money allocated to the armed forces is translating into equipment delivered, whether operational deficiencies have been addressed and whether multiple programmes have been completed on time: how much has been spent is one question but what that expenditure has achieved, is entirely another.Reluctance to probe procurement reformThe same reluctance to probe outcomes is evident in the SCoD’s treatment of procurement reform. It noted that the MoD had circulated a draft Defence Acquisition Procedure in February 2026 for public comments and asked to be informed when it was finalised. However, it did not appear to press the more pertinent questions as to why had the new procedure taken so long to get the final nod, what was it intended to fix, and how would it improve a procurement system notorious for delays?On the Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu defence industrial corridors, the SCoD sought a breakdown of investment, the types of industries being established and the participation of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). But the ATR report offers no explanation of what the committee hopes to establish from these details.Investment figures and lists of industries may indicate the scale of activity, but they do not, by themselves, reveal whether the corridors are building meaningful defence-manufacturing capacity, strengthening domestic supply chains or reducing dependence on imported materiel and components. Without examining these outcomes, SCoD risks getting bogged down in mundane administrative detail while losing sight of the larger objective.Some of the committee’s observations are more troubling still.Modernisation of defence servicesAfter noting that modernisation is funded through the capital budget and involves acquiring new platforms, technologies and weapon systems to meet operational needs, response to threats and technological change, the SCoD recommended enhanced capital allocations to maintain credible deterrence. In a somewhat edifying move, it also urged the MoD to adopt a “pragmatic approach” when seeking additional funds at the revised-estimates stage.Yet the recommendation amounts to little more than telling the MoD to spend more on modernisation while ensuring that it seeks no more funds than it actually needs. Surely the ministry understands as much.The final allocation, in any case, depends on the government’s overall financial position and the Finance Ministry’s assessment of competing demands from other sectors, including health, education, infrastructure and social welfare.Simply urging the MoD to seek more money does little to establish whether the funds already available are being spent wisely, whether procurement delays are wasting scarce resources or whether expenditure is translating into tangible improvements in the armed forces’ operational capabilities. General exhortations to spend more do not constitute meaningful parliamentary scrutiny or advice.Also read: As Global Military Expenditure Surges, India Bucks the TrendThat is not what parliamentary oversight was designed – or intended – to achieve. The SCoD is one of 24 departmentally related standing committees, comprising 31 MPs from assorted political parties, including 21 from the Lok Sabha. These committees were established to enable Parliament to examine government policies, expenditure and performance in greater depth than is possible during floor debates.Army tanks and armoured vehicles during Exercise Maru Jwala, in Jaisalmer, Rajasthan, Wednesday, November 12, 2025. Photo: PTITheir purpose is not merely to collect and collate information or endorse ministerial assurances, but to critically scrutinise decisions, question priorities, expose shortcomings and hold ministries accountable for what they have – or have not – delivered.The committees consider ministries’ demands for grants, examine referred bills and annual reports and scrutinise long-term policy documents placed before Parliament. They are not meant to manage the day-to-day affairs of ministries. But neither are they intended to serve as clearing houses for official explanations nor as repositories of routine administrative information.How effective is the oversight of India’s defence?Read together, the SCoD’s March reports and the follow-on August ATRs create an impression that, by and large, all is well with the management of India’s defence. With the major political parties represented on the committee, that apparent consensus is striking but whether it bears any resemblance to the existing state of the armed forces, remains quite another matter.India’s defence establishment has no shortage of problems that require sustained parliamentary attention: dwindling fighter strength, delayed acquisitions, stalled indigenous programmes, procurement procedures that fail to deliver on time and persistent gaps between budgetary outlays and operational needs.Also read: A ‘Free-Hand’ in the Nuclear Age is Political AbdicationSCoD is particularly well placed to investigate these shortcomings and bring Parliament’s collective, cross-party judgement to bear on possible solutions.To do so, it must move beyond past templates and requests for more information. The real test of such committee oversight is not whether a ministry has accepted a recommendation or furnished the requested figures. It is whether the committee has compelled the government to confront a problem, explain a failure and demonstrate that something has changed.Without such a shift, parliamentary scrutiny risks becoming another exercise in which the boxes get ticked but the underlying deficiencies left untouched.Amit Cowshish is a former financial advisor (acquisitions), Ministry of Defence.