Chandigarh: Extended delays in developing the Indian Navy’s (IN’s) Twin Engine Deck-Based Fighter or TEDBF, alongside the impending retirement of the operationally underperforming Russian MiG-29K/KUB fleet, are likely to compel it to import an additional 31 Dassault Rafale-M aircraft, according to a series of recent French and local media reports, citing unnamed defence officials.If realised, this prospective procurement would, once again, underscore the persistent gap between India’s defence ambitions and its industrial ability to plug critical operational shortfalls through imports. It would also mark yet another instance where so-called “intermediate” or “stopgap” acquisitions – often presented as quick fixes to compensate for slow or faltering indigenous programmes – entrench themselves as long-term dependencies.Originally scheduled for its maiden flight in 2026, followed by series production from 2029 to 2030, the TEDBF – envisioned as the future backbone of the IN’s aircraft carrier aviation – has seen its timelines slip significantly. Revised projections suggest prototype testing will likely be pushed into the early 2030s, with full-scale production unlikely before 2038 and possibly extending into the following decade. Even thereafter, it will take several years to fully equip carrier squadrons, leaving the IN with a prolonged shortfall in its carrier-borne fighter arm, thereby further forcing reliance on imported aircraft, like the Rafale-M.This constraint is further exacerbated by the projected retirement of the IN’s existing fleet of MiG-29K/KUB fighters by 2034-35, which have long been beset by technical deficiencies and low serviceability, leaving the carrier air arm increasingly stretched and vulnerable in the interim. Delivered between 2009 and 2017, 45 of these fighters – five of which have been lost in accidents – have consistently failed to deliver payloads at full range, suffered frequent engine failures, and necessitated extensive and near-constant maintenance.CAG had flagged structural and operational shortcomingsInvestigations by the government watchdog Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in July 2016 had flagged structural and operational shortcomings – including airframe, engine, and fly-by-wire issues – which continue to compromise these platforms. The CAG further revealed that fighter availability between 2014 and 2016 ranged between 16% and 38%, with multiple instances of single-engine landings. Many fighters also required extensive post-landing repairs repeatedly due to deck-induced stress, stated its report tabled in parliament.Against this backdrop of the delayed TEDBF and a faltering MIG-29K/KUB legacy fleet, the reported move to acquire 31 more Rafale-M fighters – beyond the 26 already contracted in early 2023 for Rs 63,000 crore – potentially reflects a growing reliance on interim imports to sustain the IN’s carrier-based air arm.The IN’s official spokesman, however, declined to comment on these reports.Yet, should this procurement materialise, as it just might say industry sources, the IN’s Rafale-M fleet would rise to 57 –ironically mirroring its 2017 requirement, as reflected in its global Request for Information (RfI), for a similar number of Multi-Role Carrier Borne Fighters (MRCBF) to augment operational capability. And, when combined with the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) 36 Rafales, whose deliveries were completed by late 2022, India’s total fleet of this French fighter type could then reach 93 platforms.Moreover, building on this fleet composition, the IAF’s Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme aims to further expand its Rafale numbers. In February 2026, the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), chaired by Rajnath Singh, granted Acceptance of Necessity (AoN), a formal approval necessary to proceed with major defence acquisitions, for the IAF’s proposed acquisition of 114 Rafales under the MRFA project.Valued at around Rs 3.25 lakh crore – or over $40 billion – the programme envisages substantial domestic production, with about 80% of the fighters manufactured locally and an intended indigenous content of around 60%. If realised, India’s overall Rafale fleet would rise to 207, significantly deepening platform commonality across the IN and the IAF.Meanwhile, like several other domestic Atmanirbhar or indigenous defence programmes – where intent routinely outpaces capacity – the proposed supplementary Rafale-M buy, if approved, will echo a familiar pattern: early assurances of self-reliance giving way to delay, dilution, and shortfalls, leaving operational fissures that imports are then required to bridge.Such an enduring trend is underscored by recent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data, which ranks India as the world’s second-largest materiel importer, after war-torn Ukraine, accounting for around 8.2 % of global acquisitions between 2021 and 2025, despite its much-vaunted Atmanirbhar initiatives over the past decade.The IN’s doubts concerning indigenous carrier fighter development are long-standing. In 2016, the IN formally rejected the single-engine naval variant of the IAF’s Light Combat Aircraft- Navy (LCA-N) developed by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), declaring it was “not up to the mark” and incapable of meeting the force’s operational requirements.Then Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sunil Lanba made it clear at his annual presser that the overweight aircraft, which conducted its maiden test flight in 2012, did not adequately fulfil the thrust-to-weight ratio that prevented it from operating effectively off carrier decks with meaningful fuel and weapons loads. The limitations, he stressed, were fundamental, not incremental and operationally un-negotiable.That rejection effectively set the IN on an import trajectory, with Adm Lanba acknowledging that viable global options were limited but necessary in addition to signalling the intent to procure a carrier-capable fighter within a five-to-six-year timeframe. In the meantime, for reasons that remain unclear–beyond possible MoD pressure – the IN continued to extend technical and financial support to the ADA’s LCA-N programme, in what appeared less an expression of operational confidence than merely a gesture of institutional continuity.Soon after, the commissioning, in September 2022, of the indigenously designed and built INS Vikrant, the 40,000 tonne short take-off barrier arrested recovery (STOBAR)-six years behind schedule and after multiple cost revisions–was celebrated nationally as a milestone of India’s naval ambitions. But this triumph was short-lived as the carrier had entered service without an air arm.For a platform designed around air power, this was no minor oversight; for, without an embarked fighter squadron, Vikrant’s ability to project power, conduct air defence, or execute strike missions, was effectively nil; the carrier could sail, launch helicopters, and serve as a symbol of indigenous capability and display the tricolour at sea, but its core role as an aircraft carrier remained completely circumscribed.To mitigate this gap, the IN was forced into hastily adapting its inadequate MiG‑29K/KUB fleet to operate from Vikrant, despite their chronic operational inadequacies; but these fighters were never intended as a permanent solution. Ultimately, after frantically evaluating global alternatives, including the USA’s Boeing F/A-18 ‘Super Hornet’s, the IN opted in July 2023 to acquire 26 Rafale-M’s- 22 single-seat and four dual-seat trainers–albeit 31 less than the 57 MRCBF it had intended to acquire six years earlier. The IN aimed to make up this fighter deficit with the TEDBF, which then, in 2022-23, was projected to go into production by 2029.This embarrassing and jarring lapse in Vikrant’s yet-to-be-established air arm prompted former IN Chief of Staff Admiral Arun Prakash to acerbically note that, in India’s “typically disjointed decision-making process,” fighter selection for Vikrant had become “delinked” from the carrier project itself.“We knew the ship was likely to be commissioned this year,” he told Reuters in August 2022, “and hence the selection process and negotiations for the fighter should have started well in time–perhaps three to four years earlier.” Other commentators similarly observed that commissioning a carrier without fighters starkly illustrated how strategic ambition, bureaucratic delays, and procurement setbacks transformed a celebrated milestone like Vikrant into an operationally hollow achievement.Seen in this context, the prospective expansion of Rafale-M numbers is not an isolated procurement decision. The fighter had emerged as a proven carrier-borne platform, offering relatively rapid induction timelines – compared to the TEDBF – in addition to benefiting from logistical and training commonality with the IAF’s Rafale fleet. Besides, expanding its numbers would help ensure that the IN’s two carriers – Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya – remained operationally credible in an increasingly contested maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).A deeper structural flaw in India’s defence planningThis unfolding episode also underscores a deeper structural flaw in India’s defence planning: a persistent disconnect between projection and delivery. Indigenous defence programmes are routinely over-exaggerated in scope, but routinely diluted by weak execution, interminably extended deadlines and continually shifting qualitative specifications.The result is consequently predictable as development lags and operational pressures mount: India’s armed forces are compelled to fall back on proven foreign platforms to sustain operational readiness, entrenching a cycle of imports that undermines the very essence of ersatz self-reliance.Veteran navalists have pointed out that carriers cannot wait for future aircraft – they require effective air wings now, with fighters capable of fulfilling their core role as instruments of maritime force projection, which often means interim imports that quietly become permanent. If the TEDBF programme continues to slip, as it appears to, the Rafale-M could shift from a stopgap to a mainstay. And, that, without doubt, would represent the real failure: the system’s inability to achieve genuine self-reliance, despite relentless government and media emphasis on securing Atmanirbhar Bharat.