Chandigarh: On May 30, when United States Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth told delegates at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore that India would acquire the American FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank guided missile (ATGM), he was effectively reviving a procurement programme that had remained unresolved for over 16 years.Over that period, the proposed ATGM acquisition, like several other high-profile Indo-US defence projects linked to technology transfer and local production, has repeatedly stalled amid protracted negotiations and unresolved industrial issues, rarely advancing beyond the realm of intent and discussion.Hegseth’s reference to the Javelin came in the broader context of Washington’s efforts to deepen defence cooperation with New Delhi and position India as a key security partner in the Indo-Pacific. In his address in Singapore last week, he described India as “a critical anchor to hold the line” in South Asia, praising its military modernisation efforts and growing role in regional security.Yet, the Javelin was a curious programme for the American Defence Secretary to highlight, as it represented one of the longest-running, albeit least conclusive, efforts in the history of Indo-US defence cooperation over the past quarter century.Since 2010, both sides have sought to bring the missile into the Indian Army service, only for the effort to flounder on technology-transfer disputes, bureaucratic inertia, competing procurement priorities, and the lure of alternative and indigenously developed ATGM systems. Rather than progressing steadily towards induction, the Javelin steadily became emblematic of the structural obstacles that have long complicated Indo-US defence collaboration, particularly in areas involving technology transfer and local series production.The stillborn Javelin episode also serves as a reminder that, contrary to popular perception, defence dealings with Washington – even between countries routinely described as close strategic partners like the US and India – are far from straightforward. It highlights that US arms transfers, along with the tightly-controlled technologies that accompany them, remain among the most heavily regulated in the world, subject to extensive governmental, commercial, and legislative scrutiny, often resulting in procurement timelines measured in decades rather than just years.“Given these structural handicaps, there remains ample scope for further delays and complications before the Javelin finds its way into Indian Army inventories – if indeed it ever does,” said a senior industry official, declining to be named. After all, declarations of intent and political support have accompanied the project for much of the past decade and a half, with nothing to show for them, he added.When did India’s interest in Javelin begin?The Indian Army’s requirement for a third-generation ATGM emerged in the late 1990s-early 2000s, as it sought to replace its ageing French-origin Milan/Milan-2T and Soviet-era 9M113 Konkurs-M inventories. Both legacy missile systems had served reliably for decades, but they belonged to an earlier generation of warfare, whereas modern armoured combat increasingly demanded fire-and-forget missiles, capable of striking tanks from above, where their armour was weakest.The Javelin first caught the Indian Army’s attention during the joint Indo-US Yudh Abhyas exercise in late 2009 at the Babina Field Firing Ranges near Jhansi, in which it was prominently featured. Thereafter, in August 2010, then Defence Minister A.K. Antony informed the parliament that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) intended to issue a Letter of Request (LoR) to the United States under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route for the acquisition of the Javelin, along with a proposed technology-transfer package aimed at enabling local production through a collaboration involving Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL).Also read: At Shangri-La Dialogue, Hegseth Steps Back From US Intelligence Warning on Pakistan Missile ProgrammeDeveloped by the Raytheon-Lockheed Martin Javelin joint venture (JV), the Javelin is a third-generation, man-portable, fire-and-forget anti-tank guided missile that has evolved through several variants since entering service in the mid-1990s. Depending on the variant, it can engage targets at ranges of 65-75 metres out to around 4-4.75 km, employing an imaging infrared seeker, top-attack and direct-attack flight modes, and a tandem high-explosive anti-tank warhead designed to defeat modern reactive armour.The Javelin’s lock-on-before-launch capability allows operators to relocate immediately after firing, significantly enhancing battlefield survivability, combining range, lethality, and operational flexibility in a compact man-portable system. For the Indian Army, facing armoured contingencies in the plains against Pakistan and high-altitude environments along the China frontier, it appeared, at least on paper, to be a near-ideal solution to its anti-armour modernisation requirements.Yet, the Javelin’s tactical appeal proved insufficient to overcome the combined procurement and technology transfer constraints on both sides. A retired one-star infantry officer who participated in the negotiations between 2010 and 2012 said the programme ultimately stalled over the issue of restricted access to critical US technologies. He recalled that despite bilateral mechanisms such as the now-defunct Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), meaningful transfer of sensitive systems and know-how remained out of reach for India.Speaking on condition of anonymity, the officer said US defence companies had little incentive to transfer technologies developed at high cost, merely because officials in Washington sought closer strategic ties with partners like India. At best, he argued, India could expect local assembly of systems such as the Javelin, with limited or token indigenous content included largely to demonstrate industrial participation, rather than enable meaningful technology transfer. More than a decade later, he believes little has fundamentally changed, with expectations regarding technology transfer and industrial absorption remaining broadly similar to those that shaped the ultimately unsuccessful Javelin negotiations over a decade earlier.Although these talks gradually lost momentum, the Javelin ATGM never entirely disappeared from the Indo–US defence conversation, resurfacing periodically in bilateral discussions as part of broader efforts to deepen strategic defence cooperation. Its trajectory was further marked by repeated cycles of interest, delay, and reversal, once more driven by unresolved questions of technology transfer and industrialisation.Could Javelin be included under ‘Make in India’ framework?One such attempt to translate intent into an industrial framework emerged in September 2016, when Tata Power Strategic Engineering Division signed a Letter of Intent with the Raytheon-Lockheed Martin Javelin JV to explore co-development of the system and potential production in India under the broader ‘Make in India’ framework. The proposed arrangement envisaged local manufacturing and technology infusion across infantry and platform-based applications, but remained contingent on a formal MoD order that eventually never materialised.With the Javelin pathway stalled, the Indian Army turned to alternative suppliers to address its acute anti-armour capability gap, eventually shortlisting and selecting Israel’s Spike ATGM following extensive field evaluations in 2013-14. Developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, Spike is a third-generation, man-portable, fire-and-forget missile featuring electro-optical guidance, an 800 metre to 4 kilometre engagement range, and a top-attack profile designed to defeat modern armoured platforms, much like the Javelin.Also read: India’s Fifth-Generation Fighter Gap Gives Fresh Life to Russia’s Su-57 OfferBy 2016, the MoD had negotiated a $500-700 million Spike ATGM procurement covering 321 launchers and over 8,000 missiles, including some 5,500 in fully assembled form. The agreement also envisaged an extensive transfer-of-technology arrangement under which BDL would licence-produce an additional 30,000 missiles, addressing the Army’s long-standing requirement for nearly 68,000 ATGMs.But soon after, the Spike buy was summarily scrapped in late 2017, ostensibly amid a renewed push by the government to prioritise the indigenous Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO) Nag Man-Portable ATGM (MPATGM) programme.Industry officials widely interpreted this as being shaped by broader ‘strategic and commercial considerations’ linked to competing supplier interests in the ATGM segment. Some also noted that the timing of the decision coincided with wider ‘external sensitivities around competing systems’, leading to widespread speculation in defence circles that ‘outside pressure’ may have played a role in the outcome.Yet the Spike ATGM deal proved difficult to dislodge, underscored by the continuity of India-Israel defence cooperation in high-end systems. Following Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s January 2018 visit to New Delhi, the programme registered a partial revival, resulting in the limited acquisition of some 260 Spike-LR missiles and 12 launchers as a ‘stopgap measure’ to address urgent operational requirements.Throughout this period, however, the Javelin remained in the background, its profile further reinforced by the Russia–Ukraine war, where extensive battlefield imagery highlighted its effectiveness against Russian armoured formations. For Indian planners, the conflict underlined the operational relevance of modern fire-and-forget ATGMs, and Javelin re-entered the Indian Army’s procurement cycle in November 2025.This was when the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) approved a $47.1 million FMS to India for an initial tranche of 100 Javelin missiles and 25 Lightweight Command Launch Units (LwCLU), along with associated command systems, spare parts, training, technical assistance, and lifecycle support. The DSCA described the sale as reinforcing the US–India strategic partnership and noted that India would face no difficulty integrating the system into its force structure, reflecting its continued operational relevance after years of intermittent engagement with the missile system.In conclusion, the Javelin’s return to India’s procurement cycle – revived once again in the form outlined by Hegseth, who may not be fully conversant with its long and complicated history – reflects less of the missile system itself, and more a recurring pattern in Indo-US defence and technology cooperation, where political momentum is often not matched by execution on the ground.This pattern is not unique to the Javelin. It is also evident in programmes such as the General Electric GE-F414 engine deal and broader technology initiatives under the three-year old Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), which have faced delays, restrictions on technology transfer, and differing expectations on both sides. While these initiatives are frequently presented as markers of deepening strategic convergence, progress in practice remains slower and more uneven.If India ultimately acquires the Javelin, it will close one of the longest-running procurement arcs in recent memory. If not, it will remain what it has been since 2010 – a symbol of opportunity repeatedly pursued, repeatedly negotiated, and repeatedly missed.