Chandigarh: India’s quest for military airpower dominance continues to be undermined by its most enduring weakness – fighter engines. Both the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Navy (IN) face critical constraints in powering their planned indigenous fighter programmes, a situation shaped by complete reliance on imported engines. This complete dependence on foreign powerplants – the most vital component of any combat aircraft – has debilitatingly undermined production timelines, force levels, and strategic autonomy in equal measure.The two services presently confront mounting delays and uncertainties over the availability and localisation of the USA’s General Electric F404-IN20 and F414-INS6 afterburning turbofan engines, intended to power a range of current and planned domestically designed fighters, turning what was once touted as steady indigenisation into a familiar, recurring cycle of chronic import dependence.At the centre of this ongoing crisis is the delayed delivery of F404-IN20 engines, which has significantly slowed Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s (HAL’s) production of the Tejas advanced Mk1A variant. In 2021, HAL had ordered 99 of these engines for around $716 million to power 83 Mk1As for the IAF, with deliveries scheduled to begin in early 2024. However, the first engine arrived 14 months late, in March 2025, followed by just five more, resulting in a total of six units delivered.These slippages have been severe enough for HAL to recently impose liquidated damages on GE Aerospace, signalling both the scale of the disruption and a growing erosion of contractual confidence, even as completed Tejas airframes sit idle awaiting engines. A follow-on order for 113 additional F404 engines, signed in November 2025 for around $1 billion, has only deepened HAL’s exposure to GE, taking its total commitment to 212 similar power plants – despite an increasingly questionable delivery record.And though in response, GE has recently pledged to accelerate F404 engine supplies – assuring delivery of some 20 additional units by year-end – the backlog has already disrupted Tejas production timelines and significantly amplified the structural risks of India’s dependence on external power plants.According to senior IAF officers, these setbacks were not merely technical or logistical, but carried tangible consequences for operational readiness. Most notably, the IAF’s combat fleet has declined from a sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons to just 29-30, including six squadrons of ageing SEPECAT Jaguar aircraft inducted in the late 1970s and long overdue for retirement. Nowhere are these deferments more apparent than in the Tejas programme, which was intended to halt the decline in fighter strength, but has itself been slowed by persistent engine and production setbacks.Former Ministry of Defence (MoD) acquisitions advisor Amit Cowshish cautioned that HAL’s decision to impose liquidated damages – usually a measure of last resort following prolonged attempts to resolve supply-side issues by extending delivery deadlines – amounts to an acknowledgement that the contract may be in serious jeopardy to the extent of even approaching termination. “It (demanding damages) marks a clear and consequential escalation of the situation by the buyer”, he warned.A deeply structural problemIndia’s reliance on imported engines is neither incidental nor recent, but deeply structural. It spans multiple programmes – not only those involving aerial platforms but also land-based systems like main battle tanks, infantry combat vehicles and major naval platforms. Rooted in decades of stalled indigenous propulsion efforts, this dependence has repeatedly exposed frontline capabilities to external supply disruptions and wider strategic vulnerabilities, such as those now involving GE engines.Over four decades of effort by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to develop the GTX-35VS Kaveri afterburning turbofan engine for Tejas have proven not only costly, but ultimately futile. Sanctioned in March 1989 with a budget of Rs 382.81 crore and an initial completion target of 1996, the programme showed early promise but soon faltered and never recovered. Kaveri prototypes failed critical high-altitude trials in Russia in 2004 due to excess weight, a poor thrust-to-weight ratio, and persistent reliability and thermal issues under sustained performance.A 2005 revision raised Kaveri project costs to Rs 2,839 crore and extended the deadline to 2009, enabling GTRE to attempt a redesigned engine with 81 kN (kilo-newton) thrust and ambitious spinoffs. These included adapting the Kaveri engine for tanks, ships, locomotives, and the indigenously designed ‘Ghatak’ unmanned combat aerial vehicle – but little materialised.Around 2010, the MoD acknowledged Kaveri’s overwhelming challenges: technological complexity, inadequate manpower, subpar testing infrastructure, and restricted access to foreign technologies. A 2016 revival attempt for Kaveri by collaborating with French engine-maker Snecma/Safran SA, linked to the 36 Rafale fighter procurement offset obligations, also yielded no tangible results.And even as the Kaveri engine remained – somewhat optimistically – on the drawing board, the first Tejas Mk1 prototype took to the skies in January 2001, powered by the F404-IN20. By 2004, the F404 was formally adopted as Tejas’s power plant, despite its modest 84-85 kilonewton (kN) thrust, which constrained high-angle manoeuvrability, limited the effective strike radius to around 350-400 km, and capped weapons payload at roughly 3 tonnes.Its selection, however, reflected a pragmatic trade-off: proven engines over an untested indigenous alternative. Also, for the IAF, operating legacy fighters like the Soviet-era MiG-21 beyond their technical life, this compromise was operationally acceptable, prioritising performance and availability over the uncertainties of the under-development Kaveri engine – thereby embedding a dependence on F404 engines that would prove impossible to reverse.Beyond the immediate F404 engines’ operational constraints and delivery delays, a more consequential long-term challenge lies in India’s growing reliance on the more advanced GE F414INS6 power pack -generating 98-100 kN of thrust – which by the late 2010s had emerged as a central dependency in the IAF’s next-generation combat aviation plans. It was earmarked to power the advanced Tejas Mk2, early variants of the proposed 5th-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), as well as the IN’s Twin-Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF).HAL’s agreement with the US to locally manufacture the F414 under licence – concluded in June 2023 during prime minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington – was widely hailed by analysts and compliant sections of the media as a ‘breakthrough,’ intended to move India beyond engine assembly toward genuine power pack indigenisation. The deal, initially valued at roughly $2 billion for 99 engines, has since been complicated by GE’s additional financial demands for the deal, in addition to severe problems over technology transfer.GE is reportedly reluctant to transfer “hot section” technologies – such as single-crystal turbine blades, thermal barrier coatings, and advanced cooling systems – that are essential for engine performance, durability, and thrust optimisation. These omissions, coupled with the escalating cost, threaten to leave India permanently – and hopelessly – dependent on GE in perpetuity for the F414 engine’s most advanced elements.A fundamental divergence in expectationsIndustry officials said that at the core of this impasse is a fundamental divergence in expectations: HAL is seeking a ‘deeper technology transfer’ that would allow it not just to manufacture, but eventually to design and develop engines independently, along with greater flexibility over its intellectual property rights (IPR). It has been argued that its demands on this were not ‘peripheral’, but tantamount to seeking ‘sovereignty’ over combat aircraft engine technology from GE.This is understood to include the core engine architecture – namely the high-pressure compressor, combustor, and turbine – along with advanced single-crystal turbine blade technology capable of withstanding extreme temperatures, the Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC)-effectively the power pack’s digital brain-and specialised high-end materials and coatings. Without access to all these critical elements, HAL would be limited to assembling and servicing the F414 but unable to independently design and develop a comparable engine from scratch.GE, for its part, is reportedly willing to provide only extensive engine manufacturing capability but not full access to proprietary design knowledge or control over its IPR. Its “crown jewels” – including core engine architecture and high-temperature materials – remain tightly guarded, as is standard across all civil and military jet engine makers. Taken together, these elements constitute a closely held blend of design know-how, advanced materials science, and specialised manufacturing processes that are seldom, if ever, shared in full with customers– and remain effectively priceless, existing well beyond conventional financial valuation.“The F414 deal, even if finalised, will likely give India the factory for the engines but not their formula,” said an aviation industry official. Without access to the engine’s core technology, true self-reliance in fighter propulsion for India will remain out of reach, he added, declining to be named, due to the sensitivity of the matter.Further compounding India’s combat aircraft engine uncertainty is France’s re-emergence as a parallel – and potentially disruptive – option.In February 2026, Paris-based Safran SA offered to establish a full engine assembly line in India, expand local sourcing, and provide unprecedented technology transfer, including access to critical “hot section” know-how essential to modern fighter engines. Unlike the more guarded U.S. approach, Safran has signalled a willingness to co-develop engines for platforms such as the AMCA, offering India a hedge against overdependence on a single supplier.Last September, Bloomberg reported that India was actively weighing French-made engines for its fighter jets as talks over joint manufacturing the GE F414 with the U.S. had slowed. It stated that if realised, the French engine option could offer both a strategic hedge and accelerated access to critical engine technologies that remain restricted under the U.S. deal.This French initiative gathered traction last November, when prime minister Narendra Modi inaugurated Safran’s Hyderabad facility, which includes one of the world’s largest Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul centres for civil CFM International’s Leading Edge Aviation Propulsion engines and a new production line for M88 engines that power Dassault Rafale fighters, of which the IAF operates 36 and plans on acquiring another 114 under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft programme.Beyond civil aviation, the Hyderabad facility builds precisely the high-end metallurgy, materials, and assembly capabilities that underpin advanced fighter engine production, in areas where U.S. collaboration remains tightly restricted. With the IAF procuring 114 more Rafales, demand for their Safran M88 turbofan engines and support infrastructure will further deepen the French engine maker’s footprint in India.But pursuing Safran engine collaboration is not without its complexities. Co-development would require significant upfront investment by India, transparent IPR frameworks, and a realistic assessment of timelines. Above all, integrating a new engine into existing or planned airframes would entail major design adjustments and rigorous certification challenges, as all fighters are fundamentally built around their powerplants.Beyond technical considerations, this collaboration would represent a critical inflection point for India – a deliberate move to reduce strategic dependence on the US while building long-term capability and operational autonomy with France.In conclusion, India’s combat aircraft engine challenge is more than just a technical hurdle– it is an abiding strategic fault line. And, until Delhi secures reliable access to advanced propulsion technology and breaks the cycle of foreign dependence, its ambitions to become a major aerospace power will remain grounded – quite literally – by the limits of imported thrust.