A recap of the failuresPahalgam was Pakistan’s answer for the Jaffar Express terror attack. The link is clear from the fulminations of then General, now Field Marshal Asim Munir, chafing under that attack. As a former intelligence chief, he knew which levers to pull.For its part, India gave him a wide-open goal in its having earlier withdrawn the security forces’ picquet at Baisaran meadow. This unexplained vacating of a tourist-frequented site quite naturally fed speculation in the usual quarters. That there has been no accountability for this operational level failure only strengthens conspiracy theories.Pakistan’s conspiracy narrative is understandably more vehement and holds that the Baisaran terror attack was a black-operation to provide the – albeit tenuous – legal cover for an Indian armed attack that would sans such cover amount to aggression in international law.The higher-level failure is in the potential of the regional security environment for periodically generating such crises. The post-August 2019 situation in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is only superficially stable. Within J&K, the Pirpanjal – where alienation lingers – had long been activated by the Pakistanis, using the vacation of that space by the Indian redeployment to Ladakh. Thus, Baisaran, followed soon by the tango Op Sindoor-Op Banyan al-Marsoos, was only to be expected. Apparently, the return of the Uniform Force to its original areas of jungle bashing was not timely enough.The third failure is in the security strategy adopted since the Uri episode – of reprisal from a cold start – falling short. Neither did Uri deter a Pulwama, nor did a Pulwama deter a Baisaran. That Op Sindoor continues is Indian acceptance that even Op Sindoor does not deter. No one’s been sacked for adoption of a strategy lacking imagination.The fourth failure is to chase the mirage of dominance. India could pay heed to a lesson from the ongoing Iran War II: mere lobbing of ordnance, missile and drone strikes do not beget higher-order strategic outcomes. At best, lower-order strategic objectives as pressure points, serve for messaging and to get even can be met thereby.Not only did Israel, later joined by the United States (US), pound Iran in Iran War I (the 12-Day War), but both have had to repeat the volleys multifold in the ongoing Iran War II (the Ramadan War). Though both arsenals have run-down, Iran is holding out, which suggests that stand-off targeting isn’t strategically efficacious, defined as begetting strategic outcomes. Russians also learnt this at an unanticipated cost in Ukraine.Contrarily, the takeaway is that a hardening of stances results. Iran’s staying away from Islamabad for the second round of talks avers. This is of a piece with the lessons of yore: the lesson from World War II was relearnt in Vietnam that the limitations of strategic bombing outdo its utility.Even though the US has the wherewithal to take out Iran – as US President Trump has often threatened – having the capacity does not imply it is usable. Likewise, Israel has the nuclear capability, which cannot be employed. The inference is that ‘more of the same’ also cannot work as its votaries wish. Consequently, arming with a thrust towards more in the Balakot-Sindoor tradition may be as ill-thought out as the strategy of reprisal itself.Finally, the missing of the wood for the treesThe only satisfaction will be of masculinist retribution, an avoidable seduction. The assumption that the public is bays for it, as was the case for Op Sindoor, may be a red-herring in that such an outcry could well be a manufactured one – such as in Op Sindoor’s case with its very naming, topped by an innovative logo.Being responsive may embellish a strongman’s image, but for the country such domestic political utility is questionable since there may be perverse incentive to keep the fraught security situation alive for more of such partisan dividend through military means.The sine qua non of military power is to beget strategic outcomes. Desired outcomes such as administering punishment are distinct from desirable strategic outcomes: a mitigation of the security predicament and, better still, creation of conditions for a negotiated settlement.Military power exertion is to enable a position of advantage conducive to pursuing political ends politically. By repeatedly exercising the military option without political follow up to address the incompatibility is to misuse the military instrument. Worse is the military’s collusion with such abuse of its services.The shape of the futureThat the military is handmaiden is clear from the manner it is fallen for the regime’s line on Op Sindoor 2. It must recall that the new-found strategic doctrine – ‘new normal’ – in relation to Pakistan was close on the heels of Op Sindoor’s last night, precluding time for any strategic thinking going into it.The proximity in time suggests it was to placate the hardcore (‘trads’) camp-followers of the regime, who were disheartened by the calling-off of Op Sindoor. The line that the operation was put on pause was but appeasement of the voluble hard-right. For the military to thereafter keep up the din is political naivety, if not a political act in itself.After the fact, the military has indicated that it had more up its sleeve to dish out, with both the navy and the army indicating that – interrupted by a call from the Pakistani military operations’ head – they had to keep their powder dry. Taking cue from such claims, the next round is likely to see much stand off and aerial punishment delivered. The readiness to up-the-ante is to ensure that Pakistan replies in kind rather than ups-the-ante.If Iran could hold up against two versatile and armed-to-the-teeth foes, it can be expected that Pakistan could get back at India in kind. There is much being made of the interception at Sirsa, praiseworthy in itself, but surely incentivises smarter Pakistani tactics. That Pakistan held out a surprise – with Chinese help – in Op Sindoor’s first night, has no doubt forewarned India. A ‘draw’ is on the cards, even if after both sides claim a ‘win’.This begs the question whether it makes any strategic sense to persist with the military prong of strategy in relation to Pakistan. Worse is that the military prong appears entangled with the intelligence prong, wilfully handled by the national security and intelligence czar, Ajit Doval. The military prong provides cover for the intelligence prong of strategy to pursue its vile ends.The history of the military in the lead on the Kashmir front does not enthuse. Repeated junctures of the military wrestling the Pakistani proxies to the mat were squandered by the political level’s unwillingness to progress matters politically, either domestically or with Pakistan. As a result, the problem persists.Similar political and bureaucratic lassitude is now visible at the conventional level, though with an admixture of ideology; with each crisis merely setting the stage for the next, rather than creating conditions for talks to discontinue their recurrence.It appears easier to unceasingly impose on Indian communities – Kashmiris and by extension Indian Muslims (or the other way around), and increasingly on Ladakhis – than take on the primary antagonist – Pakistan – militarily. For its part, Pakistan has no love lost for Indian Muslims and will fight India to the last Kashmiri.Shaping the futureA strategically significant outcome is only possible if India were to field its fancily-named integrated battle groups in the fight. Holding these in reserve as an escalation dominance gimmick is lethargic and pusillanimous. True, it will set off a jolly good war; but the good part is it will end traditionally – in a negotiated settlement.To be sure, it would be a risky proposition. The Pakistanis will push their information war buttons on the nuclear overhang. The good part of this would be both greater in-conflict escalation control and post-conflict international persistence in facilitating (mediation being taboo) a negotiated outcome.The military must champion the logic of war, the rightful use of the military instrument to create the conditions for politically addressing root causes. Repeatedly addressing proximate causes – terror attacks – especially to no perceptible deterrence advantage is imbecility (famously defined as doing something repeatedly with the same vacuous results every time). To elevate this to strategy – a Pakistan-centric one – is ultimate testimony of strategic vapidity.That such a strategy was nevertheless proclaimed by none less than the prime minister only goes to prove the domestic politics at play. Persistence of Pakistan as a foe helps the regime collapse the internal and external Other into one, for the manufacture of a unity based on a majoritarian logic. Aware of the potential for a wider war to provoke the international community’s midwifing of a settlement on Kashmir, India is fighting shy of one.An apolitical military implies being non-partisan. Apolitical does not mean being a political ingenue. The military cannot change the regime’s refrain, but it need not be party to a political project. It’s professional responsibility at the apex level is advisory, and must be used to good effect.The military must advocate political ends that have a sustainable strategic rationale. The changed character of war not having changed war’s nature, the military must reinsert war – traditionally envisaged – as an option for choice at the political level.Ali Ahmed is a strategic analyst. This article first appeared on his blog, ‘ali’s version’.