Outgoing ITBP chief Shatrujeet Kapur has set the cat among the pigeons by confirming that there have been Chinese incursions along the Line of Actual Control in Arunachal Pradesh. The government had so far not commented on multiple reports of incursions, especially in the Asaphila/Taksing area of the Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh. In a long speech Kapur spoke of the challenges to the ITBP, its need for modernisation and adoption of asymmetrical strategies against a more powerful adversary.The remarks directly validate independent reports going back to June 2026, which flagged friction in the Taksing sector and standoffs near Asaphila where Chinese troops allegedly attempted to deviate from standard patrolling layouts and had pitched temporary shelters near the LAC.In response to Kapur’s remarks, the official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs said that both sides used the diplomatic and military mechanisms to resolve the outstanding issues to avoid problems, but “the situation in the India-China border areas gets disturbed from time to time when Chinese forces deviate from established patrolling patterns.”Illustration: Pariplab Chakraborty.Asaphila is not a new problem. When India and China got down to sign their 1993 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA), India also accepted for the first time that the border was actually a Line of Actual Control (LAC). Both sides agreed that the other side knew how it ran, though even today there is no commonly accepted map delineating it. They also acknowledged that they had differing perceptions in the Trig Heights and Demchok in the Western Sector, Barahoti in the Middle sector and Namka Chu, Sumdorong Chu, Yangtse, Asaphila and Longju in the Eastern Sector. In the agreement they made a commitment to clarify the LAC in these areas.But that has not happened and in fact the list of disputed areas expanded to include Samar Lungpa, Depsang, Pangong Tso, Dumchele and Chumar in Ladakh, Kaurik and Shipki La in the Middle Sector and Fish Tail 1&2 in Dibang Valley and Dichu. During the 2020 Ladakh incursions, the Chinese also began to claim the entire Galwan Valley.There have been incidents in the past in the Asaphila area which is roughly 100 sq km of high mountain area with dense jungles and the last post is at Taksing to which a road was laid in 2018 and which is adjacent to Longju, the site of the first India-China clash in 1959. There are many differences between India and China over where the LAC runs adjacent to Taksing and Longju. The incident of August 2003 was perhaps the most serious. A small patrol comprising two police personnel and five men from the Special Security Bureau and their porters were resting when they were surprised by a larger Chinese patrol. They were disarmed and deposited at the nearest Indian observation post. This happened when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was on an official visit to Beijing.In May 2005, there was another report of a Chinese intrusion in Asaphila area, shortly after the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao ended his visit to India. This was denied by the Chinese authorities.In 2018, it was the Chinese who accused India of transgressing the LAC in the Asaphila area, something that was denied by New Delhi which said it was only patrolling its side of the LAC.In 2023, there was a clash at an Indian patrolling point called Shera-5 and the Indian border guards were effectively evicted from there and have not been able to return to it. As in the case of Ladakh, there are complaints from locals of Indian restrictions that prevent them from accessing traditional grazing and hunting grounds.There have been local reports about Chinese activities in the region. Since July 2026, India and China got involved in a standoff at Asaphila. During routine patrolling Indian and Chinese troops came face to face near Maja. Both sides went back but the PLA returned and pitched their tents within 6-7 km of the Indian side of the LAC near the Maja company operating base of Taksing.This situation has persisted through the visit of President Xi Jinping to New Delhi for the 18th BRICS summit in September and two or three rounds of border talks between the two sides. This included the 36th Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) meeting of August 6 and the 25th round of talks between Special Representatives Ajit Doval and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. Indeed, on September 6, the first ever higher commander meeting between the Corps Commanders of the two sides was held at the Kibithu (Wacha)-Damai Border Personnel Meeting point.The Asaphila region is one of the earliest points of India-China friction. The 1959 Chinese occupation of Longju, adjacent to the town of Migyitun, some 20-35 km as a crow flies from Asaphila was the first clash between India and China on the border. India had set up an Assam Rifles post since Migyitun is considered the historic border with Tibet, though the McMahon Line put it on the Tibetan side. The Chinese claimed the area and said it was being used to support Tibetan rebels. The small Indian post of a dozen or so Assam Rifles personnel was pushed out by about 200-300 Chinese troops, leaving one Indian soldier dead and another injured.This was the turning point in India-China relations. This was the point in which the Chinese finally declared that the entire Sino-Indian border was, in their eyes, disputed. Till then they had maintained the fiction that China had been using old Kuomintang maps and had not really applied its mind to the boundary issue.The problem actually goes beyond the claims and counterclaims. The McMahon Line was negotiated as part of the Simla Convention of 1914 as the boundary between British India and Tibet. Nearly 900 km long it runs along the Himalayas high crest from Bhutan in the west to the point where the Brahmaputra enters India in the east. The British and Tibetan authorities signed the convention and the attached maps, but the Chinese representative initialled the convention but did not sign it. The Chinese refused to ratify it, but mainly because in their view, it wrongly depicted the Tibet-China border.India recognises the line, while China calls it illegal and unequal, and claims all of Arunachal Pradesh. However, for the present, the Chinese accept that the LAC is roughly aligned to the McMahon Line. Note that in the 1962 war, China captured all of Arunachal, but pulled back to their side of the McMahon Line after the ceasefire.The problem is with the small-scale map on which Sir Henry McMahon drew the line. On this map, the thick pen stroke used covered the ground of 1-2 km. The terrain was mountainous, forested and not fully explored and the map lacked detailed description of the high ridges or passes.As we noted China did not recognise the Line, while India did. But the Indian side insisted that it followed the highest watershed of the Himalayas, not the delineation made on the map by Sir Henry McMahon. The Chinese faced a double whammy—not only did they have to deal with a line they did not accept, but the Indians also insisted that they accept New Delhi’s interpretation of it. In line with this, India had sought to occupy Longju in 1959 and attempted to occupy the Thagla ridge, north of Tawang in October 1962, even though this was north of the literal interpretation of the McMahon Line. This was the trigger of the Sino-Indian war.In 1986-87, it led to the Sumdorong Chu crisis. When Indian forces realised Chinese forces had crossed the Sumdorong Chu and established a post south of the watershed, they launched a military operation to confront the Chinese leading to a near-war situation.As part of this operation, India took control of a number of positions to the east of the area, and this led to another face off in 2022 when the Chinese tried to evict the Indian positions in the Yangtse area.There are two issues that need to be dealt with here. First, is the need for the two sides to arrive at a final settlement with regard to their border. The second is the need to maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC in the interim. After a long period in which the two sides sought to settle the border on the basis of historical claims, they agreed in 2003 to do it through a political bargain. This has been outlined in the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles of a Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question signed on April 11, 2005 during the visit of Wen Jiabao. The agreement mandates safeguarding the interests of settled populations and strategic needs of both sides. Two Special Representatives have, since 2003, developed the framework for the settlement, but there remain important differences. The Chinese side insist on India conceding the Tawang area in any settlement, while India is equally clear it is not ready to do so.As for the LAC, the 1993 agreement committed both sides to clarify and confirm where it ran. The 1996 agreement had called on the two sides to speed up the work of clarifying the Line and exchanging maps indicating their perception of where the LAC ran. The 2005 agreement urged the two signatories to continue this work pending a final settlement.As is evident, none of these things have happened. The clarification exercise has not even begun. The map exchange process ended after the two sides shared their maps of the Central Sector, but those of the more contentious Western and Eastern sectors have not been exchanged.In these circumstances, the LAC remains a place where both sides push their claim and there are incidents such as the ongoing face-off in Taksing and the earlier ones in Yangtse and the eastern Ladakh crisis of 2020. Military agreements have ensured that guns are avoided in such clashes, but canes and stones are often freely used.The lesson is that neither military firmness nor diplomatic engagement alone can resolve this recurring problem. India and China need to work on both fronts. They should seek a fair and equitable settlement of their boundary dispute through processes already in place, while managing the border in ways that create the conditions for such settlement rather than undermine it.Manoj Joshi is a distinguished fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.This piece was first published on The India Cable – a premium newsletter from The Wire – and has been updated and republished here. To subscribe to The India Cable, click here.