Chandigarh: For over two decades, successive governments in New Delhi have proclaimed the United States as India’s “major defence partner” and presented their expanding relationship as a defining pillar of the country’s strategic engagement with Washington.But, in the area New Delhi values most – the acquisition of the industrial capabilities needed to build an indigenous defence industrial base – the US has proved less forthcoming than Russia, France and Israel, which, to varying degrees, have displayed greater willingness to support technology transfer, local manufacturing and indigenous capability development.Together with the US, these three countries have, over the years, supplied the overwhelming majority of India’s imported military capability, ranging from fighter, transport, and tanker aircraft, submarines, assorted warships and helicopters to tanks, missiles, small arms, radars, electronic warfare systems, drones, and precision-guided weapons. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), during 2020–2024 Russia remained India’s largest materiel supplier, accounting for around 36% of major arms imports, followed closely by France at around 33%, while the US accounted for approximately 13% and Israel around 10%.However, the significance of this quartet of India’s principal materiel suppliers cannot be measured merely by the volume of equipment provided: it lies equally in the different models of defence cooperation they represent. Russia, France and Israel have generally combined arms transfers with varying degrees of production assistance, technical collaboration and technology access.Also read: Russia’s Shadow over India-US Defence TiesIn contrast, the US defence industry remains constrained by complex export-control regulations, compliance requirements and intellectual-property protections, among numerous other regulatory and legal constraints. The reasons lie largely in the structure of the US defence industry and its technology-transfer regime. US defence companies operate within one of the world’s most restrictive frameworks, governed by regulations like the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), stringent end-use monitoring requirements, the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) and related controls. Together, these strict structures impose rigorous security obligations on overseas contractors and subcontractors handling sensitive military-related technical information, including controlled designs, specifications and production data. Unlike Russia’s state-directed military sector, where the government can directly shape defence-industrial cooperation, or France, which has generally shown greater flexibility on manufacturing partnerships, the US model places far greater authority in the hands of private corporations that remain protective of closely held know-how and cautious about entering deeper technology-sharing arrangements.Also read: The Long-Delayed Proposal For Integrated Theatre Commands and Its Many PitfallsConsequently, the outcome has been a persistent disconnect in Indo-US defence relations between ambitious political rhetoric and the near absence of the industrial capability transfer needed to advance India’s pursuit of atmanirbharta, or greater self-reliance in the defence sector. Such limited progress, however, has not prevented the Modi government from investing unprecedented diplomatic capital in strengthening the broader strategic partnership with Washington. Much of that effort has focused on embedding India more firmly within Washington’s evolving regional security architecture and aligning the two countries more closely in responding to the challenges posed by China’s growing hegemony.Modi’s Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party-led (BJP-led) government, for instance, enthusiastically embraced the US-backed Indo-Pacific construct, placed the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) at the centre of India’s maritime security engagement with the US, Japan and Australia, and signed and expanded the four foundational bilateral military agreements governing logistics support, secure communications, geospatial intelligence and information sharing between Delhi and Washington.These initiatives represented the core pillars of India’s strategic alignment with Washington, but their future direction has become increasingly uncertain.Elusive promisesThe Trump administration’s decision to revert the US Indo-Pacific Command to its historical designation as US Pacific Command (USPACOM) – undoing the 2018 name change that reflected the growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean region –has added to questions over Washington’s long-term commitment to the framework. Similarly, the QUAD too has lost momentum, with uncertainty over Washington’s regional priorities, differing threat perceptions among its members and questions over sustained political commitment, raising doubts about its ability to develop into a more cohesive security arrangement.Furthermore, in 2023, the two sides unveiled a succession of ambitious bilateral initiatives aimed at transforming Indo-US defence ties beyond the traditional buyer-seller model, reviving aspirations that had earlier faltered under the joint Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) launched in 2012.These included the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) to deepen cooperation in defence, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, 6G communications, quantum computing and aerospace; INDUS-X (India-US Defence Acceleration Ecosystem) to foster collaboration between defence start-ups, investors and industry; and the US-India Defence Industrial Cooperation Roadmap to promote co-development, co-production and more resilient defence supply chains.The objective was to build on a defence relationship already underpinned by more than $22 billion in US military sales-including C-17 Globemaster III and C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, M777 ultra-light howitzers, AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, MH-60R Seahawk naval helicopters, MQ-9B remotely piloted aircraft and SIG Sauer assault rifles- and evolve it into one centred on joint development, domestic manufacturing and advanced technology collaboration. Also read: What’s the Real Story Behind IAF’s Rafale ‘Bridge Support’ ContractAnd, while these acquisitions substantially enhanced India’s military modernisation and were accompanied by expanded intelligence sharing and increasingly sophisticated military exercises, both governments repeatedly presented them as the foundation of a broader strategic partnership that would ultimately move beyond arms sales towards deeper industrial cooperation. That promise, however, has remained stubbornly elusive. Nothing illustrates this more clearly than India’s prolonged negotiations with General Electric over the domestic manufacture of the F414 fighter engine, a 98-kilonewton (kN) afterburning turbofan intended to power the IAF’s Tejas upgraded Mk-2 variant and the first two squadrons of the under-development fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). The issue is not merely whether the engine can be built in India, but how much of the underlying design expertise, engineering processes and manufacturing know-how GE is willing to share of its core technologies. Announced with considerable fanfare during Modi’s Washington visit in 2023, the HAL-GE joint venture was presented as a landmark step towards advanced Indo-US defence-industrial cooperation. More than three years later, ongoing negotiations have exposed many of the structural constraints that continue to define these ties.India, for its part, is pressing for access to the engine’s core design, production processes and critical intellectual property, while GE is reportedly insisting on retaining control over its most sensitive proprietary technologies. With engine costs reportedly escalating sharply and no production agreement yet concluded, the F-414 programme has become the clearest indicator of the limits that continue to constrain Indo-US defence-industrial cooperation.“The longer the F-414 negotiations drag on, the more they reinforce concerns within India’s defence establishment that, despite ambitious declarations and expanding strategic ties, Washington remains reluctant to share critical technologies with India” said a Bengaluru-based defence industry official, who declined to be identified. For many in India’s defence industry, the F-414 negotiations have become a litmus test of whether the US is prepared to move beyond merely selling us materiel or actively supporting its long-term industrial and technological advancement, he added. Alongside, discussions over the proposed domestic production of General Dynamics’ Stryker infantry combat vehicles and co-manufacture of Javelin anti-tank guided missiles have followed a pattern similar to the F-414 programme: ambitious announcements, protracted negotiations and, so far, no concrete outcomes. “Rather than isolated delays, both initiatives reinforce a broader pattern in Indo-US defence cooperation, where political enthusiasm has repeatedly collided with the commercial, regulatory and technology-transfer constraints embedded within the US defence ecosystem” said the aforementioned industry executive.Moscow’s willingness to share sensitive technologiesMeanwhile, Russia’s approach has been markedly different, characterised by a far greater willingness to share production capabilities and critical defence technologies.Beginning with the licensed production by HAL of MiG-21 fighters in the 1960s, followed by MiG-27 ground-attack aircraft in the 1980s and Sukhoi Su-30MKI multirole fighters in the early 2000s, Russia has long viewed defence technology transfer both as a commercial transaction and instrument of state policy. The same philosophy has extended to T-72 and T-90 main battle tanks, BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles, BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and, more recently, the AK-203 assault rifle programme, among numerous sundry collaborative defence projects. A Mobile Autonomous Launcher carrying BrahMos missile proceeds during rain-affected full-dress rehearsal for the Republic Day Parade, in New Delhi on January 23, 2026. Photo: PTI/Kamal Kishore.The BrahMos programme remains one of the clearest examples of this approach.Established in 1998, as a joint venture between the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyenia, it combined Russian propulsion expertise with Indian guidance systems, software, production engineering and systems integration, creating a genuine technological partnership rather than a conventional buyer-seller relationship.Today, BrahMos remains one of the world’s few successful examples of multinational missile co-development and one of the very few commercially available weapon systems of its type, capable of attaining speeds approaching Mach 3, while presenting significant challenges for detection, tracking and interception. It has also emerged as India’s most successful defence export, with coastal-defence BrahMos batteries worth nearly $375 million being sold to the Philippines and a further $450 million contract secured recently with Indonesia. Vietnam is imminently expected to become BraMos’s next overseas customer, while several other countries like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Brazil, Chile, South Africa and Malaysia have expressed interest in acquiring the missile. Also read: The Questions That Need to Be Asked as BrahMos Emerges as India’s Flagship Defence ExportMore importantly, Moscow’s willingness to share sensitive technologies with India has extended well beyond conventional weapons into the strategic realm. Few countries would contemplate helping another state develop the technological foundations of a sea-based nuclear deterrent, yet Russia did precisely that via its support for India’s secretive nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) programme.From the earliest stages of India’s Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) programme in the 1970s, Russian technologists and nuclear specialists provided critical assistance in SSBN design, reactor miniaturisation, precision engineering, metallurgy, quieting technologies and crew training. That collaboration culminated in the commissioning of INS Arihant in 2016, India’s first indigenously built SSBN, and has since enabled the induction of its successors – INS Arighaat and the recently commissioned INS Aridhaman. A fourth Arihant-class boat is expected to be delivered shortly to the Indian Navy (IN).Equally important was the leasing of two nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) –both commissioned as INS Chakra, the first between 1988 and 1991 and the second from 2012 to 2021 – which provided generations of IN submariners with invaluable operational experience that no shore-based training could have replicated. Without this sustained Russian support, senior naval officials acknowledge, India would have taken far longer to establish the maritime leg of its triad of land, air- and sea-based strategic delivery systems.France’s dependable modelIn parallel, France has followed a different, but equally dependable model, combining advanced weapon systems with long-term industrial cooperation and domestic manufacturing partnerships.The Indo-French defence relationship dates back to the 1950s with India’s acquisition of the Dassault Ouragan (Toofani) fighter, followed by the Mystère IVs and later Jaguars. The Mirage 2000H acquisition in the 1980s marked a major milestone, providing India with one of its most capable combat aircraft, laying the foundations for deeper operational and industrial cooperation between Delhi and Paris.Vajraang formation comprising of a C 130 Super Hercules transport aircraft in the centre flanked by two Rafale multirole fighters on either side on Republic Day, January 26, 2023. Photo: PIB.That cooperation expanded significantly with the acquisition of 36 4.5 generation Dassault Rafale multirole fighters under a government-to-government agreement signed in 2016. Building on that programme, Delhi has now approved the procurement of a further 114 Rafale F4s under the IAF’s Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme. Current plans envisage 96 of these aircraft being manufactured in India, incorporating technology transfer and around 60 per cent indigenous content, making it one of the country’s largest aerospace manufacturing projects.Such an approach has also extended beyond combat aircraft into submarine construction and aerospace technologies. The diesel-electric Scorpène submarine programme, launched under a 2005 agreement with France’s Naval Group, saw six Kalvari-class conventional boats built at Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), Mumbai, from 2009 onwards under a technology-transfer arrangement. The first of these, INS Kalvari, was commissioned in late 2017, with the remaining five submarines entering service progressively through 2025. With plans for three additional Scorpène-class boats now under consideration, the Scorpene-Kalvari submarine programme remains one of the most successful examples of long-term Indo-French defence-industrial cooperation.Aerospace cooperation has followed a similar pattern. The jointly developed Shakti helicopter engine – a Safran-HAL programme based on Safran’s Ardiden engine and manufactured in India for the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) fleet – provided valuable experience in engine production, assembly and integration. Safran, which also manufactures the Rafale’s M88 turbofan engine, is presently establishing a maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facility in Hyderabad to support advanced propulsion systems. Building on this foundation, Safran is now discussing deeper cooperation with Indian industry on the development of a new 110–120 kilonewton (kN) fighter engine for the AMCA programme. The continuing negotiations underscore a French approach that has consistently favoured technology sharing, local manufacturing and industrial collaboration, often on terms more flexible than comparable US proposals, especially with regard to the F-414.Israel’s hand in India’s domestic UAV industry growthAnd finally, Israel that occupies a different but equally important niche in India’s defence ecosystem.Unlike Russia and France, it has not been a partner in the development or licensed production of major military platforms like fighters, submarines or armoured vehicles. Instead, it has emerged as one of India’s most trusted suppliers of battlefield “force multipliers” – advanced missiles, radars, electronic warfare systems, unmanned aerial vehicles and precision-guided munitions that have significantly enhanced the operational effectiveness of India’s armed forces. The most prominent example of this technological collaboration is the Barak-8 family of surface-to-air missile systems, jointly developed by the DRDO and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), which has strengthened India’s air-defence capabilities across the armed forces. Other Israeli projects include the Green Pine and EL/M-2084 radars, the Harop loitering munition and a range of assorted surveillance and electronic warfare systems.A drone manufactured by ideaForge Technology is being operated. Photo: PTI.IAI’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) expertise too has played an important role in shaping India’s drone ecosystem, with platforms like the Heron and Searcher series providing all three services with decades of operational experience in surveillance and reconnaissance. More recently, Israeli collaboration and technology inputs have contributed to the growth of India’s domestic UAV industry, including private-sector efforts to develop indigenous drones, sensors and autonomous systems.However, Israel’s real distinction has not been the scale of its defence exports but the speed and flexibility with which it has responded to Indian military requirements. Israeli firms have consistently demonstrated a willingness to customise systems for Indian needs, integrate them with existing equipment and deliver operational capabilities within compressed timelines.Unlike the US, where technology cooperation is invariably encumbered by lengthy regulatory procedures, compliance requirements and extended negotiations, Israel has built its reputation on responsiveness and operational pragmatism. That agility has made it one of India’s most dependable long-term defence partners, with an influence extending far beyond the monetary value of its defence sales.However, Israel’s real distinction has not been the scale of its defence exports but the speed and flexibility with which it has responded to Indian military requirements. Israeli firms have consistently demonstrated a willingness to customise systems for Indian needs, integrate them with existing equipment and deliver operational capabilities within compressed timelines. Unlike the US, where ambitious defence initiatives have frequently struggled to progress beyond declarations and negotiations, Israel has consistently demonstrated an ability to convert requirements into operational capability with speed and flexibility. That responsiveness has made it one of India’s most dependable long-term defence partners, with an influence extending far beyond the monetary value of its defence sales.In the final analysis, the gap between ambition and execution remains the defining challenge in the US-India defence-industrial partnership. Beyond the growing alphabet soup of agreements, initiatives and declarations, the relationship still awaits the industrial breakthrough that would turn intent into enduring capability.