Chandigarh: The latest addition to the ever-expanding catalogue of India-US defence cooperation initiatives – the Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA) programme unveiled during Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to New Delhi last month – joins a long list of military technology collaborations whose ambitions have, over decades, outpaced their implementation.Focused on jointly tracking submarine activity, protecting critical seabed infrastructure and undersea communications cables and strengthening maritime surveillance across the Indian Ocean, the UDA is intended to address the growing strategic challenge posed by China’s expanding naval presence in the region. In principle, military planners in Delhi believe the initiative is both timely and strategically sound, but its success will ultimately depend on whether it sidesteps the fate of earlier Indo-US defence and military technology collaborations that failed to move beyond intent.Over the past two decades, such announcements in both Delhi and Washington have frequently outpaced implementation, leaving a growing inventory of projects stalled amid negotiations, regulatory constraints, and technology-transfer disputes. A cross-section of defence industry officials and analysts in Delhi and Bengaluru describe India-US bilateral defence cooperation as “high maintenance, but low deliverability.”Many maintain that beneath this pattern lies another enduring illusion: that the US is inherently quicker at delivering defence outcomes than India’s other major arms suppliers – Russia, France and Israel. “Historical record in the Indian context suggests otherwise,” said a senior defence industry official previously involved in negotiating with several vendors from the US’s vast military-industrial complex. The reality of India-US defence cooperation, he added, is that despite both governments agreeing on the destination, processes often stretch over years, as proposals wind their way through layers of negotiations, evaluations, approvals and regulatory procedures.In terms of India’s broader import materiel structure, four countries – France, Israel, Russia and the US – constitute its principal suppliers, though their respective shares vary significantly. Russia still accounts for the largest share at roughly 45-55% of India’s defence equipment imports, reflecting a large quantity of legacy platforms and long-standing supply chains.France follows with approximately 10-20%, driven largely by Rafale fighter aircraft and submarine-related systems. Israel accounts for around 10-15%, primarily in the form of drones, sensors, precision-guided munitions and air defence systems, while the United States contributes roughly 10-15%, led by transport aircraft, helicopters, maritime surveillance platforms and an expanding portfolio of drones and support systems.Against this backdrop, online research and interviews with industry officials suggest that Russia, despite recurring concerns over spare parts availability and sanctions-related disruptions, has traditionally been India’s most flexible defence partner. It has routinely concluded major arms deals within one to four years, frequently approving licensed production and local assembly, and, in select cases, deeper co-development frameworks – most notably the BrahMos cruise missile – alongside extensive licensed production of platforms like Sukhoi Su-30MKI combat aircraft and T-90 main battle tanks, with comparatively fewer structural constraints on localisation than other major suppliers.Also read: Despite US, India-Russia Defence Cooperation Remains a Necessary Pillar of New Delhi’s Security StrategyIsrael, for its part, has proven even more responsive in several instances, often delivering systems within one to three years and emerging as a dependable ordnance supplier during urgent operational requirements like the rapid provision of 155mm artillery ammunition and sundry critical battlefield equipment during the 1999 Kargil conflict.Its strength has typically lain in fast-tracked procurement cycles for surveillance platforms, precision-guided munitions, air defence systems and a range of drones, which can be quickly integrated with existing Indian equipment. This willingness to customise equipment, integrate local systems and co-develop subsystems has made it one of Delhi’s most practical and least bureaucratic defence partners, though it remains reluctant to transfer its most sensitive technologies.France, on the other hand, occupies something of a middle ground. Major programmes with it can take years to negotiate, as demonstrated by the Rafale fighter and Scorpene diesel-electric submarine acquisitions. But Paris has generally shown greater flexibility on technology transfer, industrial participation and strategic autonomy than most Western suppliers, while imposing fewer political conditions, but retaining some critical technologies like fighter aircraft source codes which govern mission systems, avionics and sensor integration.The US, by contrast, offers some of the world’s most advanced military equipment and extensive logistics support, but is often the most restrictive partner when it comes to source codes, advanced propulsion technologies, radar systems and other sensitive know-how. Consequently, while Washington excels at supplying high-end platforms, its collaborative programmes are frequently slowed by export-control regulations, Congressional oversight, technology-transfer protocols and end-use monitoring requirements, making it one of India’s most demanding defence partners to navigate, despite the sophistication of the kit on offer.Indeed, when assessed purely in terms of ease of concluding deals and adapting military systems to Indian requirements, online research and local industry assessments generally place Russia first, followed by Israel, France and lastly, the US. This ranking reflects differences in bureaucratic processes, export controls and the willingness to accommodate Indian customisation requirements for defence equipment.It also highlights a key contrast: while Russia, Israel and France permit varying degrees of “jugaad” or innovation in the integration and modification of imported military systems to suit Indian operational needs, the US system is far more rigid in this regard. It leaves little room for improvisation, which has long been central to India’s approach to adapting defence equipment over decades, becoming its hallmark.This structural rigidity has, in turn, shaped the outcomes of several ambitious bilateral India-US frameworks, many of which have struggled to move beyond intent into execution.One of the first and most prominent, albeit stillborn, amongst them was the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) framework, launched in 2012 to move the bilateral relationship beyond a simple buyer-seller dynamic towards co-development and co-production of advanced military systems. Despite considerable political backing and years of meetings, working groups and pilot projects, DTTI produced little or no tangible outcomes and gradually faded into irrelevance. And, by the early 2020s, it had become better known for what it was intended to achieve than for what it actually delivered.Its successor, the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), unveiled in 2022, was conceived on an even grander scale.Extending well beyond defence, iCET encompasses cooperation in jet-engine production, drones, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 6G telecommunications, space, critical minerals and advanced manufacturing. At many joint forums in the respective capitals, it was presented as the framework that would finally translate strategic convergence into industrial and technological collaboration.Over four years later, however, progress remains questionable.The General Electric GE F414 fighter engine, for instance, intended for the upgraded Tejas Mk 2 light combat aircraft, and at least two initial squadrons of the under-development indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) that is part of the iCET, was hailed as a breakthrough in defence-industrial cooperation and technology transfer. Yet, despite repeated political endorsements from both governments, negotiations over the extent of technology transfer, intellectual property rights and export-control restrictions have continued to slow progress. While neither side has backed away from the project, it remains some distance away from closure.So does the Raytheon-Lockheed Martin-designed and series-built Javelin anti-tank guided missile (ATGM), which US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth highlighted at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last month as a major area of potential defence-industrial cooperation with India. Discussions over possible Indian acquisition and co-production of the Javelin have surfaced repeatedly since the early 2010s, as the missile was promoted not only as a replacement for portions of India’s ageing ATGM inventory, but also as a test case for deeper technology transfer and manufacturing collaboration between the two countries.But more than 16 years later, the Javelin programme remains far from resolution, with India pursuing both indigenous alternatives and other foreign options instead. Hegseth’s latest reference to Javelin, ironically, serves as a reminder that some of the most frequently discussed India-US defence projects tend to remain under discussion in perpetuity.Also read: India’s Defence Vision Document Shows Military Organisational System Remains Trapped in a CycleThe proposed General Dynamics-designed Stryker infantry combat vehicle (ICV) partnership is also progressing cautiously and, according to industry officials, remains unlikely to reach fruition in its current form. First highlighted under the iCET, the programme envisages potentially adapting the US-made ICV for Indian operational requirements, including high-altitude deployment. However, user trials, localisation requirements, production arrangements and commercial negotiations remain unresolved, and – as with several such initiatives – the concept has advanced far more rapidly than its implementation either on the factory floor or the battlefield.This contrasts sharply with the more established defence trade dimension of the India-US relationship, where outcomes have been comparatively more tangible.Through a combination of direct commercial contracts and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route, India has, since 2002, acquired an estimated $25-30 billion worth of US defence materiel, ranging beyond major platforms to include a wide array of weaponry, missiles and sustainment and logistics support packages.Following the easing of US sanctions, imposed after India’s 1998 nuclear tests, the first defence transaction between Delhi and Washington was the purchase of 12 AN/TPQ-37 Fire-finder weapon-locating radars from Raytheon for around $142 million. And though this acquisition marked a milestone in the normalisation of bilateral strategic ties and helped lay the foundation for a future defence relationship, it was a troublesome buy; the radar system routinely malfunctioned and needed frequent retrofitting and was ultimately junked.The relationship, however, expanded further in 2007 with India’s acquisition of USS Trenton, a second-hand 16,900-tonne amphibious troop transport commissioned into the Indian Navy as INS Jalashwa, and six embarked Sikorsky/Westland Sea King helicopters, in a $48 million deal that took around two years to conclude.Thereafter, bilateral miliary commerce proliferated.The procurement of 12 C-130J-30 Super Hercules special operations transport aircraft and 11 C-17 Globemaster III strategic airlifters moved from requirement to contract in roughly two years, while the deal for 12 Boeing P-8I maritime patrol aircraft took around four years to conclude in 2009. Thereafter, as programmes became larger and more complex, timelines lengthened considerably.The acquisition of 22 Apache and 15 Chinook helicopters for the Indian Air Force (IAF) required around seven years, while the Indian Army’s subsequent purchase of six additional Apache helicopters took another three years. The procurement of 145 M777 155mm/39 calibre ultralight howitzers required nearly nine years to conclude in 2016, while the acquisition of 24 MH-60R Seahawk naval helicopters stretched over more than a decade and was finally concluded in early 2020.Collectively, these acquisitions amounted to 35 fixed-wing aircraft, 73 helicopters, 145 artillery guns and one amphibious transport dock alongside associated missiles, torpedoes, munitions and support equipment acquired under separate contracts.India’s latest major acquisition – 31 General Atomics MQ-9B SeaGuardian/SkyGuardian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) worth around $3.5-4 billion – was first seriously discussed in 2017-18 and signed only in October 2024, with deliveries scheduled to begin around 2029 and conclude a year later. The package includes 15 SeaGuardians for the Indian Navy and 8 SkyGuardians each for the Indian Air Force and the Indian Army, along with weapons, training and logistics support. However, while the contract provides for in-country sustainment infrastructure, including Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul and limited industrial participation, it does not include local assembly of the MQ-9B or any meaningful transfer of core technology.In short, US defence equipment may be advanced, but it is rarely easy to procure or adapt. Heavy regulation, oversight and approval processes in Washington, combined with India’s own procurement system, slow everything down. The result is a partnership that is strong on announcements but slow on delivery. In that sense, initiatives like the UDA programme, too, are unlikely to escape the same underlying constraints.